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During the last twenty years the mutual fund industry has experienced enormous growth. 
While in 1996 assets under management in US domestic equity funds totaled to only $1.44 
trillion, this number meanwhile has increased almost fivefold to over $6.41 trillion in 2016.
1
  
This increasing popularity among investors seems surprising as academics have 
repeatedly questioned the superiority of actively managed funds over passive investment 
strategies like ETFs. Starting with Jensen (1968), the general consensus is that the average 
fund manager portfolio tends to underperform passive benchmarks, especially after expenses 
and fees are deducted. Gruber (1996) analyzes a period between 1985 and 1994 and quantifies 
this underperformance as about 65 basis points per year. Carhart (1997) as well observes a 
negative correlation between active trading and a fund’s benchmark-adjusted net return to 
investors. All of these studies draw a rather negative picture of the stock picking skill of 
mutual fund managers and conclude that investors are better off investing in low-expense 
index funds.  
However lately, this harsh judgment has been at least partly mitigated by several more 
recent studies, which argue that the factor models that had been applied in previous studies, 
might not have been powerful enough to detect stock picking skill. They suggest a different 
approach and examine the performance of the individual stocks in the portfolio. These 
studies, e.g. Daniel et al (1997), Chen et al. (2000), and Wermers (2000), analyze the 
performance of the single trades in the portfolio and contradict prior findings as they find that 
these trades outperform their benchmark, at least before any expenses are deducted. Thus, 
                                                 
1 cf. Investment Company Institute 2017. 
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these more recent studies provide a more encouraging picture of mutual fund managers. 
However, while these studies find that the average mutual fund delivers an outperformance of 
gross returns, but still no outperformance of net fees, they cannot fully explain the popularity 
of actively managed mutual funds. For this reason, it remains interesting to ask, why investors 
keep trusting the ability of mutual fund managers to invest their money.  
One possible explanation might be that every investor is likely to think that he has 
picked a fund that will outperform the average fund. This confidence might be the reason why 
investors are not concerned that studies have not detected an outperformance of funds on 
average. The desire to find the most skilled and most talented manager that can outperform 
the benchmark, is understandable and is worth being investigated. Therefore, research that 
focuses on metrics which are able to detect the above-average fund manager is widespread in 
literature. This dissertation contributes to this stream of literature as well. Since Chordia 
(1996), Edelen (1999), Nanda et al. (2000) and Alexander et al. (2007) it is well known that 
not every trade a manager makes is voluntary and based on valuation. Studies about stock 
picking skill are therefore negatively biased as a certain amount of trades are solely done to 
provide liquidity for investors. For this reason, this dissertation presents an approach to 
distinguish liquidity-motivated and valuation-motivated trades. This enables investors to 
retain a more precise measure of stock picking skill, which can be used to improve the 
forecasts of future fund performance.  
A further possible explanation for the popularity of actively managed funds might be 
that investors think fund managers can better anticipate and prepare for major social and 
macro-economic upheavals. To contribute to this question, this dissertation investigates how 
fund managers handle and deal with one of the next future challenges for investors - the 
carbon risk. Carbon risk is a company’s risk of decreasing future cashflows as the emission of 
carbon becomes more expensive and regulated to meet the climate goals set forth in Paris 
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(2015). For this reason, it is interesting to investigate whether fund managers are good at 
anticipating this type of challenge, in which case it would justify the investment in their 
actively managed funds. 
The dissertation is divided into two parts and structured as follows. Chapter II presents 
the innovative approach which enables researchers and investors to measure stock picking 
skill more precisely than in existing literature. This helps investors to choose actively 
managed funds that are more likely to beat their benchmark. Chapter III and chapter IV are 
about carbon risk. While chapter III provides an overview of the distribution of carbon risk 
among the different investor categories like hedge funds, mutual funds and governments etc., 
chapter IV explicitly investigates how mutual fund managers deal with it. The last chapter V 
sums up the results of this dissertation, shows some limitations and gives an understanding of 
research ideas that might be relevant in the future based on the insights provided in this 
dissertation. The rest of chapter I ends with the following brief summaries of the research 
articles provided in this dissertation. 
 
1.2 Overview of papers included 
Paper title Co-authors Journal Date 
Mutual fund stock picking skill: New 
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WP, University of Augsburg 
 
2017 
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1.2.1 Article I - Mutual fund stock picking skill: New evidence from valuation- versus 
liquidity-motivated trading 
If one wants to fairly assess the stock picking skill of a fund manager, it is important to 
consider the fact that not every trade of a manager is executed based on valuation. A 
considerable portion of trades are forced and flow-induced and thus only performed to 
provide liquidity as investors redeem their money or to work off new inflow even if there is 
no new investment idea. As such trades are triggered by external factors, they should not be 
included in the assessment of a manager’s stock picking skill. 
To deal with this problem and to provide a more precise measure of stock picking 
skill, we propose in the first article of this dissertation a novel Trade Motivation Matrix 
(TMM) that allows differentiating mutual funds’ valuation-motivated (VM) and liquidity-
motivated (LM) trades on single trade level. Analyzing over 4.7 million trades of a sample of 
3,802 actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds between 2003 and 2012, we find that 
valuation-motivated trades significantly outperform liquidity-motivated trades and thus 
confirm and quantify the adverse effect of flow. Additionally, we show that valuation-
motivated trades do outperform the market and thus provide clear evidence that managers 
have stock picking skill on average. Besides we find that this more precise measure can be 
used to pick stocks and funds that are more likely to outperform in the future.  




 climate conference in Paris (2015) set itself the goal to keep the increase of global 
average temperature well below 2°C in comparison to pre-industrial levels. To reach this goal, 
regulatory requirements will tighten and companies must pay for allowances to emit carbon 
emissions. Companies that have high carbon emissions within their value chain are likely to 
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face decreasing future cash flows. However, this will not only pose a challenge for the 
companies involved. Investors with exposure to such companies will be equally affected. 
This study aims to thoroughly investigate how the ownership of carbon intensive 
stocks is distributed among the different investor types. To identify high-polluting stocks we 
provide a classification of stocks based on three different categories related to industry 
sectors, carbon footprints, and environmental scores. We use data from 2000 to 2015 to 
compare the attitude of different investor types towards investments in carbon intensive 
stocks. We find that institutional investors, hedge funds, individuals, investment advisors and 
mutual funds tend to hold less carbon polluting firms in their investment portfolios. 
Interestingly, in contrast, government agencies seem to have a higher exposure to carbon 
intensive stocks in their portfolios and typically also hold a high percentage of the total 
market capitalization of these firms. Thus, this study builds the foundation for a better 
understanding of the exposure to carbon intensive stocks for various investor types but also 
illustrates which parties have the ability to influence the environmental behavior of CO2-
emitting firms, e.g. by exhibiting voting rights. 
1.2.3 Article III - About carbon risk exposure in mutual funds - New evidence from 
mutual fund holdings 
The next article deals with carbon risk as well. However, this study explicitly focuses on 
actively managed US domestic open-end mutual equity funds. The study is the first to link the 
implication and meaning of carbon risk to the behavior of mutual fund managers. 
Investigating fund holdings of 702 mutual funds between 2007 and 2014, the article deals 
with the following research questions: How do stocks from carbon intensive industries differ 
from non-carbon intensive industries? How do the worst emitters within a carbon intensive 
industry differ from the lowest emitters? How did the fund manager’s carbon risk exposure 
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vary over time? What fraction of market capitalization of carbon risk stocks is owned by the 
mutual fund industry? Besides, it identifies funds that are exposed to particular high carbon 
risk and funds that already have started to divest. Furthermore, the study investigates the 
relation between carbon risk and a manager’s performance and risk. Here the study reveals 
that funds that structure their portfolio towards low emitter stocks generate more risk-adjusted 
performance and have less risk. Thus, this study helps investors and policy makers to get a 
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2 Article I: Mutual fund stock picking skill: New evidence from valuation- versus 
liquidity-motivated trading 
 
Martin Rohleder, Dominik Schulte, Janik Syryca, and Marco Wilkens 
 
Abstract. We propose a novel Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM) that allows differentiating 
mutual funds’ valuation-motivated (VM) and liquidity-motivated (LM) trades on single trade 
level. It thus enables analyses of stock picking skill on three levels: trade, stock and fund. On 
trade level, we find significant outperformance of VM buys and significant underperformance 
of VM sells indicating manager stock picking skills, especially during illiquid market periods. 
VM trades outperform LM trades confirming negative performance effects due to flow risk, 
especially when market liquidity is low. On stock level, VM trades capture size, value, 
liquidity and market risk premiums. LM trades are related to stock momentum. VM trading in 
specific stocks explains future stock returns. On fund level, higher VM trading is related to 
higher future fund alpha, especially during illiquid times.  
JEL Classification G11, G20, G23 






When assessing the stock picking skill of professional investors such as mutual funds it is of 
vital importance to distinguish valuation-motivated (VM) trades from liquidity-motivated 
(LM) trades. Only trades based on valuations allow judging managers’ stock picking skill 
while forced trades based on fund holders’ liquidity demands may be thought of as noise 
trading and do not represent skill (e.g., Edelen, 1999). In this paper, we propose a novel 
approach, the Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM), which is the first to differentiate between 
single (holdings-based) VM and LM trades. With the TMM it is therefore possible to run 
analyses on three different levels: individual trades, individual stocks and individual funds, 
whereas previous research remains on an aggregated trade level (e.g., Alexander et al., 2007). 
Thus, our model enables more precise measurement of stock picking skill and of the costs of 
liquidity provision to fund investors due to flow risk (e.g., Rakowski, 2010), a very relevant 
matter that the SEC recently turned their attention to.
2
 Moreover, it allows investigating 
which stocks are traded based on VM and LM and whether funds’ VM trading is related to 
future stock and fund performance. 
Applying the TMM to a sample of over 4.7 million trades results in several 
contributions. First, on trade level, we contribute to the literature on stock picking skill by 
finding that VM buys have on average higher returns and VM sells have significantly lower 
returns than their respective benchmarks, consistent with stock picking skill. By conducting 
this analysis during different market liquidity regimes, we additionally contribute to the 
literature on market efficiency showing that VM trading decisions are more successful during 
times of low market liquidity. Lower market efficiency during such times (e.g., Chordia et al., 
2008, 2011) increases pricing heterogeneity and consequentially creates more opportunities 




for VM trading (e.g., Sadka and Scherbina, 2007; Dong et al., 2014; Pástor et al., 2015b). It is 
also consistent with the finding that manager skill is time-varying and depends on the 
economic conditions (e.g., Kacperzyk et al., 2014).  
Second, we are the first to consider different benchmark universes to measure trade 
performance. Specifically, we use all CRSP stocks to measure trade performance relative to 
stocks with similar characteristics (e.g., Daniel et al., 1997, henceforth DGTW). However, for 
sells this assumes unrestricted short selling, which is not allowed by the SEC and therefore 
seldom done (e.g., Chen et al., 2013). Therefore, we alternatively use the respective fund’s 
holdings at the time of the trade to measure if trades improve portfolio quality. With this 
distinction, we are the first to show specifically that funds’ VM trades overall improve 
portfolio quality while LM trades do not.  
Third, we contribute to the literature on flow risk as the TMM facilitates a more 
detailed analysis of funds’ LM trading compared to previous research. Contrasting VM and 
LM trades clearly shows that funds are forced to make disadvantageous trading decisions if 
investors’ and managers’ investment strategies are not aligned. This represents strong 
empirical evidence that mutual fund performance suffers significantly from investor-induced 
flow risk. It also indicates that previous trade-based approaches to measuring skill are biased 
by LM trading. In analyses during different liquidity regimes, we show that this adverse effect 
of investor flows also worsens during illiquid times.  
Fourth, on stock level, we contribute to the general understanding of fund manager’s 
trading preferences. Specifically, the TMM allows detailed analyses of the characteristics of 
stocks traded by mutual fund managers based on VM and LM. We show that with their VM 
buys fund managers prefer smaller over bigger companies and value over growth stocks, i.e. 
fund managers chasing size and value premiums (e.g., Fama and French, 1993). Moreover, if 
funds have a clear valuation, they are prepared to accept higher market risk exposure as well 
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as higher illiquidity risk, even during times of low market liquidity. If managers are forced to 
trade without clear valuations (LM buys and sells), they prefer to engage in momentum 
trading (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Carhart, 1997), sell very liquid stocks and reduce 
risk with their LM sells.  
Fifth, we find that the collective VM trading decisions of mutual funds in single 
stocks, i.e. the ratio of VM buys (sells) and all buys (sells) in a specific stock during a certain 
quarter, represents wisdom of the fund manager crowd (e.g., Chalmers et al., 2013; Jiang et 
al., 2014; Sias et al., 2016). Specifically, we show that stock-specific VM buying ratios are 
significantly related to positive future stock performance over horizons at least up to 12 
months, while VM selling ratios are significantly related to negative future stock 
performance. 
Sixth, on fund level, we contribute to the literature on differences between mutual 
funds by analyzing the fund characteristics associated with a higher degree of VM trading, i.e. 
the ratio of VM trades to all trades by a fund during a certain quarter. We show that inflows 
and higher cash increase buying discretion, while outflows and low cash decrease buying 
discretion (e.g., Simutin, 2014). Moreover, younger and smaller funds have higher buying 
discretion, consistent with the prior literature on diseconomies of scale (e.g., Chen et al., 
2004; Berk and Green, 2004; Pollet and Wilson, 2008; Pastor et al., 2015). Fee structures such 
as expense ratios and load fees have no effect on the degree of VM trading. Turnover as a 
measure of overall trading is positively related to VM trading, consistent with Pastor et al. 
(2016).  
Seventh, we show that a higher degree of VM trading is significantly related to funds’ 
future Carhart (1997) alpha and thus translates directly into benefits for investors, especially 
during illiquid market periods. It also confirms our previous finding that stock picking skill is 
valuable primarily in periods with low market efficiency and high valuation uncertainty. 
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Our work is thus related to various popular streams of mutual fund research. The flow-
performance relation and the potentially adverse effect of investor flows on the discretion of 
open-end mutual fund managers, i.e. flow risk, was first empirically investigated by Edelen 
(1999). He finds that the general underperformance of actively managed funds compared to 
passive alternatives can partly be explained by flow-induced LM trading. Dubofsky (2010) as 
well as Fulkerson and Riley (2015) confirm the strong relation between investor gross flows 
and aggregated mutual fund trading during later periods.
3
 Therefore, the SEC recently turned 
their attention to flow risk and mutual fund liquidity, considering new regulation to protect 
buy-and-hold investors from negative effects of LM trading caused by purchasing and 
redeeming investors (e.g., Hanouna et al, 2015). Within this literature, the TMM builds 
particularly on the study by Pollet and Wilson (2008) who investigate mutual fund behavior in 
reaction to growth. They argue that mutual funds may react to investor flows by means of two 
alternative strategies: scaling and diversification. On the one hand, a manager without new 
investment ideas or valuations uses investor flows to scale her existing holdings, thereby 
maintaining her old portfolio allocation. On the other hand, a manager possessing new 
investment ideas and valuations may utilize investor flows to alter her allocation and to invest 
in new stocks. 
The TMM is also related to the fund trading literature which attempts to assess 
manager performance directly from the success of buying and selling decisions. The first to 
use such an approach are Grinblatt and Titman (1993) who show a significantly positive 
covariance between mutual fund holdings-weight changes and subsequent stock returns based 
on quarterly holdings.
4
 Chen et al. (2000) use quarterly holdings and DGTW benchmark-
                                                 
3 Further empirical studies confirming the existence of flow risk are, e.g., Coval and Staffort (2007), Frino et al. 
(2009), Cherkes et al. (2009), Rakowski (2010) and Rohleder et al. (2015). 
4 There are studies using actual mutual fund trades from the Abel Noser Corp. ANCERNO database (e.g., 
Puckett and Yan, 2011; Anand et al., 2012; Eisele et al. 2015; Busse et al., 2015). However, this database 
13 
 
adjusted stock returns and find that stocks bought by mutual funds significantly outperform 
stocks sold.
5
 Using the same approach, Dyakov et al. (2015) report that the informational 
advantage leading to this pattern turned negative after 2001. However, none of these studies 
consider trade motivation and thereby potentially underestimate skill. Moreover, these studies 
do not consider different benchmark universes for trades and thus cannot assess the trades’ 
effects on portfolio quality. 
Alexander et al. (2007) are the first to infer trade motivation from the direction and 
size of trades and flows. Aggregating single trades to portfolios, they show that a higher 
probability of VM trading results in higher trade performance. However, our methodology is 
distinctively different to theirs and fixes some of its limitations. We therefore explicitly 




Another approach to consider trading motivation is provided by Da et al. (2011) who 
derive fund level motivation from the traded stocks’ probability of informed trading (PIN). 
They find that mutual funds trading high PIN stocks outperform funds trading low PIN 
stocks. However, as they use aggregated trades their analyses remain on the portfolio level. In 
contrast, by assigning motivation directly to each single trade, the TMM allows additional 
analyses on single trades and single stocks.  
                                                                                                                                                        
includes only 8% of total trading volume in US stocks and 10% of total trading volume by US domestic equity 
funds. Thus, this data is very valuable for specific types of studies like those studying the transaction costs of 
mutual funds (Busse et al., 2015), but inadequate for large scale studies on the mutual fund universe. 
5 Further studies using holdings-based mutual fund trades include Pinnuck (2003), Baker et al. (2010), Cullen et 
al. (2010), Brown et al. (2014) and Wei et al. (2014). 
6 Another approach to considering trade motivation is provided by Da et al. (2011) who derive fund level 
motivation from the traded stocks’ probability of informed trading (PIN, Easley et al., 1996).  
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We proceed as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM) in 
detail and explains how we measure trade performance against different benchmark universes. 
Additionally it distinguishes our model from previous approaches. Section 2.3 describes the 
data. Section 2.4 presents our empirical analysis on trade level, Section 2.5 on stock level and 
Section 2.6 on fund level. Section 2.7 presents robustness checks and further tests. Section 2.8 
concludes.  
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 The Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM) 
To assign each single mutual fund trade to one of the four categories of the TMM, we 
combine two intuitive measures: trade direction and weight change.  
Figure 1: The Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM) 
   
 Weight change in the 
direction of the trade 
No weight change in the 
direction of the trade 
Buy  VM buy LM buy 
   
Sell  VM sell LM sell 
 
As shown in Figure 1, we first categorize trades into buys and sells.
7
 Following the related 
literature (e.g., Chen et al., 2000; Pinnuk, 2003; ACG; Dyakov et al., 2016), fund i’s trade in 
stock j = 1, … N between quarterly holdings reports in q–1 and q is given by Eq. (1): 
 tradei,j,q = sharesi,j,q – sharesi,j,q–1, (1) 
                                                 
7 In addition to VM and LM, funds may also trade due to tax motives (e.g., Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002) or 
for window dressing (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2014). We address those in section 7.3. 
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where sharesi,j,q is the split and corporate action-adjusted number of shares that fund i holds in 
stock j at time q. A positive trade represents a buy while a negative trade represents a sell. 
Then, we consider the weight change of stock j in fund i caused by a trade (e.g., 
Grinblatt and Titman, 1993). Specifically, we define weight change as the difference between 
the actual portfolio weight of stock j at time q and the hypothetical benchmark weight of stock 
j that would have occurred if the fund had not traded between times q–1 and q except for 
direct reinvestment of dividends.
8
 The assumption underlying the hypothetical benchmark 
portfolio is that each holdings report represents the fund manager’s efficient portfolio 
allocation and is based on her current valuations. If these do not change, the allocation should 
not change. Thus, the TMM should only consider weight changes if the manager’s valuations 
are updated. Further, we include cash as a separate asset N+1 to control for funds managing 
investor flows using cash as a buffer (e.g., Simutin 2010 and 2014). Weight change is thus 
calculated as shown in Eq. (2) where Pj,q is the price of stock j at time q and 𝑟𝑗,𝑞
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 is the total 
return of stock j from q–1 to q including dividends.
9
 












                                                 
8 The majority of dividends and other distributions obtained by mutual funds is usually directly reinvested into 
the fund. If the manager invests the dividends directly into the same stocks, this does not present a new 
investment idea and is thus identified by the TMM as an LM buy. If the manager invests the dividend into a 
different stock, the TMM identifies this as a VM buy. In unreported robustness tests, we abstract from the 
assumption, obtaining economically similar results. 
9 The intuitive way to consider direct reinvestment of dividends in the hypothetical benchmark portfolio is to 







. Here Dj,t is the 
dollar amount of dividends paid per stock j at time t. This amount is instantaneously reinvested into shares of 
stock j at its price ex dividends 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝐷. However, instead of considering the exact timing of t, we employ the total 
return conveniently provided by CRSP.  
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If a fund manager possesses a positive (negative) valuation regarding a stock, she will 
increase (decrease) its weight in her portfolio. Hence, valuation-motivated buys (VM buy) are 
trades where a buy in stock j leads to an increase of its portfolio weight. Similarly, valuation-
motivated sells (VM sell) are trades where a sell transaction in stock j leads to a decrease in 
its portfolio weight. Both VM trade categories can occur during times of inflow and outflow. 
VM buyi,j,q  = 1   if    tradei,j,q > 0   &   weight changei,j,q > 0  (3a) 
VM selli,j,q  = 1   if    tradei,j,q < 0   &   weight changei,j,q < 0  (3b) 
Conversely, if the fund manager has no valuation, Pollet and Wilson (2008) argue that 
inflowing money is allocated by simply upscaling existing portfolio holdings. Since these 
trades lack a clear investment idea we consider them to be liquidity-motivated buys (LM 
buy). The same holds for disproportionately small buys in times of inflow, resulting in a 
decrease of stock j’s portfolio weight.
10
   
LM buyi,j,q  = 1   if    tradei,j,q > 0   &   weight changei,j,q ≤ 0 (3c) 
Similarly, we argue that sell transactions that simply downscale existing portfolio holdings in 
times of outflows without considerably changing portfolio weights lack clear valuation-
motivation and are thus defined as liquidity-motivated sells (LM sell). The same holds for 
sells in times of outflow that are so small in comparison to other sells that they result in an 
increase of the portfolio weight of stock j.  
LM selli,j,q  = 1   if    tradei,j,q < 0   &   weight changei,j,q ≥ 0 (3d) 
 
                                                 
10 To test against misclassifications due to imperfect scaling that can arise because only integer numbers of 
stocks can be sold or bought, we provide some robustness tests in section 7.2. 
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2.2.2 Measuring trade performance against different benchmark universes 
To measure the stock picking performance of mutual fund trades, we use an approach similar 
to Chen et al. (2000) and calculate the stocks’ cumulative monthly characteristics-based 
benchmark-adjusted return in the spirit of the DGTW “characteristics selectivity (CS)” 
measure. Specifically, we measure the cumulative DGTW-adjusted return of the trade, 
assuming the respective stocks are held over the subsequent 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. 
Further, we consider different benchmark universes for different trade categories. As 
in the classic DGTW approach, we (i) use all CRSP stocks assuming that funds may freely 
choose from this benchmark universe. A positive buy trade performance thus indicates that 
managers buy stocks which subsequently outperform other stocks with similar stock 
characteristics with regard to firm size, book-to-market ratio and momentum. Similarly, a 
negative sell trade indicates that managers buy stocks which subsequently underperform other 
stocks with similar characteristics. Both are consistent with stock superior stock picking skill. 
However, for sells such an approach assumes unrestricted short selling. Taking into account 
that short selling is strictly regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 and thus 
seldom used by mutual funds (e.g., Chen et al., 2013), we use as an alternative universe (ii) 
only the stocks held by the fund at the time of the trade. Specifically, we measure 
performance of single trades against the equal-weighted DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns 
of all stocks held by the respective fund at time q–1. A positive buy performance thus 
indicates that the stock outperforms the average stock held by the fund and thus improves 
portfolio quality. A negative sell performance similarly indicates that a manager sells a stock 
that subsequently underperforms the average stock she keeps in the portfolio, also consistent 
with improved portfolio quality. In addition, we present results where we measure all trades 
against their respective relevant universes, i.e. buys against all CRSP stocks and sells against 
the funds’ holdings. 
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2.2.3 Advantages of the TMM over previous approaches 
The approach which is closest to ours is developed by Alexander, Cici and Gibson (2007), 
hereafter ACG. They derive degrees of VM trading from the direction and size of trades and 
flows. Aggregating single trades to portfolios, they show that a higher probability of VM 
trading results in higher trade performance. Specifically, in each period, they aggregate the 
trade volume of all buys (sells) of a fund and the fund’s experienced flow to build a BF (SF) 
portfolio. Then, motivation is assigned to BFs (SFs) by sorting them into quintiles within the 
fund over time. While this approach is also very intuitive, it has some differences and 
disadvantages in comparison to the TMM. 
The first difference is that ACG requires a fund to have a very long reporting history 
to provide reliable results. To be able to have all BF and SF quintiles occupied, a minimum of 
six consecutive holdings reports per fund are required (5+1 starting point). Having all 
quintiles balanced (to reduce noise) even requires integer multiples of this number. In 
contrast, TMM can be applied for every two consecutive reported fund quarters. As a result, 
the lower data requirement of the TMM reduces incubation and survivorship bias, allows 
more timely analysis and is the only alternative to assess funds that are either new or from 
countries with low reporting availability. 
The second important difference is that sorting BFs and SFs into quintiles following 
ACG assumes that each fund makes as many VM trades (BF1 and SF1) as it makes LM trades 
(BF5 and SF5). However, this is very unlikely the case due to differential skill in the cross-
section of mutual funds (Fama and French, 2010) and because funds face differential levels of 
flow risk (Rakowski, 2010; Rohleder et al., 2017). For example, consider a fund with a skilled 
manager who is excellent at flow risk management or faces overall low flow risk. It is safe to 
assume that this fund performs more VM trades than LM trades. The TMM adequately 





 Consider another fund which is unskilled and faces high flow risk. According to 
the TMM, this fund may have many LM trades and only few VM trades. According to ACG, 
it performs 20% VM trades and 20% LM trades. Thus, by construction, the ACG may 
mechanically lead to false classifications. While we concede that the TMM may make some 
false classifications, too, we argue that they are not mechanical. In sections 7.1 and 7.2, we 
run robustness tests controlling for potential misclassifications by the TMM.  
Moreover, once assigned to, e.g., the BF1 quintile, all of the fund’s buys during that 
period are considered VM, while the TMM allows for VM and LM buys of the fund within 
the same period which may also be the more realistic case. Furthermore, the TMM allows for 
VM buys and VM sells during the same period. Conversely, with ACG, which conditions on 
the flow direction, a simultaneous occurrence of VM buys and VM sells is very unlikely by 
definition. However, especially during phases of high overall pricing heterogeneity we 
consider it very realistic that funds have over- and under-valuations of different stocks at the 
same time.  
In addition, due to the sorting approach, the ACG method may lead to unstable 
classifications of BFs and SFs into the quintiles when the sample period is extended, e.g. by 
incorporating new holdings reports, or shortened, e.g. for sub-period analyses. Conversely, 
the TMM results in a stable classification of trades independent of the sample period. Thus, 
we consider our TMM the more reliable method. 
Furthermore, the direct assignment of motivation to single trades by the TMM 
guarantees that 100% of the trades made by the sample funds over the sample period are 
considered. Conversely, ACG base their interpretations only on the extreme portfolios and 
thus ignore >90% of the trades. While one may argue that looking only at the extremes 
                                                 
11 4% each if we take into account that ACG additionally sort by trade size within the BFs and base all 
interpretations on the corner portfolios of the resulting 5x5-matrix. 
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reduces noise in motivation assignment, it does not allow for any conclusions regarding the 
average skill of mutual fund managers or regarding the profit and loss resulting from average 
mutual fund trading with different motivations. With the TMM this is possible.  
As a consequence of the direct assignment of motivation to single trades, the TMM 
facilitates further analyses on fund level as in Section 6 by utilizing, e.g., in each period the 
ratio of VM trades to overall trades. Here, a higher ratio may proxy for more investment 
ideas, higher skill or lower exposure to flow risk. Moreover, the variation of the ratio over 
time may be used to link fund behavior to macro influences such as market illiquidity and 
other economic or market crises. With the ACG method, similar analyses are not possible 
because for each fund in the cross-section the ratio of VM trades to overall trades is 20% by 
definition (respectively 4% when combined with trade size). Over time within the fund, the 
ratio may only be 1 or 0, and the assignment is dependent on the sample period also 
aggravating such analyses. 
The ACG puts more focus on a trade’s absolute trade volume while TMM attaches 
more attention to the trade’s weight change. This can result in different categorizations. 
Consider a fund manager who experiences high outflows and scales down the existing 
holdings to maintain her old allocation. Unless the fund holds an equal-weighted portfolio, 
some trades have a larger dollar volume than others. According to the TMM, all trades are 
clearly categorized as LM sells. According to ACG, larger trades will be assigned a higher 
probability of VM than smaller trades, despite both having no impact on portfolio 
composition. Overall, we therefore think that the TMM fixes some of the limitations of the 




Fund characteristics and information on mutual fund holdings are from the CRSP 
Survivorship-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database. As fund data from CRSP are mostly at the 
share class level, we aggregate them to fund level by value weighting with the respective total 
net assets (TNA) of each share class. Only TNA is exempt from this procedure, as it is 
defined as the sum of individual share class TNA. We only include funds that are listed as 
domestic equity style or cap based funds (EDY or EDC). We follow Amihud and Goyenko 
(2013) and exclude index funds by eliminating those with names containing words like index, 
‘S&P’, ‘Dow’, ‘WILSHIRE’, ‘RUSSELL’. We further exclude funds before they first surpass 
the threshold of 5 million in TNA as in Fama and French (2010). In line with Kacpercyk et al. 
(2008), we delete fund periods with less than 10 reported holdings as this is an indication of 
bad reporting quality.  
Information on stock returns and characteristics are obtained from the CRSP Stock 
Database and from Compustat. We include only equity holdings with share codes 10 and 11 
and delete all stocks with a price below $1. Following ACG, we account for stock splits when 
computing quarterly fund trades by using the cumulative adjustment factors from the CRSP 
stock return file. The final sample consists of 79,814 quarterly
12
 fund observations for 3,802 
active U.S. domestic equity funds in the period from 2003 to 2012. 
To measure the performance of stocks bought and sold by mutual funds, we use the 
returns of the DGTW characteristics-based benchmark portfolios developed by Daniel et al. 
                                                 
12 During our sample period, mutual funds are obliged to report portfolio holdings to the SEC on a quarterly 
basis. Empirically however, actual reporting frequencies deviate from strictly quarterly reports, even within 
individual funds, and may be as high as monthly or as low as semiannually in few cases. As the average time 
between reporting frequency is close to 3 months, we simplify by referring to reporting periods as quarterly. 
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(1997) and kindly provided by Russ Wermers.
13
 Further, we use the market liquidity factor 
from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) which is kindly provided on Lubos Pastor’s homepage.
14
 




Table I: Mutual fund characteristics 
This table presents pooled summary statistics of fund characteristics for 3,802 
actively managed US domestic equity funds in the period 2003-2012. 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Net excess return (% p.a.) 9.36 16.44 16.66 
Net Carhart alpha (% p.a.) -1.6879 -1.2136 4.7937 
TNA ($mil) 1,159.9 200.3 4,853.9 
Expense ratio (% TNA, p.a.) 1.20 1.17 0.45 
Max. front load (%) 2.96 3.77 2.43 
Max. rear load (%) 1.10 1.00 1.11 
Turnover ratio (% TNA, p.a.) 90.73 67.00 110.49 
Cash (% TNA) 3.19 1.79 6.16 
Age (years) 12.9 10.3 10.8 
Net flow (% TNA) 0.66 -0.74 9.89 
Abs. net flow (% TNA) 5.42 2.56 8.31 
 
Table I displays descriptive statistics of the fund characteristics in our sample of 3,802 
funds. Overall, the statistics are in line with previous mutual fund research. Especially 
important for our analysis are the cash positions of funds, as these may serve as a potential 
liquidity buffer. On average, funds hold 3.19% of their TNA in cash, however there is 
substantial variation in the cross section indicated by the standard deviation of 6.16%. This is 
consistent with statistics in Simutin (2014) and Hanouna et al. (2015). Even more importantly, 
                                                 
13 We thank Russ Wermers for providing the data. For details on benchmark construction, please refer to Daniel 
et al. (1997) and Wermers (2004). http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.html.  
14 We thank Lubos Pastor for providing the data. For details on factor construction, please refer to Pastor and 
Stambough (2003). http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research/. 
15 We thank Kenneth R. French for providing the data. For details on benchmark construction, please refer to 
Fama and French (1993) and http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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the funds in our sample experience substantial investor flows with absolute monthly net 
percentage flows of about 5.42% of TNA on average. Over the period 2003-2012, the funds 
experience monthly net inflows of 0.66% of TNA on average, while the median represents an 
outflow of -0.74% of TNA, indicating that a few funds experienced extreme inflows.  
Table II: Fund stock holdings 
This table provides year-end summary statistics on stock holdings of 3,802 actively managed US domestic equity 
funds in the period 2003-2011. It contains statistics on all stocks with available returns over the following 12 
months. 
Year Funds 
Stocks held by 
all funds 
Mean number of stocks per fund and quarter 
Held Bought Sold 
2003 1,747 3,935 82 58 26 
2004 1,658 3,806 108 96 54 
2005 1,711 3,657 114 91 50 
2006 1,731 3,631 83 105 54 
2007 2,020 3,474 86 123 61 
2008 2,326 3,129 125 110 78 
2009 2,232 3,274 180 108 72 
2010 2,876 3,152 199 90 69 
2011 2,876 3,122 221 96 76 
      
Average 2,131 3,464 133 98 60 
Total 3,802 5,246 3,368,497 2,458,616 2,277,088 
 
Table II provides year-end summary statistics on the funds’ stock holdings. Overall, funds 
report holdings in 5,246 distinct stocks over our sample period, which makes up a substantial 
portion of all stocks available in the CRSP stock database.  
Table III: TMM sorting 
This table displays numbers (N) and fractions (%) of trades 
sorted into valuation-motivated buys (VM buys), liquidity-
motivated buys (LM buys), valuation-motivated sells (VM 
sells) and liquidity-motivated sells (LM sells) according to the 
Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM). 
 N in % 
All Trades 4,735,704 100.00 
  Buys 2,458,616 51.92 
    VM buys 1,710,743 36.12 
    LM buys 747,873 15.79 
  Sells 2,277,088 48.08 
    VM sells 2,111,743 44.59 
    LM Sells 165,345 3.49 
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Table III illustrates the number of trades assigned to the different categories according to the 
TMM. Our sample includes more than 4.7 million trades. 52% of these trades are buys and 
48% are sells. 36% of all trades are VM buys, 16% are LM buys, 45% are VM sells and only 
3.5% of all trades are LM sells.
16
 As a rough comparison, Edelen (1999, Table 3) reports that 
29% of the buying volume and 27% of the selling volume was liquidity-motivated during the 
late 1980s, documenting high flow risk. This effect seems to decrease over time as Dubofsky 
(2010, Table 3) reports that 13.2% of the buying volume and 7.5% of the selling volume was 
liquidity-motivated in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, our fractions of 16% LM buys 
and 3.5% LM sells for 2003 to 2012 are in line with the related literature. Involuntary noise 
trading is thus more prevalent in buys than in sells, as the number of LM buys is nearly five 
times the number of LM sells.  
2.4 Trade level analysis 
2.4.1 Mutual fund stock picking skill and the costs of liquidity provision 
In this section, we analyze the performance of single trades regarding the existence of stock 
picking skill and flow risk. Whether mutual fund managers are skilled should show most 
prominently in their VM trading activities. Hence, we argue that if managers exhibit 
significant stock picking skills, their VM buys should subsequently outperform and their VM 
sells should underperform. If, on the other hand, mutual fund managers possess no stock 
picking skill, there should be no significant outperformance of VM buys and no significant 
underperformance of VM sells.  
Panel A of Table IV presents pooled single trade performance for the overall period 
against the CRSP universe, which is the standard approach in the literature (e.g., DGTW;  
                                                 
16 The number of LM sells is very small and may stem from imperfect downscaling by mutual funds in an 
attempt to reduce transaction costs. We consider such gray cases in robustness section 8.1. 
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Table IV: Pooled single trade performance - Overall period  
This table reports cumulative DGTW benchmark-adjusted performance over the next 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months periods 
resulting from trades sorted according to the Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM) of 3,802 actively managed US domestic 
equity funds in the period 2003-2012. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  Cumulative DGTW-adjusted performance (in %) over the next 
 N 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Panel A. Benchmarked against the CRSP stock universe - unlimited short selling 
VM buys 1,710,743 0.177*** 0.240*** 0.352*** 0.362*** 
VM sells 2,111,743 0.029*** 0.088*** 0.148*** 0.194*** 
VM buys – VM sells  0.148*** 0.152*** 0.204*** 0.168*** 
      
LM buys 747,873 0.045*** 0.094*** 0.226*** 0.392*** 
LM sells 165,345 0.228*** 0.358*** 0.599*** 0.621*** 
VM buys – LM buys  0.132*** 0.146*** 0.126*** -0.030 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.199*** -0.270*** -0.451*** -0.427*** 
      
Panel B. Benchmarked against the holdings - no short selling 
VM buys 1,710,743 0.055*** 0.013 -0.026 -0.153*** 
VM sells 2,111,743 -0.077*** -0.105*** -0.144*** -0.178*** 
VM buys – VM sells  0.131*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.025 
      
LM buys 747,873 -0.023** -0.038** -0.011 0.014 
LM sells 165,345 0.001 0.034 -0.053 -0.143* 
VM buys – LM buys  0.078*** 0.051** -0.014 -0.167*** 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.077*** -0.139*** -0.091 -0.035 
      
Panel C. Benchmarked against the relevant universe (buys: CRSP, sells: holdings) 
VM buys 1,710,743 0.177*** 0.240*** 0.352*** 0.362*** 
VM sells 2,111,743 -0.077*** -0.105*** -0.144*** -0.178*** 
VM buys – VM sells  0.254*** 0.344*** 0.496*** 0.540*** 
      
LM buys 747,873 0.045*** 0.094*** 0.226*** 0.392*** 
LM sells 165,345 0.001 0.034 -0.053 -0.143* 
VM buys – LM buys  0.132*** 0.146*** 0.126*** -0.030 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.077*** -0.139*** -0.091 -0.035 
 
Chen et al., 2000). On the one hand, the cumulative performance of VM buys is positive and 
statistically significant over all tested investment horizons (e.g., 0.240% over the first 3 
months), indicating that the stocks bought based on VM subsequently outperform other stocks 
with similar stock characteristics, consistent with stock picking skill. On the other hand, the 
performance of VM sells is also positive and statistically significant against the CRSP 
universe indicating that funds sell stocks which subsequently outperform other stocks with 
similar stock characteristics, counterintuitive to stock picking skill. 
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However, the CRSP universe is not relevant for sells due to short selling restrictions 
(e.g., Chen et al., 2013). Therefore, Panel B shows trade performance against the respective 
fund’s holdings. Here, VMB buys are positive and significant only over the first month 
indicating that VM buys slightly increase portfolio quality in the short run. More 
interestingly, the cumulative performance of VM sells is negative and statistically significant 
over all tested horizons (e.g., -0.105% over the first 3 months), indicating that the stocks sold 
based on VM subsequently underperform the stocks held. Hence, funds sell the right stocks 
on average revealing that selling-skill is a valuable contributor to fund performance which has 
widely been ignored in the literature so far.  
Panel C considers all CRSP stocks for buys and the holdings for sells. The difference 
between VM buys and VM sells, the “value added” compared to the relevant benchmark 
universe, is thus positive and statistically significant over all tested horizons (e.g., 0.344% 
over the first 3 months), Overall, all our findings regarding VM trades are consistent with the 
existence of stock picking skill in active mutual fund management. 
Next, we analyze the existence of flow risk based on single trades. In this context, 
Edelen (1999) argues that a fund manager holding a - from her perspective - optimal portfolio
 
is moved away from this allocation by investor flows. To regain an optimal portfolio, the fund 
is forced to trade. In a standard expectations model, this investor flow is interpreted as 
exogenous supply noise trading which faces expected losses in comparison to informed 
trading. In the TMM model, this should show in significant outperformance of VM buys over 
LM buys and in significantly higher avoided losses through VM sells compared to LM sells.  
In Panel A of Table IV, the cumulative performance of LM buys is positive and 
statistically significant over all tested horizons (e.g., 0.094% over the first 3 months), 
indicating that even with less discretion, managers may make good decisions on average 
compared to the overall market. However, VM buys still significantly outperform LM buys, 
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leading to a positive and statistically significant difference at least over the first 6 months 
(e.g., 0.146% over the first 3 months) and indicating that the restricted trading discretion 
caused by investor flows is costly. After 12 months, we see no significant difference between 
VM buys and LM buys. In Panel B, measured against the respective fund’s holdings, the 
performance of LM buys is negative over all tested horizons and statistically significant over 
the first 3 months, indicating that liquidity-motivated buys - despite showing positive 
performance in Panel A - cannot improve portfolio quality on average and thus hurt 
performance. 
LM sells in Panel A are positive, high and statistically significant over all tested 
horizons (e.g., 0.358% over the first 3 months). We interpret this so that funds selling without 
a clear valuation consider the relative liquidity of the stocks, thereby generating “losses” to 
informed traders. Moreover, it is consistent with our previous assumption that mutual funds 
hold a positive selection of the CRSP universe on average. However, the difference between 
VM sells and LM sells are very large and significant (e.g., -0.270% over the next 3 months) 
indicating high illiquidity costs caused by flow risk. 
Contrasting VM sells and LM sells using the more relevant holdings benchmark 
universe in Panel B, the cumulative performance of LM sells is insignificant over the first 6 
months before turning slightly negative after 12 months indicating that LM sells cannot 
improve portfolio quality. The difference between VM sells and LM sells is negative and 
statistically significant over the first 3 months and then becomes insignificant indicating that 
higher discretion leads to better selling decisions and that flow-induced LM selling is costly. 
The results in Panel C using the respective relevant benchmarks confirm the previous panels 
and show that both LM buys and LM sells are detrimental to performance at least in the short 
run, consistent with the existence of flow risk. 
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To investigate why outperformance of VM buys over LM buys turns negative after 12 
months, we additionally analyze the average duration of a trade’s motivation, i.e. the time 
period until the same stock is traded with a different motivation. Table V shows that for all 
trades the average motivation duration is well below the hypothetical 12-month holding 
period in Table IV. This indicates that the result in Table IV that LM buys outperform VM 
buys over the 12-month horizon is of minor relevance compared to 3-month and 6-month 
holding periods, for which we find strong evidence of flow risk.  
Table V: Motivation duration of TMM trade categories 
This table shows the average and median motivation duration of trades categorized by the TMM of US domestic equity 
mutual funds during the period from 2003 to 2012. We define the motivation duration of a trade as the time period until 
the same stock is traded by the fund in another direction or in the same direction with a different motivation.  
       
 Motivation duration (months)  Motivation duration (months) in illiquid times 
 
N Average Median N Average Median 
       
VMB 1,659,887 5.85 3.00 373,105 6.62 4.00 
LMB 737,687 4.94 3.00 160,613 5.94 3.00 
VMS 2,020,433 6.43 4.00 449,869 7.06 5.00 
LMS 160,843 3.02 2.00 30,267 3.76 3.00 
       
 
2.4.2 Skill in illiquid market periods, liquidity costs and market efficiency 
In this section, we perform additional analyses which focus on the interplay between stock 
picking skill, flow risk and market illiquidity. Regarding stock picking skill in illiquid times, 
prior research (e.g., Sadka and Scherbina, 2007; Chordia et al., 2008, 2011; Dong et al., 2014; 
Pastor et al., 2015) indicates that market efficiency is lower and pricing uncertainty is higher 
during periods of low market liquidity. Thus, these periods frequently present more 
opportunities for VM trades and the potential gains from such trades should be higher. In the 
TMM, this should show in higher returns to VM buys, in higher avoided losses through VM 
sells and ultimately in a wider performance spread between VM buys and VM sells compared 
to non-illiquid times. Moreover, during illiquid times, the mispricing may be more 
fundamental and thus provide long-term opportunities to informed traders, while mispricing 
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during non-illiquid times may present only short-term opportunities. In the TMM this should 
show in clearer patterns over longer holding periods during illiquid market periods.  
 Table VI presents pooled single trade performance separately for illiquid and non-
illiquid periods.
17
 Panel A presents results for illiquid times, defined as the bottom 10% of the 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregated market liquidity factor, against the holdings 
benchmark.
18
 With slightly over 1 million trades, about 22.5% of all trades occur during the 
10% illiquid times, indicating higher trading activity during such phases consistent with, e.g., 
Pastor et al. (2016). The performance of VM buys is positive over all tested periods and 
significant in 3 of 4 cases (e.g., 0.373% over the first 12 months). This clearly indicates that 
VM buys improve portfolio quality. The performance of VM sells is negative and statistically 
significant for all tested periods (e.g., -0.735% over the first 12 months), so that the difference 
between VM buys and VM sells is statistically significant and economically relevant with, 
e.g., 1.107% over the first 12 months. It also confirms that VM sells improve portfolio quality 
more strongly than VM buys. 
Panel B shows results against the respective relevant benchmarks for buys and sells. 
The results are even stronger with a performance of VM buys of 2.007% over the first 12 
months and the difference to VM sells, the “value added”, increasing to 2.742%. Overall these 
finding confirm our expectation that stock picking skill is more valuable during times of low 
market efficiency. Moreover, the results support our assumption that this informational 
advantage allows outperformance over longer periods as all figures are statistically and 
economically significant over all tested horizons. 
                                                 
17 In TableVI, we drop the Panel using all CRSP stocks as a benchmark for sells as it is economically irrelevant 
due to short selling restrictions. 
18 For robustness, we also test a 20% Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) cutoff to identify illiquid periods, for 
economic contractions following the definition of the NBER, and stock market crises following Ben-David et al. 
(2012). The results are economically similar and available upon request. 
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Table VI: Pooled single trade performance - Illiquid vs. non-illiquid market periods 
This table reports cumulative DGTW benchmark-adjusted performance over the next 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months periods 
resulting from trades sorted according to the Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM) of 3,802 actively managed US domestic 
equity funds in the period 2003-2012. Non-illiquid (Illiquid) market periods are defined as periods with Pastor and 
Stambaugh’s (2003) aggregated market liquidity factor above (below) the 10%-percentile. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  Cumulative DGTW-adjusted performance (in %) over the next 
 N 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Panel A. Illiquid market periods (Bottom 10%), benchmarked against holdings 
VM buys 387,368 0.091*** 0.049 0.188*** 0.373*** 
VM sells 479,154 -0.149*** -0.202*** -0.453*** -0.735*** 
VM buys – VM sells  0.240*** 0.251*** 0.641*** 1.107*** 
      
LM buys 165,761 -0.039 -0.032 -0.030 -0.198** 
LM sells 31,991 -0.001 0.041 -0.252 -0.322 
VM buys – LM buys  0.130*** 0.081 0.218*** 0.571*** 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.148* -0.243** -0.201 -0.413* 
      
Panel B. Illiquid market periods (Bottom 10%), benchmarked against relevant universe 
VM buys 387,368 0.476*** 0.739*** 1.462*** 2.007*** 
VM sells 479,154 -0.149*** -0.202*** -0.453*** -0.735*** 
VM buys – VM sells  0.625*** 0.941*** 1.915*** 2.742*** 
      
LM buys 165,761 0.217*** 0.495*** 0.906*** 0.725*** 
LM sells 31,991 -0.001 0.041 -0.252 -0.322 
VM buys – LM buys  0.259*** 0.244*** 0.556*** 1.282*** 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.148* -0.243** -0.201 -0.413* 
      
Panel C. Non-illiquid market periods (Top 90%), benchmarked against holdings 
VM buys 1,323,375 0.044*** 0.003 -0.088*** -0.307** 
VM sells 1,632,589 -0.056*** -0.076*** -0.053*** -0.014 
VM buys – VM sells  0.100** 0.079*** -0.035 -0.293*** 
      
LM buys 582,112 -0.019* -0.039** -0.006 0.075* 
LM sells 133,354 0.001 0.032 -0.005 -0.100 
VM buys – LM buys  0.063*** 0.042* -0.083** -0.382*** 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.057** -0.109*** -0.048 0.085 
      
Panel D. Non-illiquid market periods (Top 90%), benchmarked against relevant universe 
VM buys 1,323,375 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.027 -0.119*** 
VM sells 1,632,589 -0.056*** -0.076*** -0.053*** -0.014 
VM buys – VM sells  0.145*** 0.170*** 0.080*** -0.105*** 
      
LM buys 582,112 -0.004 -0.020 0.032 0.297*** 
LM sells 133,354 0.001 0.032 -0.005 -0.100 
VM buys – LM buys  0.094*** 0.114*** -0.005 -0.417*** 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.057** -0.109*** -0.048 0.085 
 
Comparing the results for illiquid times with those for non-illiquid times in Panels C 
(holdings universe) and D (relevant universe) shows that VM buys have positive but rather 
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low returns only over the first 6 months and then turn negative after 12 months. Similarly, 
VM sells are only slightly negative compared to illiquid times. The value added from VM 
trading during non-illiquid times is thus comparably low (e.g. Panel D, 0.170% over the first 
3 months) and turns negative after 12 months. Clearly therefore, the results for the overall 
period presented in Table IV are driven by the strong positive VM trading performance during 
illiquid times. This is also consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis (e.g., Fama, 1970) 
that during non-illiquid times there exists no informational advantage even for skilled 
managers, at least not over long horizons.  
Regarding the interplay between flow risk and market illiquidity, it should be more 
costly to provide liquidity to investors while facing illiquidity on the stock market. In the 
TMM model, this should show in inferior performance of LM trades during illiquid times 
compared to non-illiquid times. To test this, we first look at LM buys in illiquid times. In 
Panel A, LM buys show insignificant but slightly negative performance which turns 
significantly negative after 12 months (-0.198%) and thus cannot improve portfolio quality. 
Compared to VM buys, LM buys clearly underperform with 0.571% over the first 12 months 
which represents economically significant liquidity “costs” and confirms increased flow risk. 
In Panel B, LM buys show positive performance over all tested periods (e.g., 0.725% over the 
following 12 months) but still clear, significant and economically relevant underperformance 
compared to VM buys with statistically significant differences of, e.g., 1.282% over the 
following 12 months.  
Similar interpretations apply to LM sells, which are negative but statistically 
insignificant for most tested periods (e.g., -0.252% over the following 6 months). However, 
they are significantly less negative compared to VM sells with differences of, e.g., -0.413% 
over the first 3 months. This supports our assumption that the “costs” of providing liquidity to 
investors are higher during illiquid times. Interestingly, the liquidity costs from capital 
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inflows (VM buys minus LM buys) are higher and show higher statistical significance than 
the costs from capital outflows (VM sells minus LM sells). One explanation of this result 
could be that during illiquid times, those funds that provide liquidity to other market 
participants (LM sellers) gain a liquidity premium while funds demanding liquidity (LM 
buyers) pay the premium. This may at least partly offset the disadvantages of LM selling 
compared to VM selling while increasing the disadvantages of LM buying compared to VM 
buying. 
Finally, looking at the costs of liquidity provision during non-illiquid times (Panels C 
and D) we see that VM buys outperform LM buys only by a small margin and only for the 
first 6 months before turning negative. This is also consistent with an efficient market where 
the disadvantage of low trading discretion is not too harmful after all. 
2.5 Stock level analysis  
2.5.1 Manager preferences and characteristics of stocks 
After showing that mutual funds’ VM trades generally outperform their LM trades in the 
previous section, we now analyze whether the stocks that funds trade due to VM are 
significantly different from the stocks they trade based on LM. Table VII therefore shows 
average stock characteristics for the TMM categories during illiquid (Panel A) and non-
illiquid times (Panel B). Overall, the table shows clearer patterns during illiquid times, which 
is consistent with our previous finding that there exist clearer valuations in illiquid markets. 
Therefore, we concentrate on the respective results in Panel A and comment on the results of 
non-illiquid times in Panel B only if they follow a different pattern.  
As measures for stock liquidity, we use monthly trading volume and the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity ratio. With their VM trading, funds tend to buy illiquid stocks and sell non- 
33 
 
Table VII: Average stock characteristics for TMM trade categories 
This table reports pooled average characteristics of the stocks traded by 3,802 actively managed US domestic equity funds in the period 2003-2012 sorted according to the Trade Motivation 
Matrix (TMM). Panel A presents results for illiquid market periods defined as the bottom 10% of the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) market liquidity measure at the time of the trade. Panel B 
reports the results for all trades in the remaining periods (top 90%). +Compustat firm characteristics are filtered at the 1% and 99% percentiles to control for extreme outliers. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance of the differences in means at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
N (tsd) VM buy VM sell 
VM buy –  
VM sell 
LM buy LM sell 
LM buy –  
LM sell 
VM buy –  
LM buy 
VM sell –  
LM sell 
Panel A. Illiquid market periods - Bottom 10% 
Trading volume ($mil p.m.) 1,064 134.500*** 139.900*** -5.318*** 112.800*** 139.800*** -26.940*** 21.709*** 0.086 
Amihud illiquidity ratio 1,064 0.124*** 0.052*** 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.060*** 0.020*** 
Market capitalization ($bil) 1,064 19.409*** 22.797*** -3.387*** 21.241*** 20.470*** 0.770*** -1.831*** 2.327*** 
Book-to-market ratio+ 810 0.956*** 0.844*** 0.112*** 0.864*** 0.872*** -0.008 0.092*** -0.028 
Prior 1y DGTW-adj. return (% p.a.) 997 -2.919*** 1.825*** -4.743*** 2.850*** -11.619*** 14.469*** -5.768*** 13.444*** 
CAPM beta 1,064 1.179*** 1.121*** 0.057*** 1.139*** 1.159*** -0.021*** 0.040*** -0.038*** 
Return standard deviation (% p.a.) 1,064 3.402*** 3.258*** 0.144*** 3.062*** 3.657*** -0.596*** 0.341*** -0.399*** 
Return skewness 1,064 0.114*** 0.115*** -0.001 0.117*** 0.129*** -0.012*** -0.003 -0.015*** 
Return kurtosis 1,064 3.379*** 3.343*** 0.036*** 3.343*** 3.304*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 
Short interest (mil)+ 620 9.845*** 10.098*** -0.253*** 9.202*** 10.105*** -0.904*** 0.644*** -0.007 
Price-to-earnings ratio+ 491 16.721*** 17.656*** -0.934*** 17.622*** 15.782*** 1.840*** -0.901*** 1.874*** 
Price-to-cash flow ratio+ 446 12.137*** 12.712*** -0.574*** 12.629*** 11.082*** 1.547*** -0.492*** 1.630*** 
Return on equity (% p.a.) + 610 9.898*** 11.495*** -1.597*** 10.761*** 9.668*** 1.092*** -0.863*** 1.826*** 
Return on investment (% p.a.) + 611 7.348*** 8.479*** -1.131*** 7.931*** 7.162*** 0.769*** -0.583*** 1.317*** 
S&P short-term credit rating+ 107 102.575*** 102.552*** 0.023*** 102.562*** 102.577*** -0.015 0.013** -0.025** 
S&P long-term credit rating+ 281 10.566*** 10.458*** 0.107*** 10.461*** 10.348*** 0.113*** 0.104*** 0.111*** 
Total assets to total equity ratio+ 512 3.380*** 3.260*** 0.120*** 3.424*** 3.586*** -0.162*** -0.044*** -0.326*** 





Table VII: continued. 
 
N (tsd) VM buy VM sell 
VM buy –  
VM sell 
LM buy LM sell 
LM buy –  
LM sell 
VM buy –  
LM buy 
VM sell –  
LM sell 
Panel B. Non-illiquid market periods - Top 90% 
Trading volume ($mil p.m.) 3,671 119.400*** 123.000*** -3.576*** 95.939*** 132.500*** -36.525*** 23.465*** -9.484*** 
Amihud illiquidity ratio 3,671 0.045*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.039*** 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.006 -0.004 
Market capitalization ($bil) 3,671 20.831*** 23.052*** -2.221*** 20.261*** 23.562*** -3.301*** 0.570*** -0.509*** 
Book-to-market ratio+ 2,939 0.697*** 0.631*** 0.066*** 0.687*** 0.659*** 0.028** 0.009 -0.028*** 
Prior 1y DGTW-adj. return (% p.a.) 3,596 22.312*** 26.273*** -3.961*** 22.022*** 20.318*** 1.704*** 0.289*** 5.955*** 
CAPM beta 3,671 1.190*** 1.173*** 0.016*** 1.154*** 1.163*** -0.010*** 0.036*** 0.010*** 
Return standard deviation (% p.a.) 3,671 2.211*** 2.158*** 0.052*** 2.050*** 2.231*** -0.181*** 0.161*** -0.073*** 
Return skewness 3,671 0.106*** 0.118*** -0.011*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.004* 0.000 0.015*** 
Return kurtosis 3,671 3.469*** 3.458*** 0.011*** 3.466*** 3.369*** 0.097*** 0.004*** 0.089*** 
Short interest (mil)+ 2,192 9.137*** 9.312*** -0.174*** 8.173*** 9.883*** -1.710*** 0.965*** -0.571*** 
Price-to-earnings ratio+ 1,826 18.334*** 18.972*** -0.639*** 18.743*** 17.697*** 1.046*** -0.410*** 1.275*** 
Price-to-cash flow ratio+ 1,705 13.135*** 13.527*** -0.392*** 13.345*** 12.521*** 0.823*** -0.210*** 1.005*** 
Return on equity (% p.a.) + 2,178 12.067*** 13.236*** -1.169*** 12.285*** 13.127*** -0.842*** -0.218*** 0.108** 
Return on investment (% p.a.) + 2,186 8.827*** 9.652*** -0.825*** 8.981*** 9.420*** -0.439*** -0.155*** 0.232*** 
S&P short-term credit rating+ 407 102.594*** 102.577*** 0.017*** 102.592*** 102.614*** -0.021*** 0.002 -0.037*** 
S&P long-term credit rating+ 1,055 10.685*** 10.610*** 0.075*** 10.661*** 10.456*** 0.205*** 0.024*** 0.154*** 
Total assets to total equity ratio+ 1,884 3.331*** 3.249*** 0.081*** 3.406*** 3.402*** 0.004 -0.075*** -0.153*** 





illiquid stocks (e.g., Cao et al., 2013, Dong et al., 2014). This difference is most striking in the 
Amihud illiquidity ratio which is 0.124 for VM buys and 0.052 for VM sells on average. 
Moreover, VM buys have a distinctly higher illiquidity ratio than LM buys. This is consistent 
with funds capturing illiquidity premiums during times of low market liquidity if they have a 
clear valuation regarding the stock. With their LM trading, funds tend to sell highly liquid 
stocks. Overall, their LM sells have the highest level of liquidity, even in times of low market 
liquidity, which is consistent with funds reacting to investor outflows by selling off the assets 
with the lowest liquidity-related transaction costs (e.g., Clarke et al., 2007). 
Next, we consider the stock characteristics accounted for by the DGTW benchmarks 
(Daniel et al., 1997). Regarding market capitalization, funds tend to buy smaller stocks and 
sell larger ones with their VM trades, consistent with a small cap premium strategy (e.g., 
Fama and French, 1993). Conversely, with their LM trades, funds buy larger stocks and sell 
smaller ones. During non-illiquid times (Panel B) we see a similar pattern for VM trades but a 
reversed one for LM trades, as funds sell larger and buy smaller stocks, as is also consistent 
with a small cap premium strategy. 
Regarding the book-to-market ratio, we observe that funds capture the value premium 
with their VM trades, as they generally buy stocks with high book-to-market ratios and sell 
stocks with low ratios. LM trades do not differ in their average book-to-market ratios. 
Regarding momentum we compute the stocks’ prior year’s DGTW-adjusted return based on 
daily returns. With their VM buys, funds buy stocks with moderately negative prior returns 
which might be an indication of current undervaluation. Similarly, VM sells show moderately 
positive prior returns, potentially indicating current overvaluation. The clearer pattern, 
however, can be observed in funds’ LM trades, as they buy stocks with prior positive returns 
and sell stocks with very high negative returns, consistent with a classic momentum strategy 
(e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Carhart, 1997). Thus, if they have no clear fundamental 
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valuation, funds strongly rely on technical analysis when forced to trade by investors’ 
liquidity needs.  
Concerning measures of risk, the market beta is significantly higher for VM buys than 
for LM buys, suggesting that mutual funds are prepared to take more systematic risk if they 
have a positive fundamental valuation of a stock. Comparing VM sells with LM sells shows 
the opposite pattern, suggesting that if funds have no clear valuation, they tend to sell stocks 
with higher systematic risk exposure. This pattern is also observable but less pronounced for 
the standard deviation of daily returns to reduce risk. As further risk characteristics, the 
skewness and kurtosis of returns show no clear patterns between VM and LM trading. 
The short interest of the stocks, represented by the number of shares sold short by 
investors and not yet covered, is generally higher for sells than for buys, consistent with the 
interpretation as a measure of the market’s sentiment regarding the stock (e.g., Lamont and 
Stein, 2004). For LM trades this pattern is stronger than for VM sells, especially during non-
illiquid times. Thus, if funds have no clear valuations and especially during times with low 
overall investment opportunities, funds tend to follow market sentiment in their LM selling 
decisions. 
Regarding commonly used multiples, the price-to-earnings ratio and the price-to-cash 
flow ratio show different patterns between VM and LM trades. Specifically, with their VM 
trades funds buy stocks with lower ratios on average. Such stocks may be considered 
undervalued and offer each unit of earnings or cash flow at a cheaper price. With their LM 
buys, on the other hand, funds tend to buy stocks with higher ratios, which may be interpreted 




Regarding measures of firm’s operating profitability, funds tend to buy stocks with 
lower return on equity (ROE) and with lower return on investment (ROI) and sell stocks with 
higher measures. This is against the intuition used by Fama and French (2015) in creating the 
profitability factor RMW which is long in firms with robust profitability and short in firms 
with weak profitability. The only exception is the pattern of LM trading during illiquid times, 
when funds buy stocks with higher profitability as they sell, which is consistent with the Fama 
and French (2015) intuition. 
Regarding the credit worthiness of the firms, we see no relevant differences between 
the S&P short-term or long-term credit ratings. Moreover, we see no relevant differences in 
the firm’s ratio of total assets to total equity which we interpret as the leverage of the firms 
playing no important role for the trading decisions of mutual funds. 
Lastly, we look at the retained earnings of the firms as indicators of past profitability 
but also of the stocks’ tendency to withhold earnings from the investors instead of paying 
profits out as dividends. While during illiquid times there seem to be no clear tendencies we 
observe that during non-illiquid times, LM buys are in stocks with low retained earnings and 
LM sells are in stocks with high retained earnings. This may be explained by the lack of 
investment ideas and growth expectations so that funds rely on the tendency of firms to at 
least pay a dividend (e.g., Harris et al., 2015). 
Overall, we find that funds tend to display rather different trading patterns with their 
VM and LM trades. These can be rationalized in many cases with the funds capturing risk 
premiums and following fundamental valuations with their VM trades versus relying on 




2.5.2 Explaining stock performance with collective mutual fund trading - Wisdom of 
crowds 
Considering the findings in the previous sections, we find it reasonable to assume that the 
collective valuations of all mutual funds may have explanatory power over the future 
performance of single stocks. In this context, several recent papers analyzing the “wisdom of 
crowds” in financial markets indicate that the collective trading decisions of mutual fund 
managers (e.g., Chalmers et al., 2013) and hedge fund managers (Sias et al., 2016) predict 
future raw and risk-adjusted stock returns. However, these studies do not consider trading 
motivation.  
Therefore, we define two new stock-specific variables based on the TMM: 
𝑉𝑀𝐵 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗,𝑞 is defined as the number of funds buying stock j due to VM during quarterly 
reporting period q divided by the total number funds buying stock j during q. Similarly, 
𝑉𝑀𝑆 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗,𝑞 is defined as the number of funds selling the stock due to VM divided by the 
total number funds selling the stock. A higher VMB ratio thus indicates a stronger positive 
consensus valuation of a stock and a higher VMS ratio indicates a stronger negative 
consensus valuation of a stock. Thus, our VM ratios reverse the approach by Da et al. (2011), 
who use the stocks’ probability of informed trading (PIN) based on stock characteristics to 
derive fund level motivation from the funds’ trades.  
To test our expectation that the VM ratios represent wisdom of the (fund manager) 
crowd, we run panel regressions for the overall period with stock- and time-fixed effects to 
explain future stock performance, measured by the DGTW-adjusted returns over up to 12 
months going forward, with the stocks’ VM ratios controlling for the stock characteristics 
presented in Table VII
19
 following Eq. (4). To ease interpretation, all variables are 
                                                 
19 We use only those fund characteristics as control variables which have a high number of observations 
available to retain a high number of observations in our regression analysis. 
39 
 
standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation. Standard errors are 2-dimensionally 
clustered by stock and reporting period following Petersen (2009) to control for 
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional as well as time-series correlation. 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑞+𝑥
=  𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑉𝑀 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗,𝑞 + ∑ 𝜑𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=2
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑗,𝑐,𝑞 + 𝜂𝑗,𝑞 
(4) 
The results are presented in Table VIII. Panel A reports results for mutual fund VM buying. 
Univariate (1) as well as multivariate regression results (2) indicate that a higher degree of 
VM buying is significantly related to positive future DGTW-adjusted stock returns over all 
tested time horizons. Thus, the collective VM buying decisions of mutual fund managers 
represent wisdom of the crowd. Moreover, as the pattern can be observed over long horizons, 
this shows that our finding is not driven by a potential price impact by funds’ collective 
trading.  
Similarly, Panel B reports results for mutual fund VM selling. As expected, the 
coefficients of the VMS ratio are negative and in most cases statistically significant for all 
tested horizons. Thus, also the collective VM selling decisions of mutual fund managers 
represent wisdom of the crowd.
20
 Further, the coefficients on the stock characteristics indicate 
that trading volume has an overall negative effect and market beta has a positive effect on 
DGTW-adjusted stock returns. The fund characteristics explicitly controlled for by the 
DGTW benchmarks - size, book-to-market ratio and momentum - still have significant effects 
on DGTW-adjusted returns, similar to findings on fund level by Busse et al. (2016). 
  
                                                 
20 Unreported additional panel regressions using future cumulative raw returns as independent variables lead to 
qualitatively similar results which are available upon request. 
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Table VIII: Prediction of future stock performance with the stocks’ degree of valuation-motivated trading 
This table reports panel regressions with stock- and time-fixed effects (within) of future cumulative DGTW-adjusted stock performance with the amount of collective 
valuation-motivated mutual fund trading in 5,246 common US stocks in the period 2003-2012. VMB ratio (VMS ratio) is the number of VM buying (selling) funds divided by 
the number of total buying (selling) funds. All independent variables are measured over quarterly reporting period q except “Prior 1y DGTW-adjusted return” which is 
measured over year y-1. P-values are given in parentheses. All variables are standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are 2-dimensionally clustered by stock and reporting period following Petersen (2009) to control for 
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional as well as time-series correlation. 
 Cumulative DGTW-adjusted performance over the next 
 1 month  3 months  6 months  12 months 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Panel A. Collective VM mutual fund buying 
         
VMB ratio 0.0073** 0.0065* 0.0120*** 0.0110*** 0.0100*** 0.0089** 0.0163*** 0.0149*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trading volume  -0.0046*  -0.0054  -0.0080  -0.0141*** 
  (0.09)  (0.24)  (0.13)  (0.01) 
Amihud illiquidity ratio  0.0039  -0.0006  0.0068  0.0059 
  (0.21)  (0.90)  (0.16)  (0.32) 
Market capitalization  -0.0242***  -0.0412***  -0.0550***  -0.0739*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Book-to-market ratio  -0.0116**  -0.0154**  -0.0142*  -0.0100 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.19) 
Prior 1y DGTW adjusted return  -0.0460***  -0.0795***  -0.1116***  -0.1424*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Market beta  0.0269*  0.0213  0.0197  0.0216* 
  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.07) 
         
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 




Table VIII continued. 
 Cumulative DGTW-adjusted performance over the next 
 1 month  3 months  6 months  12 months 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Panel B. Collective VM mutual fund selling 
         
VMS ratio -0.0072* -0.0053 -0.0092** -0.0062* -0.0107*** -0.0067** -0.0099*** -0.0049 
 (0.07) (0.16) (0.02) (0.09) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.13) 
Trading volume  -0.0042*  -0.0042  -0.0070  
-
0.0132*** 
  (0.09)  (0.32)  (0.16)  (0.01) 
Amihud illiquidity ratio  0.0072  0.0093*  0.0194**  0.0183* 
  (0.29)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.10) 
Market capitalization  -0.0233***  -0.0390***  -0.0525***  
-
0.0713*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Book-to-market ratio  -0.0068  -0.0139**  -0.0126*  -0.0090 
  (0.14)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.25) 
Prior 1y DGTW adj. return  -0.0500***  -0.0849***  -0.1168***  
-
0.1495*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Market beta  0.0334**  0.0290**  0.0287**  0.0299** 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
         
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 
N 143,143 143,143 143,143 143,143 143,143 143,143 143,143 143,143 
42 
 
2.6 Fund level analysis 
2.6.1 Determinants of mutual funds’ extent of VM trading 
This section analyzes which fund characteristics are associated with discretionary trading. 
Hence, similar to our stock level analysis, we define three fund-specific variables based on the 
TMM: 𝑉𝑀 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑞 is defined as the number of VM trades of fund i during quarterly reporting 
period q divided by the number of fund i’s total trades during q. Similarly, 𝑉𝑀𝐵 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑞 
(𝑉𝑀𝑆 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑞) is defined as the number of VM buys (sells) divided by the total number of 
buys (sells).
21
 To determine which fund characteristics are associated with a higher degree of 
VM trading, Table IX shows the results of panel regression (5) with fund- and time-fixed 
effects (within) of the VM ratios on the fund characteristics reported in Table I. To ease 
interpretation, all variables are standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation. 
Standard errors are 2-dimensionally clustered by fund and reporting period following Petersen 
(2009) to control for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional as well as time-series correlation. 
𝑉𝑀 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑞 =  𝜑0 + ∑ 𝜑𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑞 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑞. (5) 
As our previous findings on the value of funds’ VM trading are more pronounced during 
illiquid market periods, Panels A and B report results separately for the different liquidity 
regimes. The first overall impression is that fund characteristics explain VM trading quite 
well with R
2
 of 18% overall and of 32% for VM buying. However, the R
2
 for VM selling is 
only 2%, possibly due to the low overall number of LM sells compared to LM buys 
documented in Table III.. 
  
                                                 
21 In unreported tests, we use similar VM ratios based on trading (buying/selling) volume. The results are 
economically similar and available upon request. 
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Table IX: Determinants of extent of valuation-motivated mutual fund trading  
This table reports panel regressions with fund- and time-fixed effects (within) of the extent of valuation-motivated mutual fund trading for 3,802 actively managed US 
domestic equity funds in the period 2003-2012. VM ratio is the number of VM trades divided by the number of total trades per fund in quarterly reporting period q, VMB 
ratio (VMS ratio) is the number of VM buys (sells) divided by the number of total buys (sells). Alpha is the intercept from the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model calculated 
using daily net returns. All dependent and independent variables are measured over quarterly reporting period q except Alphaq-1 and VM ratioq-1 which are lagged one 
reporting period. P-values are given in parentheses. All variables are standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are 2-dimensionally clustered by fund and reporting period following Petersen (2009) to control for heteroskedasticity 
and cross-sectional as well as time-series correlation. 
 VM ratio  VMB ratio  VMS ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Illiquid market periods - Bottom 10% 
 
Net flow -0.4142*** -0.4144*** -0.4180*** -0.5555*** -0.5532*** -0.5673*** 0.1370*** 0.1348*** 0.1403*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cash -0.0317** -0.0307** -0.0290** -0.0502*** -0.0469*** -0.0481*** 0.0427*** 0.0398*** 0.0436*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log-Size -0.0110 -0.0083 -0.0103 -0.0242** -0.0224* -0.0233* 0.0008 0.0040 0.0109 
(0.46) (0.58) (0.53) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.96) (0.83) (0.54) 
Age -0.0115 -0.0127 -0.0143 0.0275*** 0.0273** 0.0212* -0.0574*** -0.0591*** -0.0620*** 
(0.33) (0.34) (0.26) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expense ratio -0.0090 -0.0079 -0.0094 -0.0108 -0.0096 -0.0113 -0.0042 -0.0036 -0.0061 
(0.45) (0.51) (0.51) (0.38) (0.44) (0.43) (0.74) (0.78) (0.62) 
Front load 0.0005 0.0036 -0.0027 0.0107 0.0147 0.0080 -0.0073 -0.0084 -0.0109 
(0.98) (0.84) (0.88) (0.58) (0.45) (0.70) (0.56) (0.49) (0.37) 
Rear load -0.0181 -0.0222 -0.0189 -0.0111 -0.0162 -0.0134 -0.0058 -0.0046 -0.0089 
(0.30) (0.20) (0.29) (0.54) (0.39) (0.45) (0.65) (0.68) (0.50) 
Turnover ratio 0.0098 0.0111 0.0045 0.0184** 0.0174** 0.0153 -0.0014 0.0005 -0.0020 
(0.43) (0.35) (0.74) (0.03) (0.05) (0.12) (0.88) (0.96) (0.84) 
Alphaq-1  0.0007   0.0072   -0.0102  
 (0.95)   (0.56)   (0.42)  
VM ratioq-1   -0.0167   0.0061   -0.0535 
  (0.53)   (0.81)   (0.29) 
 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Within R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.02 0.02 0.03 




Table IX continued. 
 VM ratio  VMB ratio  VMS ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Panel B. Non-illiquid market periods - Top 90% 
 
Net flow -0.4520*** -0.4537*** -0.4220*** -0.5508*** -0.5522*** -0.5134*** 0.1405*** 0.1405*** 0.1440*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cash -0.0199*** -0.0204*** -0.0146** -0.0313*** -0.0318*** -0.0209*** 0.0292*** 0.0284*** 0.0271*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log-Size -0.0233** -0.0245*** -0.0129 -0.0414*** -0.0428*** -0.0259*** 0.0392*** 0.0388*** 0.0377*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age 0.0223*** 0.0219*** 0.0156*** 0.0279*** 0.0273*** 0.0187*** -0.0116** -0.0113** -0.0115** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Expense ratio -0.0012 -0.0013 0.0007 -0.0153** -0.0159** -0.0114* 0.0152** 0.0163** 0.0139* 
(0.87) (0.86) (0.92) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
Front load 0.0098 0.0091 0.0121* 0.0161** 0.0150** 0.0190*** -0.0086* -0.0094* -0.0093* 
(0.17) (0.21) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
Rear load 0.0045 0.0043 0.0047 -0.0054 -0.0051 -0.0055 0.0065 0.0067 0.0070 
(0.58) (0.59) (0.51) (0.52) (0.54) (0.46) (0.36) (0.34) (0.31) 
Turnover ratio 0.0123* 0.0128* 0.0088 0.0004 0.0014 0.0001 0.0214*** 0.0210** 0.0219*** 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.14) (0.95) (0.82) (0.98) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Alphaq-1  -0.0018   -0.0059   0.0021  
 (0.78)   (0.37)   (0.72)  
VM ratioq-1   0.1469***   0.1711***   0.0376*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01) 
 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Within R2 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.02 0.02 0.02 
N 35,072 34,623 33,661 33,565 33,143 31,421 33,703 33,275 31,511 
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As expected, investor flows are negatively related to the degree of VM trading at all 
times. Specifically, higher net inflows are associated with a significantly lower degree of 
discretionary buying. Conversely, higher net inflows are positively associated with 
significantly higher discretionary selling. This is consistent with previous studies showing that 
mutual funds face flow risk (e.g., Edelen, 1999; Rakowski, 2010; Rohleder et al., 2015). The 
same applies to higher cash holdings which are negatively related to VM buying and 
positively related to VM selling at all times. This is in accordance with the related literature 




Fund size, measured by the natural logarithm of TNA, is negatively related to the 
degree of VM trading, especially to VM buying for which the coefficients are significant. 
Comparing different liquidity regimes, the relation is especially prevalent during non-illiquid 
times. This is consistent with diseconomies of scale in general (e.g., Chen et al., 2004; Pastor 
et al., 2015) and especially with the findings in Pollet and Wilson (2008) that larger funds 
hold more different assets than smaller funds and thus may have greater difficulties 
generating new investment ideas. This leads to a tendency of larger funds towards scaling 
instead of diversification. In illiquid times, however, these difficulties are less severe due to 
lower market efficiency and more opportunities of VM trading. Moreover, when explaining 
VM selling, size shows positive coefficients during non-illiquid times, which may also be 
consistent with larger funds holding more different assets and thus having a larger selling 
universe to choose from − once again assuming that short sales are scarcely used by mutual 
funds (e.g., Chen et al., 2013).  
                                                 
22 In unreported tests, we confirm the findings in this paragraph by conducting trade level analyses analogue to 
Table IV where we distinguish trades occurring when funds have (i) high vs. low absolute flows and (ii) high vs. 
low cash holdings. The results are available upon request. 
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Fund age is positively related to VM buying and negatively related to VM selling. The 
former result may be explained by older funds having more mature and sophisticated 
structures and overall experience. Moreover, more successful managers may get promoted to 
older and thus more prestigious funds (e.g., Kempf and Rünzi, 2008; Evans, 2009). The 
negative relation with selling discretion, however, may indicate that selling-skill is not equally 
recognized as buying-skill when it comes to promoting fund managers. 
Concerning mutual fund fee structures, the coefficients of expense ratio, front load and 
rear load are unrelated to VM trading during both liquidity regimes. A possible explanation is 
that many mutual funds recently stopped charging front loads to become more attractive to 
increasingly well-informed and fee-sensitive investors (e.g., Barber et al., 2005).  
In terms of the overall trading behavior of funds, the turnover ratio is positively related 
to VM buying in illiquid times and with VM selling in non-illiquid times. This is in 
accordance with findings by Pastor et al. (2016), who argue that abnormal turnover may 
proxy for a higher degree of valuations and new investment ideas, especially during times 
with high valuation uncertainty. 
Finally, we also include past performance in our panel regressions (2) to control for 
endogeneity. However, the coefficients are insignificant during illiquid and non-illiquid times 
so that there is no endogeneity in our results. Moreover, we include lagged VM ratio in our 
panel regressions (3) to control for persistence in discretionary trading. While there is no 
significant effect during illiquid times, the results for non-illiquid times show significantly 
positive coefficients, so that the trading discretion of funds is persistent in such periods. 
2.6.2 Explaining fund performance with the extent of VM trading 
The findings in previous sections indicate that managers generally possess stock picking skill 
and that collective VM trading represents wisdom of the (fund manager) crowd. These 
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findings may be in contrast to the majority of mutual fund studies beginning with Jensen 
(1968) which consistently show that funds deliver negative risk-adjusted performance to 
investors. Thus it remains questionable whether the skill we find on trade and stock level 
actually translates into investor benefits via higher fund performance. However, following 
Pastor et al. (2016) we argue that VM trading may have a direct effect on performance rather 
than a cross-sectional one. 
Therefore, Table X shows the results of panel regressions (Eq. 6) with fund- and time-
fixed effects of future investor performance 𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑞+1, measured by applying the Carhart 
(1997) 4-factor model on daily fund net returns during quarter q+1, on the VM ratios defined 
in subsection 6.1 and controlling for the fund characteristics reported in Table I. To ease 
interpretation, all variables are standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation. 
Standard errors are 2-dimensionally clustered according to fund and reporting period, 




 𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑞+1 =  𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑉𝑀 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑞 + ∑ 𝜑𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=2 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑞 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑞 (6) 
The results for the univariate panel regressions (1) in Panel A for illiquid times show 
significantly positive coefficients for all three VM ratios. Thus, a higher degree of trading 
discretion during illiquid market periods is significantly related to higher investor 
performance in the following quarter. This is in line with the observation that under crisis 
conditions, the overall pricing heterogeneity creates an environment in which managers more 
easily identify over- and underpriced stocks and discipline themselves more strongly in both 
their buying and selling decision (e.g., Jin and Taffler, 2016).  
                                                 
23 In unreported tests, we use similar VM ratios based on trading (buying/selling) volume. The results are 
economically the same but statistical significance is a bit lower. 
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Table X: Predicting future fund performance by extent of valuation-motivated mutual funds trading 
This table reports panel regressions with fund- and time-fixed effects (within) of future risk-adjusted performance Alphaq+1 by the extent of valuation-motivated mutual fund 
trading for 3,802 actively managed US domestic equity funds in the period 2003-2012. VM ratio is the number of VM trades divided by the number of total trades per fund 
during reporting period q, VMB ratio (VMS ratio) is the number of VM buys (sells) divided by the number of total buys (sells). Alpha is the intercept from the Carhart 
(1997) 4-factor model calculated using daily net returns. All independent variables are measured over quarterly reporting period q. P-Values are given in parentheses. All 
variables are standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors 
are clustered by fund and reporting period following Petersen (2009) to control for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional as well as time-series correlation. 
 Alphaq+1 explained by VM ratio
  Alphaq+1 explained by VMB ratio
  Alphaq+1 explained by VMS ratio
 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Illiquid market periods - Bottom 10% 
 
VM ratio 0.0407*** 0.0393*** 0.0326** 0.0261* 0.0256* 0.0116 0.0296** 0.0292*** 0.0338*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.39) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Net flow   -0.0034   -0.0100   -0.0239 
  (0.85)   (0.59)   (0.13) 
Cash   0.0012   0.0020   0.0008 
  (0.93)   (0.89)   (0.96) 
Log-Size   -0.1140***   -0.1114***   -0.1133*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
Age   0.0049   0.0047   0.0044 
  (0.77)   (0.79)   (0.81) 
Expense ratio   -0.0072   -0.0051   -0.0076 
  (0.64)   (0.75)   (0.62) 
Front load   -0.0266   -0.0262   -0.0230 
  (0.20)   (0.20)   (0.30) 
Rear load   0.0230   0.0242   0.0207 
  (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.20) 
Turnover ratio   0.0473**   0.0517***   0.0482** 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02) 
Alpha  -0.0931** -0.0968**  -0.0949** -0.0984***  -0.0859** -0.0898** 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.02) 
 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Within R2 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 





Table X continued. 
 Alphaq+1 explained by VM ratio
  Alphaq+1 explained by VMB ratio
  Alphaq+1 explained by VMS ratio
 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Panel B. Non-illiquid market periods - Top 90% 
 
VM ratio 0.0065 0.0064 -0.0056 0.0135** 0.0128* -0.0007 -0.0177*** -0.0170*** -0.0132** 
(0.25) (0.29) (0.39) (0.04) (0.05) (0.92) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) 
Net flow   -0.0269***   -0.0245***   -0.0227*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
Cash   0.0072   0.0042   0.0099 
  (0.37)   (0.61)   (0.24) 
Log-Size   -0.0659***   -0.0654***   -0.0677*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
Age   -0.0220***   -0.0220***   -0.0241*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
Expense ratio   0.0051   0.0056   0.0031 
  (0.51)   (0.47)   (0.69) 
Front load   -0.0128**   -0.0117*   -0.0129** 
  (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.03) 
Rear load   -0.0037   -0.0033   -0.0024 
  (0.59)   (0.63)   (0.73) 
Turnover ratio   0.0054   0.0046   0.0044 
  (0.46)   (0.52)   (0.54) 
Alpha  0.0148 0.0116  0.0139 0.0106  0.0151 0.0117 
 (0.37) (0.48)  (0.40) (0.52)  (0.36) (0.48) 
 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Within R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
N 33,238 32,760 32,760 31,838 31,387 31,387 31,956 31,505 31,505 
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This relation also holds for the inclusion of alpha in specification (2) as a control variable for 
short-term persistence (e.g., Bollen and Busse, 2004). However, we find significant evidence 
for short-term reversal during illiquid times, which may be a result of performance chasing 
(Gruber, 1996). When we include the other fund characteristics as controls in specification 
(3), the coefficients for overall VM trading and VMS trading remain significantly positive 
while the positive effect of VM buying on future performance seems to be subsumed by the 
other fund characteristics. With regard to the fund characteristics, size is negatively related to 
future performance, consistent with diseconomies of scale (e.g., Chen et al., 2004; Pastor et 
al., 2015) and turnover is positively related to future performance, consistent with the findings 
in Pastor et al. (2016). 
The results in Panel B for non-illiquid market periods are less pronounced compared 
to the results for illiquid times. This could be expected from the previous sections, as under 
non-crisis conditions, there is low pricing heterogeneity which aggravates the identification of 
over- and underpriced stocks. Consequentially, the coefficients of the overall VM trading 
ratio on alpha are insignificant. However, VM buying still positively predicts future alpha 
which is in line with the higher overall buying discipline found by Jin and Taffler (2016). 
As for the control variables, higher net flows during non-illiquid times result in 
significantly lower future performance, consistent with flow risk. Log size and age are 
negatively related to future performance as in Panel A. Turnover loses its predictive power 
over performance in non-illiquid times. Finally, there is no significant relation between 
current and future alpha indicating no performance persistence, consistent with an efficient 
market (e.g., Fama, 1970).  
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2.7 Further tests and robustness checks 
2.7.1 Considering heavy and light valuation motivation 
One of the advantages of the TMM is its limited set of assumptions and hence its intuitiveness 
and clarity. However, the assignment of single trades to TMM categories may be further 
enhanced by additionally considering that within all valuation-motivated trades, there might 
exist different degrees of valuation. Therefore, we consider an extended TMM (eTMM) 
which further distinguishes VM buys and VM sells into “heavy” and “light.”  
Figure 2: The Extended Trade Motivation Matrix (eTMM) 
   
 
Weight change in the 
direction of the trade 
No weight change in the 
direction of the trade 
Buy  
                     Heavy VM buy 
Light VM buyxxxxxxxx 
LM buy 
Sell  
                   Heavy VM sell 
Light VM sellxxxxxxxxxx 
LM sell 
 
The first intuitive approach to further differentiate the degree of valuation is based on the 
magnitude of the weight increase. This makes sense, as one would assume that, e.g., VM buys 
with high weight increases contain more valuation than VM buys with only small weight 
increases. For this reason, the first test with the eTMM separates VM trades at the median 
weight change, i.e. their influence on portfolio allocation. The results are presented in Table 
XI. They are as expected in that more influential VM buys clearly outperform less influential 
VM buys for up to 6 months (overall), respectively 12 months (illiquid). Similarly, the 
mitigated losses from heavy VM sells are higher than those from light VM sells in most cases. 
The second test with the eTMM takes into account that in some scenarios a clear 
assignment of trade motivation is not always possible. Imagine a fund that experiences 
outflow and does not sell every holding in proportion but only sells some of its holdings to  
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Table XI: Pooled single trade performance - Valuation separated by weight change (overall and illiquid 
market period) 
This table reports cumulative DGTW benchmark-adjusted performance over the next 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months periods 
resulting from trades sorted according to the Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM) of 3,802 actively managed US domestic 
equity funds in the period 2003-2012. VM trades are further categorized as heavy (weight increase above 50 percentile 
within all VM trades) and light (weight increase below 50 percentile within all VM trades). ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 level, respectively. 
  Cumulative DGTW-adjusted performance (in %) over the next 
 N 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 
      
      
Panel A. Overall period - Benchmarked against the relevant universe (buys: CRSP, sells: holdings) 
      
VM buys 1,710,743 0.177*** 0.240*** 0.352*** 0.362*** 
VM buys  (heavy) 855,371 0.203*** 0.269*** 0.377*** 0.311*** 
VM buys  (light) 855,372 0.151*** 0.210*** 0.326*** 0.409*** 
VM buys  (heavy) – VM buys ( light)  0.052*** 0.059** 0.051 -0.099* 
      
VM sells 2,111,743 -0.077*** -0.105*** -0.144*** -0.178*** 
VM sells (heavy) 1,055,871 -0.078*** -0.098*** -0.159*** -0.276*** 
VM sells (light) 1,055,872 -0.077*** -0.114*** -0.132*** -0.084*** 
VM sells (heavy)  – VM sells (light)  -0.001 0.016 -0.028 -0.192*** 
      
LM buys 747,873 0.045*** 0.094*** 0.226*** 0.392*** 
LM sells 165,345 0.001 0.034 -0.053 -0.143* 
      
Panel B. Illiquid market period - Benchmarked against the relevant universe (buys: CRSP, sells: holdings) 
      
VM buys 387,368 0.476*** 0.739*** 1.462*** 2.007*** 
VM buys  (heavy) 193,672 0.518*** 0.898*** 1.832*** 2.488*** 
VM buys  (light) 193,673 0.434*** 0.577*** 1.088*** 1.511*** 
VM buys  (heavy) – VM buys ( light)  0.083** 0.321*** 0.745*** 0.977*** 
      
VM sells 479,154 -0.149*** -0.202*** -0.453*** -0.735*** 
VM sells (heavy) 239,550 -0.120*** -0.203*** -0.491*** -0.793*** 
VM sells (light) 239,551 -0.179*** -0.207*** -0.422*** -0.690*** 
VM sells (heavy)  – VM sells (light)  0.059* 0.004 -0.069 -0.103 
      
LM buys 165,761 0.217*** 0.495*** 0.906*** 0.725*** 
LM sells 31,991 0.684*** 0.986*** 1.856*** 2.561*** 
 
save transaction costs. Such trades would be identified as VM sells whereas on the other 
hand, one could argue that it is a grey case because the transactions are triggered by flow. For 
this reason we use the direction of the flow to separate heavy (clear valuation) and light 
(vague valuation) VM trades. Specifically, heavy VM sells occur during periods with net 
inflow and light (vague) VM sells as in the example occur during periods with net outflow. A 
similar logic applies to VM buys. This approach of distinguishing valuation clearness is also 
closest to the BF and SF definitions of ACG. The results are presented in Table XII. Overall,  
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Table XII: Pooled single trade performance - Valuation separated by valuation clearness (overall and illiquid 
market period) 
This table reports cumulative DGTW benchmark-adjusted performance over the next 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months periods 
resulting from trades sorted according to the Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM) of 3,802 actively managed US domestic 
equity funds in the period 2003-2012. VM trades are further categorized as heavy (if buy despite of outflow and sell 
despite of inflow) and light (up-scaling buy in case of inflow and down-scaling sell in case of outflow). ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 level, respectively. 
  Cumulative DGTW-adjusted performance (in %) over the next 
 N 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 
      
Panel A. Overall period - Benchmarked against the relevant universe (buys: CRSP, sells: holdings) 
      
VM buys 1,710,743 0.177*** 0.240*** 0.352*** 0.362*** 
VM buys  (heavy) 954,939 0.201*** 0.250*** 0.355*** 0.366*** 
VM buys  (light) 755,804 0.146*** 0.227*** 0.349*** 0.357*** 
VM buys  (heavy) – VM buys ( light)  0.055*** 0.023 0.006 0.008 
      
VM sells 2,111,743 -0.077*** -0.105*** -0.144*** -0.178*** 
VM sells (heavy) 543,736 -0.095*** -0.129*** -0.229*** -0.302*** 
VM sells (light) 1,568,007 -0.070*** -0.096*** -0.114*** -0.135*** 
VM sells (heavy)  – VM sells (light)  -0.025* -0.033 -0.115*** -0.168*** 
      
LM buys 747,873 0.045*** 0.094*** 0.226*** 0.392*** 
LM sells 165,345 0.001 0.034 -0.053 -0.143* 
      
      
Panel B. Illiquid market period - Benchmarked against the relevant universe (buys: CRSP, sells: holdings) 
      
VM buys 387,368 0.476*** 0.739*** 1.462*** 2.007*** 
VM buys  (heavy) 228,868 0.557*** 0.782*** 1.616*** 2.363*** 
VM buys  (light) 158,500 0.359*** 0.677*** 1.240*** 1.493*** 
VM buys  (heavy) – VM buys ( light)  0.198*** 0.105 0.377*** 0.870*** 
      
VM sells 479,154 -0.149*** -0.202*** -0.453*** -0.735*** 
VM sells (heavy) 126,737 -0.126*** -0.154*** -0.528*** -0.812*** 
VM sells (light) 352,417 -0.157*** -0.219*** -0.426*** -0.707*** 
VM sells (heavy)  – VM sells (light)  0.030 0.065 -0.102 -0.105 
      
LM buys 165,761 0.217*** 0.495*** 0.906*** 0.725*** 
LM sells 31,991 0.684*** 0.986*** 1.856*** 2.561*** 
the results are as expected in that heavy trades outperform light trades, however less clear 
than in the test using the median weight change (see Table XI)). 
In summary, we consider the results from the eTMM as valuable additional insights 
into the effects of heavy and light VM. However, by considering only heavy VM trades as in 
ACG ignores a significant proportion of trades and thus makes inferences on average manager 
skill impossible. As the overall difference to our main analysis is not substantial, we conclude 
that the simple classification method is robust. 
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2.7.2 Imperfect scaling 
Another possible source of imprecise categorization by the TMM can arise from imperfect 
scaling. This occurs if a manager wants to scale, i.e. trade liquidity-motivated without new 
investment idea, but fails to keep the weight change of the stock perfectly at zero, e.g. due to 
integer numbers of stocks. If such a trade (e.g. a buy) involuntarily results in a weight 
increase (even if it is only slightly higher than 0), the TMM falsely classifies this trade as 
valuation-motivated buy. To mitigate the influence of such possible imprecise classifications, 
we control for “marginal” weight changes from imperfect scaling by weighting trade 
performance with the respective weight-changes in Panel A in Table XIII (overall) and Table 
XIV (illiquid). As a result, the performance of VM buys increases while the performance of 
VM sells decreases as expected, resulting in a higher difference between VMB and VMS 
which is significant for all tested horizons. 
In addition, in Panel B (C), we reclassify VM trades as LM trades if the respective 
absolute weight change is below 5% (below 10%) of the previous portfolio weight. This 
clearly increases the proportions of LM trades and especially of the LM sells. The results are 
very similar to those presented in Panel A in that the outperformance of VM trades over LM 
trades increases for all holding periods. We therefore conclude that our findings in the 




Table XIII: Pooled single trade performance adjusted for marginal weight changes (overall period) 
This table reports cumulative DGTW benchmark-adjusted performance over the next 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months periods 
resulting from trades sorted according to the Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM) of 3,802 actively managed US domestic 
equity funds in the period 2003-2012. The benchmark universe for buys consists of all CRSP stocks. The benchmark 
universe for sells consists of all stocks currently held by the respective fund, assuming no short selling. In Panel A, the 
performance is weighted by the underlying weight changes. Weights below the 1% percentile and above the 99% percentile 
were excluded from this analysis to account for outliers. In Panel B (C), trades with absolute weight changes below 5% 
(10%) of the previous weight are reclassified as LM trades. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively, based on bootstrapped standard errors. 
  Cumulative DGTW-adjusted performance (in %) over the next 
 N 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 
      
Panel A. Weight change-weighted trades 
      
VM buys 1,613,953 0.190*** 0.258*** 0.383*** 0.385*** 
VM sells 2,019,455 -0.091*** -0.129*** -0.169*** -0.189*** 
VM buys – VM sells  0.281*** 0.387*** 0.552*** 0.575*** 
      
LM buys 747,368 0.044*** 0.094*** 0.229*** 0.401*** 
LM sells 165,304 0.002 0.037*** -0.050*** -0.138*** 
VM buys – LM buys  0.146*** 0.165*** 0.154*** -0.016*** 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.093*** -0.165*** -0.119*** -0.052*** 
      
Panel B. Reclassification of trades with absolute weight changes below 5% as LM trades 
      
VM buys 1,435,856 0.191*** 0.245*** 0.346*** 0.341*** 
VM sells 1,659,298 -0.091*** -0.113*** -0.171*** -0.247*** 
VM buys – VM sells  0.282*** 0.358*** 0.517*** 0.587*** 
      
LM buys 1,022,760 0.060*** 0.126*** 0.268*** 0.415*** 
LM sells 617,790 -0.019* -0.045** -0.047 0.017 
VM buys – LM buys  0.131*** 0.120*** 0.079*** -0.074* 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.124*** -0.264*** 
      
Panel C. Reclassification of trades with absolute weight changes below 10% as LM trades 
      
VM buys 1,345,131 0.191*** 0.246*** 0.350*** 0.345*** 
VM sells 1,419,339 -0.088*** -0.105*** -0.166*** -0.257*** 
VM buys – VM sells  0.279*** 0.351*** 0.516*** 0.602*** 
      
LM buys 1,113,485 0.071*** 0.135*** 0.269*** 0.403*** 
LM sells 857,749 -0.043*** -0.077*** -0.090*** -0.040 
VM buys – LM buys  0.120*** 0.111*** 0.082*** -0.058 





Table XIV: Pooled single trade performance adjusted for marginal weight changes (illiquid periods) 
This table reports cumulative DGTW benchmark-adjusted performance over the next 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months periods 
resulting from trades sorted according to the Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM) of 3,802 actively managed US domestic 
equity funds in the period 2003-2012. The benchmark universe for buys consists of all CRSP stocks. The benchmark 
universe for sells consists of all stocks currently held by the respective fund, assuming no short selling. In Panel A, the 
performance is weighted by the underlying weight changes. Weights below the 1% percentile and above the 99% percentile 
were excluded from this analysis to account for outliers. In Panel B (C), trades with absolute weight changes below 5% 
(10%) of the previous weight are reclassified as LM trades. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively, based on bootstrapped standard errors. 
  Cumulative DGTW-adjusted performance (in %) over the next 
 N 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 
      
Panel A. Weight change-weighted trades 
      
VM buys 357,641 0.511*** 0.794*** 1.590*** 2.156*** 
VM sells 448,490 -0.183*** -0.239*** -0.507*** -0.840*** 
VM buys – VM sells  0.693*** 1.033*** 2.096*** 2.996*** 
      
LM buys 165,368 0.222*** 0.505*** 0.945*** 0.763*** 
LM sells 31,982 0.002 0.048 -0.243*** -0.315*** 
VM buys – LM buys  0.289*** 0.289*** 0.645*** 1.394*** 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.185*** -0.286*** -0.263*** -0.524*** 
      
Panel B. Reclassification of trades with absolute weight changes below 5% as LM trades 
      
VM buys 346,443 0.492*** 0.741*** 1.498*** 2.092*** 
VM sells 417,617 -0.166*** -0.222*** -0.507*** -0.802*** 
VM buys – VM sells  0.658*** 0.963*** 2.005*** 2.894*** 
      
LM buys 206,686 0.241*** 0.540*** 0.957*** 0.837*** 
LM sells 93,528 -0.020 -0.031 -0.144 -0.291** 
VM buys – LM buys  0.251*** 0.201*** 0.541*** 1.255*** 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.145*** -0.190** -0.363*** -0.511*** 
      
Panel C. Reclassification of trades with absolute weight changes below 10% as LM trades 
      
VM buys 327,801 0.497*** 0.762*** 1.534*** 2.156*** 
VM sells 370,214 -0.165*** -0.227*** -0.521*** -0.821*** 
VM buys – VM sells  0.662*** 0.989*** 2.055*** 2.977*** 
      
LM buys 225,328 0.254*** 0.527*** 0.949*** 0.848*** 
LM sells 140,931 -0.073** -0.082 -0.228*** -0.415*** 
VM buys – LM buys  0.243*** 0.235*** 0.585*** 1.308*** 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.092** -0.145** -0.293*** -0.405*** 
 
2.7.3 Window dressing, portfolio pumping and tax motivated trading 
Apart from pure valuation-motivation and liquidity-motivation, mutual fund trades may also 
be driven by other motives such as window dressing, portfolio pumping and tax optimization 
(e.g., ACG). Specifically, regarding window dressing (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2014), mutual 
funds might alter their portfolio composition prior to reporting to disguise their true holdings  
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Table XV: Pooled single trade performance - Window dressing and tax motivated trades 
This table reports cumulative DGTW benchmark-adjusted performance over the next 1, 3, 6 and 12 months periods resulting 
from trades sorted according to the Trade Motivation Matrix (TMM) of 4,002 actively managed US domestic equity funds 
in the period 2003-2012. The benchmark universe for buys are all CRSP stocks. The benchmark universe for sells are all 
stocks currently held by the respective fund assuming no short selling. To control for window dressing and tax motivated 
trading, we drop all trades in the last quarter of each year. Due to the large number of observations, all figures are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. For readability, we do not report test statistics in the table. 
  Cumulative DGTW adjusted performance (in %) over the next 
 N 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Panel A. Overall single trade analysis  
VM buys 1,246,547 0.160 0.153 0.254 0.255 
VM sells 1,533,962 -0.071 -0.100 -0.161 -0.159 
VM buys – VM sells  0.232 0.253 0.415 0.414 
      
LM buys 557,122 0.049 0.125 0.182 0.384 
LM sells 117,834 -0.024 -0.044 -0.084 -0.157 
VM buys – LM buys  0.112 0.028 0.072 -0.130 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.048 -0.056 -0.077 -0.002 
      
Panel B. Illiquid market periods - Bottom 10% 
VM buys 288,272 0.663 0.881 1.117 1.635 
VM sells 352,310 -0.191 -0.251 -0.414 -0.619 
VM buys – VM sells  0.854 1.132 1.531 2.254 
      
LM buys 122,492 0.293 0.606 0.718 0.721 
LM sells 23,535 -0.055 -0.046 -0.365 -0.441 
VM buys – LM buys  0.370 0.275 0.399 0.915 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.136 -0.205 -0.049 -0.178 
      
Panel C. Liquid market periods - Top 90% 
VM buys 958,275 0.009 -0.066 -0.006 -0.161 
VM sells 1,181,652 -0.036 -0.055 -0.086 -0.023 
VM buys – VM sells  0.045 -0.011 0.080 -0.138 
      
LM buys 434,630 -0.020 -0.011 0.031 0.289 
LM sells 94,299 -0.016 -0.043 -0.014 -0.086 
VM buys – LM buys  0.029 -0.055 -0.036 -0.450 
VM sells – LM sells  -0.020 -0.012 -0.071 0.064 
 
and prevent copycat funds from hurting their performance (e.g., Phillips et al., 2014) as well 
as to make their portfolio look more attractive to investors. Similarly, mutual funds might 
artificially try to inflate performance by placing large bets on existing holdings (e.g., Patel 
and Sarkissian, 2013). The reason for tax-motivated trading is to realize capital losses in order 
to lower the tax base of investors (e.g., Sialm and Starks, 2012; Bergstresser and Pontiff, 
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2013). Thus, efficient tax management by mutual funds is another service provided to 
investors and often credited as performance (e.g., Sialm and Zhang, 2015). Moreover, mutual 
fund flows might be affected by after-tax returns (e.g., Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002).   
To rule out the possibility that such trades drive our findings, we utilize the fact that 
most of these trades occur in the fourth calendar quarter and replicate our pooled single trade 
performance analysis using only trades from the first three quarters (e.g., ACG). Table XV 
reports the results analog to Table IV and Table VI with the fund’s holdings as the relevant 
benchmark universe for sells assuming no short selling. Panel A shows results for the overall 
period while Panels B and C show results for illiquid and liquid market periods, respectively. 
They are economically similar to the findings in our main analysis. Therefore, we conclude 
that our findings are not driven by alternative trade motives. 
2.8 Conclusion  
We propose a novel approach to distinguishing VM trades from LM trades of mutual funds. 
The TMM is the first to allow the direct classification of single trades whereas previous 
approaches remain on the aggregated portfolio level. This allows more accurate measurement 
of stock picking skill than previous approaches not considering motivation and thus 
underestimating skill as well as previous approaches considering motivation only for 
aggregated trades. Moreover, we are the first to consider different benchmark universes for 
trades thereby distinguishing the success of VM and LM trading compared to all stocks with 
similar characteristics from their actual effects on portfolio quality. Based on funds’ VM 
trading according to the TMM, we thus find clear evidence for the existence of stock picking 
skill which is significantly related to future stock and fund performance. This is especially the 
case during illiquid market periods with low market efficiency. Based on funds’ LM trading, 
we find clear evidence for the existence of flow risk, i.e. negative performance effects due to 
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investors’ liquidity demand. This is also especially pronounced during illiquid market periods 
and overall driven more strongly by inflows than outflows, probably due to liquidity 
premiums earned by LM sellers and paid by LM buyers when overall liquidity is low. 
Overall, due to these clear and novel findings, we deem it very important to consider 
trading motivation in future analyses of stock picking skill and flow risk. Therefore, the TMM 
provides an intuitive, easy-to-apply way to accurately distinguishing between single VM and 
LM trades. Future research should also concentrate on the differential effects of buys and sells 
relative to their relevant benchmark universes when measuring the performance of active 
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3 Article II: Who holds the carbon risk bomb? An overview of potential risk takers24 
Julia Scherer, Janik Syryca, Stefan Trück 
 
Abstract. Economic growth is one of the major reasons for increasing levels of CO2 
emissions that have the potential to accelerate climatic change and threaten our environment. 
However, many investors still support CO2-heavy companies financially, even though there 
are various associated risks for these assets with respect to climate policies and stranded 
assets. This study aims to thoroughly examine which investor types tend to hold a higher 
proportion of carbon intensive stocks. To identify high-polluting stocks we provide a 
classification of stocks based on three different categories related to industry sectors, carbon 
footprints and environmental scores. Data on year-end holdings from 2000-2015 is used to 
investigate whether different investor types prefer or try to avoid carbon intensive stocks in 
comparison to investments in peer companies. We find that institutional investors, hedge 
funds, individuals, investment advisors and mutual funds tend to hold less carbon intensive 
firms in their investment portfolios. Interestingly, in contrast, government agencies seem to 
have a higher exposure to polluting stocks in their portfolios (approximately 50%) and 
typically also hold a high percentage of the total market capitalization of these firms. Our 
results are robust against different specifications of carbon intensive companies and measures 
of ownership. Overall, our study provides a better understanding of the exposure to carbon 
intensive stocks for various investor types, but also illustrates which parties have the ability to 
influence environmental behavior of CO2-emitting firms, e.g. by exhibiting voting rights.  
 




                                                 
24 This research article is joint work of Julia Scherer, Janik Syryca and Prof. Stefan Trueck. Major parts of this 




According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 
accounts for about three-quarter of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and is likely to be 
the main driver for anthropogenic global warming (Pachauri et al. (2014)). As a result, policy 
makers around the world are considering various plans to reduce carbon emissions and aim to 
mitigate the possible consequences of rising temperature. Even though there have been 
achievements like the recent Paris agreement (European Commission (2015)), the 
implementation process of the agreed measures for carbon emission reductions is typically 
rather lengthy, difficult to enforce and subject to regular changes. The uncertainty about how 
upcoming measures will impact a firm’s future cash flow is often referred to as carbon risk 
(Dupré et al. (2015)). This risk is particularly relevant for companies with exposures to carbon 
emissions in any part of their business. It has been argued that the exposure to carbon risk for 
businesses and industries could be quite substantial (Stern (2007), Carbon Tracker Initiative 
(2013)). On the one hand, companies face potential extra costs due to taxes or the requirement 
to provide allowances based on their carbon emissions. On the other hand, they also need to 
handle possible changes in customer demand and reputational risks related to being classified 
as unsustainable or high-polluting businesses. Furthermore, estimates suggest that in order to 
achieve the 2°C-goal set in Paris, about three-quarters of all remaining coal, oil and gas 
reserves should not be exploited (Global Carbon Budget (2014)), which will create so-called 
stranded assets, i.e. assets losing their economic value well ahead of their anticipated useful 
lifetime.
 
Assuming that this situation could create a “Carbon Bubble” in the valuation of 
carbon intensive companies, there is an increasing interest in who invests in firms with high 
operational carbon risk. It is also important for policy makers to understand the ownership 
structure of these firms in order to develop appropriate measures. 
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This paper aims to analyze the exposure of different investor types to carbon intensive 
stocks as well as to identify possible recent changes in investment behavior, using an 
extensive ownership database for a large universe of stocks. In particular we combine 
information on firms with high carbon risk exposure based on the Asset4 database with a 
Global Ownership database that provides year-end holdings of these stocks for different types 
of investors for the sample period 2000-2015. This allows us to thoroughly examine the 
ownership of carbon intensive stocks for various ownership and investors types. 
Our study provides important information on investor behavior with regards to high-
polluting firms and is highly relevant for different strands of existing literature. First, our 
work is related to carbon risk research. So far, academic literature has not contributed much to 
help investors with the costly challenge of cutting through the complexity of identifying an 
asset’s exposure to carbon risk. An exception includes the study by Hoffmann and Busch 
(2008) who develop four different indicators that help to assess a company’s contribution to 
climate change and its effort to manage its use of carbon emissions in a better way. Second, 
this study relates to research investigating the relationship between environmental and 
financial performance. In environmental science, scholars have illustrated that companies 
with higher pollution are typically less efficient in their operations, which harms their 
competitiveness and consequently minimizes their firm value. In addition to that, the eco-
efficiency concept suggests that modern and environmentally friendly production methods 
lead to developmental advantages (Ulshöfer and Bonnet (2009)). Based on this rationale, the 
expected relation between environmental performance, especially with respect to GHG 
emissions, and financial performance would be positive. However, the literature studying this 
relationship provides rather mixed conclusions. Using factor-model regression analysis, 
Derwall et al. (2005) and Oestreich and Tsiakas (2015) find conflicting results, with the first 
one suggesting an outperformance of good environmental performers and the second one 
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better risk-return characteristics for bad ones. In earlier years Cohen et al. (1997) find neither 
a penalty nor a reward for investing in green portfolios. Studies performed by Ziegler et al. 
(2011) and Liesen (2015) use the willingness of a company to disclose responses on climate 
change and GHG emissions, respectively, to set up different portfolios. As a result, they find a 
financial performance of disclosing firms. Summarizing the findings from event studies it 
seems that qualitative signals like companies’ attitude towards climate change have a 
significant influence on stock returns, see, e.g., Jacobs et al. (2010), Flammer (2013), Griffin 
and Sun (2013), Hsu and Wang (2013), Murguia and Lence (2015) and Veld-Merkoulova and 
Viteva (2016). However, the direction of the observed impact is not consistent. Another 
popular research method applies using regression models, with financial performance of firms 
as the dependent variable and environmental performance as the key explanatory variable. 
Most of these studies find that high emissions of greenhouse gases have a negative effect on 
market value and return on equity, see, Konar and Cohen (2001), King and Lenox (2001), 
Matsumura et al. (2011), Aggarwal and Dow (2011), Saka and Oshika (2014), Misani and 
Pogutz (2015) and Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2015). Kim et al. (2015) and Chen and Silva Gao 
(2012) confirm this effect on the cost side, when associating higher GHG emissions with a 
higher cost on equity. An exception to these results is provided by Wang et al. (2014), who 
find a positive effect of high GHG emissions on Tobin’s Q for Australian firms. This could be 
explained by the importance of the mining industry for the Australian economy. Lastly, 
academics examine whether decarbonization and the support of green investments are worth 
striving for with regards to the performance of investment portfolios. Like SRI-research, see, 
e.g., Mallin et al. (1995), Schumacher-Hummel (2005) and Derwall et al. (2011), existing 
studies on green funds make use of different data sources, observation periods, 
methodological approaches and definitions. The findings of these studies either suggest 
empirical evidence in favor of (Climent and Soriano (2011), Chang et al. (2012)) or against 
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(Labatt and White (2002), Mallett and Michelson (2010), Muñoz et al. (2014)) the superior 
performance of green investments. 
The existing literature is mainly focused on examining which incentives, i.e. higher 
performance investors might have to invest in carbon intensive stocks. However, it often fails 
to provide investors and policy makers with an appropriate approach to identify carbon risk 
exposure. Furthermore, scholars have not yet explored the question of who actually ‘holds the 
carbon risk bomb’, i.e. which investors types are most invested in carbon intensive stocks and, 
therefore, exposed to potential carbon risks. Our study contributes to the literature by 
thoroughly analyzing both of these aspects. Firstly, we define three different categories of 
carbon intensive stocks that help to identify which companies can be considered as being 
‘dirty’. Secondly, we are the first to work with an extensive dataset of ownership structures 
from 2000-2015 in order to analyze investor behavior related to carbon intensive stocks. 
Therefore, with our study, we contribute to carbon risk research by showing in which 
portfolios the risks are bundled and which investor types are more likely to hold high 
proportions of carbon intensive stocks. In particular, our study contributes to answering the 
following important research questions: How much carbon risk exposure can be observed in 
the portfolios of different investor types? What level of ownership - measured by the 
percentage of the total market capitalization of a stock - do different investor types typically 
hold for the companies in their portfolios? How is the (CO2-intensive) stock universe split 
between different owner types and how are the different owner types invested in ‘dirty’ stocks 
in comparison to their normal investment behavior and portfolio allocation? 
Our findings show that from an owner type perspective, it is typically governments 
who have the highest exposures to carbon intensive stocks in their portfolio (approximately 
50%), whereas institutionals, hedge funds, individuals, investment advisors and mutual funds 
hold much lower exposures in these stocks (between 15% and 30%). Interestingly, 
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governments also hold the highest percentage of shares of ‘dirty’ stocks in their portfolio, 
holding on average around 40% of the total market capital of these firms. Regarding the 
overall ownership distribution of stocks in the CO2-intensive universe, we find that mainly 
mutual funds, but also hedge funds and investment advisors form the biggest owner groups, 
having an ownership between 10% and 20% each. Moreover, we provide more detailed 
information about the preferences and behavior of each investor type. For example, we find 
that hedge funds, individuals, investment advisors and mutual funds own statistically 
significant less carbon intensive stocks in comparison to non-carbon intensive stocks. 
Government agencies in contrary typically have more ownership in carbon intensive stocks 
(even though not statistically significant). 
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. Section 3.2 describes the methodology 
applied to identify carbon intensive stocks and holdings. This is followed by section 3.3, 
which describes available and selected data for our empirical analysis. Section 3.4 presents 
the results of our analysis, while section 3.5 concludes and provides possible direction of 
future work in the area. 
3.2 Methodology and definitions 
To examine which investors are most exposed to carbon intensive firms, it is necessary to 
identify the companies with the highest carbon risk exposure. So far, academic research has 
not contributed much to help investors with cutting through the complexity of identifying an 
asset’s exposure to carbon risk. An exception is the study by Hoffmann and Busch (2008) 
who define considerable indicators based on the amount of CO2-emissions. However, the 
Portfolio Carbon Initiative (PCI) set up by the United Nations Environment Finance Initiative 
(UNEP FI) develops a rather practical framework and argues that carbon risk does not only 
comprise quantifiable but also non-quantifiable components. In our study, we aim to gather a 
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comprehensive picture of a firm’s exposure to carbon risk by including quantitative and 
qualitative aspects. Therefore, we define three metrics to classify carbon intensive stocks: 
Industry-based carbon risk definition (industry affiliation), the carbon footprint of a company 
as well as a measure related to climate scoring. 
3.2.1 Industry-based carbon risk definition (industry affiliation) 
To break down the complexity of identifying carbon risk exposure, we start with the most 
intuitive approach. In a first step, we use the Thomson Reuters Business Classification 
(TRBC) to classify all stocks based on the industry they belong to. This is reasonable as 
sectors are affected differently by the transformation into a carbon-constrained world, see e.g., 
Labatt and White (2002). This method has also been used in recent studies by Gallego-
Álvarez et al. (2015) and Misani and Pogutz (2015) to select GHG sensitive firms. The sector 
that is typically considered to be the most sensitive to carbon risk is the energy industry, 
including oil, gas, coal and power utilities
25
 (Labatt and White (2002) and (2007)).  
However firms that belong to energy-intensive industries such as chemicals, iron, 
steel, cement, and metallurgy
26
 are nearly equally effected. The reason is that these sectors 
have a high consumption of fossil fuels and are represented by Basic Resources (Dell’Aringa 
and van Ast (2009)). Besides direct GHG emissions, it is also relevant how much carbon is 
emitted during downstream activities. Hence, we additionally categorize producers and users 
of energy-consuming products like the automobile and transportation industry
27
 as carbon 
intensive industry. These companies are also very vulnerable, especially to technology risk 
(e.g. fuel efficiency), see, e.g., Labatt and White (2007) and Goodstein (2011). 
                                                 
25 Corresponding to the Thomson Reuters industry groups oil & gas, oil & gas related equipment and services, 
natural gas utilities, coal, electric utilities & ipp and multiline utilities. 
26 Corresponding to the Thomson Reuters industry groups chemicals, metals & mining and construction 
materials. 
27 Corresponding to the Thomson Reuters industry groups aerospace & defense, automobile & parts, freight & 
logistics services, passenger transportation and transport infrastructure. 
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We additionally include the sector “Paper and Forest Products” into the list of CO2-
heavy industries. This takes into account that deforestation does not only lead to releases of 
CO2 stored in the terrestrial biosphere, but also reduces the ability to absorb emitted 
greenhouse gases (Pachauri et al. (2014)). Therefore, the industry also has the potential to 
worsen global warming and is subject to possible regulatory measures. This leaves us with the 
15 CO2-heavy industries that are presented in Table XVI. 
Table XVI: CO2-intensive industries 
This table includes 14 industries from three categories which are most sensitive to carbon risk. In addition to the sectors 
provided, we also include the “Paper & Forest Products” industry into the list of CO2-intensive industries. Every company in 
Asset4 that belongs to one of these 15 industries is categorized as carbon intensive in our analysis. 
Energy industry Energy-intensive industry Energy-consuming products 
Coal Chemicals Aerospace and Defense 
Electric Utilities and IPPs Construction Materials Automobile and Parts 
Natural Gas Utilities Metals and Mining Freight and Logistics Services 
Multiline Utilities  Passenger Transportation Services 
Oil and Gas  Transport Infrastructure 
Oil and Gas Related Equipment 
and Services 
  
Paper and Forest Products 
 
3.2.2 Carbon Footprint 
By using the industry affiliation of a company, the underlying assumption is that all 
companies which belong to the 15 defined CO2-heavy industries face the same degree of 
carbon risk exposure. However not all companies within the same industry face the exact 
amount of carbon risk as they emit different amounts of GHG. 
To achieve a finer distinction, we therefore follow Hoffmann and Busch (2008) and 
the PCI and additionally compute a company’s footprint. The carbon footprint is defined as a 
company’s total GHG emissions
28
 standardized by some proxy of size. In line with Aggarwal 
                                                 
28 To overcome the problem of an imperfect time series, we calculate the averages of all normalized CO2e-
emissions from 2008-2015 for each firm. Working with a limited period allows us to create a static sample of 
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and Dow (2011), Balkissoon and Heaps (2014), Saka and Oshika (2014), Kim et al. (2015), 
Misani and Pogutz (2015), we use the market capitalization, EBITDA and sales as proxies for 
our ranking: 
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑀 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐻𝐺 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
     (1a) 
 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐸 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐻𝐺 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
       (1b) 
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑆 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐻𝐺 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
       (1c) 
Total GHG emissions include CO2-emissions from Scope 1 (emissions from sources directly 
owned and controlled by the company) and Scope 2 (indirect emissions from the generation 
of purchased electricity). Emissions from Scope 3, which occur in upstream as well as in 
downstream activities are not included in this definition as the company has no influence over 
them. Besides their reporting is optional and available data therefore not very reliable (Carbon 
Trust (2012)). 
However only a few regulators require mandatory GHG disclosure and if they do, 
these disclosures are only imposed on companies with specific features (Nitoiu (2013)). As a 
result, the coverage of total CO2e-emissions data is sparse, especially in the early 2000’s. 
However, Figure 3 shows that coverage has lately increased. In 2015 more than 400 
companies (more than 50% of all companies) from carbon intensive industries provide data 
for total CO2e-emissions.  
To differentiate the best and worst carbon risk stocks, we use a “worst-in-class” 
approach, i.e. we rank all companies within each carbon intensive industry based on their 
                                                                                                                                                        
CO2-heavy firms, which can be analyzed over time. Thereby we assume that the average behavior is 
representative for the whole time period of 2000-2015. We exclude companies without any emission data. 
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carbon footprint (Labatt and White (2002)). Firms with carbon footprint values in the highest 
50% of an industry are classified as worst emitters.
29
 
Figure 3: Firms with available CO2e emission data  
This figure presents the number (left y-axis) and percentage (right y-axis) of firms from CO2-intensive industries with 








3.2.3 Climate Scoring 
Earlier academic studies have mainly neglected the fact that a firm’s carbon risk exposure is 
not only a question of its quantifiable carbon footprint. If a company wants to reduce its risk, 
cutting down carbon emissions is only one step. In addition to that, there must be initiatives to 
develop improvements in dealing with natural resources, see, e.g., Calvello (2009). This is 
why we also identify firms with high carbon risk exposure through ranking their Climate 
Scoring. Hereby, we offer a more comprehensive and forward-looking picture about how a 
company deals with carbon risk exposure that also includes qualitative factors. Scoring data 
can be received from third-party providers like Thomson Reuters. But here again, coverage in 
                                                 
29 We acknowledge that one disadvantage of the „worst-in-class“ approach is that in sectors with generally low 
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the early 2000’s is spare. However Figure 4 shows that after 2009 nearly 100% of all stocks 
from carbon intensive industries have E-Score available. 
Figure 4: Firms with available E-Score data 
This figure presents the number (left y-axis) and percentage (right y-axis) of firms from CO2-intensive industries with 








Similar to the approach taken to compute the worst carbon footprint based emitters, we 
average all of a company’s reported E-scores from 2008 to 2015 and classify the lowest 50% 
in each industry as worst E-Score based emitters. 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Firms with highest carbon risk exposure 
The following section provides summary statistics about the databases used in this study. We 
obtain data about CO2-emission and E-Score from the Asset4 database (provided by Thomson 
Reuters). This database covers the most important shares traded on global stock markets
30
 and 
therefore serves as a good proxy for the worldwide investment universe. Data about sales, 
EBITDA and market capitalization stem from the data provider Worldscope. 
                                                 
30 MSCI Emerging Markets, MSCI World, CAC40, DAX, FTSE250, S&P 500, NASDAQ 100, STOXX 600, 
























































































Since Asset4 sources its CO2-data inter alia from the Carbon Disclosure Project, we 
have to work with voluntarily reported data that might possibly be unreliable, inconsistent and 
not validated by a third party according to Calvello (2009). Furthermore, it poses the risk of a 
self-selection bias, where e.g. bad environmental performers consciously do not report 
emissions in order to minimize their reputational risks. However, the Asset4 database is 
currently the best available source for ESG data without considerable alternatives (Thomson 
Reuters (2012)). Hence, this analysis has to proceed with the mentioned limitations similar to 
earlier studies (Aggarwal and Dow (2011), Matsumura et al. (2011), Wang et al. (2014), Saka 
and Oshika (2014), Misani and Pogutz (2015)) that have also worked with voluntarily 
disclosed data. 
In total, we obtain 875 stocks from carbon intensive industries which have been active 
for the whole period between 2000 and 2015. Companies that have entered the stock market 
later or were delisted due to mergers or bankruptcy are excluded. By doing so, we create an 
Asset4 universe where investors could theoretically have been invested in every year 
throughout the considered sample period. Due to the smaller coverage of available data, we 
have 291 firms that are ranked as the worst emitters according to their carbon footprint and 
424 which have the worst climate scoring.  
An overview of the industry and country distribution of these subsamples can be found 
in Table XVII. This summary also shows that the selected 875 firms correspond to 
approximately 21% of the total market capitalization of all Asset4 companies in the sample. 




Table XVII: Number of firms in Asset4 which are categorized as carbon intensive stocks 
Panels A and B include the number of firms which are covered in the subsample after selecting 875 Asset4 companies that belong to the 
15 most CO2-sensitive industries and after applying the “worst-in-class” approach for carbon footprint (with three different normalization 
metrics) and climate scoring. Panel A shows how many of the remaining Asset4 firms belong to each of the defined CO2-intensive 
industry. Furthermore, it includes the equivalent market capitalization for the defined stocks and how big their proportion of the total 
Asset4 universe is. Panel B shows where these firms have their headquarters. Countries marked with * have emission regulations (trading 
scheme or carbon tax) that have either already been implemented, are scheduled or currently under consideration. 
 
 
Panel A: Distribution by industry 
Industry 
carbon intensive  
industry 
worst carbon footprint normalized by worst E-Score 
Market Capitalization EBITDA Sales 
Aerospace & Defense 27 11 11 11 12 
Automobiles & Auto Parts 85 31 31 31 42 
Chemicals 95 37 37 37 47 
Coal 16 2 2 2 7 
Construction Materials 34 12 12 12 16 
Electric Utilities & IPPs 84 36 36 36 41 
Freight & Logistics Services 49 16 16 16 24 
Metals & Mining 179 49 49 49 88 
Multiline Utilities 22 8 8 8 10 
Natural Gas Utilities 16 5 5 5 7 
Oil & Gas 123 39 39 39 60 
Oil & Gas Related Equipment and Services 59 14 14 14 29 
Paper & Forest Products 17 8 8 8 8 
Passenger Transportation Services 43 15 15 15 21 
Transport Infrastructure 26 8 8 8 12 
Total # of firms 875 291 291 291 424 
Total market capitalization in bn.$ 8,331 3,545 3,875 3,335 1,241 
% of total Asset4 market capitalization 21% 9% 10% 8% 3% 
 




worst carbon footprint normalized by 
worst E-Score 
Market Capitalization EBITDA Sales 
Australia 73 9 11 18 48 
Brazil* 19 5 6 7 6 
Canada 106 20 22 27 73 
Chile* 10 1 2 3 7 
China* 20 2 2 2 14 
EU* 122 55 51 36 25 
Hong Kong 24 5 3 6 13 
India 26 13 14 12 12 
Japan* 106 51 47 35 36 
Kazakhstan* 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico* 6 1 2 0 2 
New Zealand* 9 1 1 2 7 
Others 70 20 20 24 51 
Russian Federation 9 3 2 2 0 
South Africa* 24 17 14 17 9 
South Korea* 21 11 10 10 6 
Thailand* 5 1 0 1 1 
Turkey* 8 2 3 1 6 
United Kingdom 26 11 11 12 7 
United States 191 63 70 76 101 
Total # of firms 875 291 291 291 424 
% of firms with headquarter in *countries  
 




3.3.2 Ownership holdings 
Our data on ownership structure is sourced from the Thomson Reuters’ Global Ownership 
database. We use year-end holdings from 2000 to 2015. We focus on institutional investors 
(incl. banks, trusts, insurances, pension and endowment funds and foundations), hedge funds, 
mutual funds, investment advisors, as well as individuals and government agencies. Since 
mutual funds report on an aggregated level (e.g. as “Fidelity Asset & Research Company”) as 
well as on a single fund level (e.g. for “Fidelity High Income Fund” or “Fidelity Value Fund”) 
there is the risk of duplicates. This is why in our empirical analysis we examine mutual funds 
and aggregated mutual funds separately. 
Table XVIII shows how the holdings of the companies in our specified Asset4 
subsample are distributed amongst the different owner groups in the Global Ownership 
database. We find that the value of all stocks held by all owners in the sample varies from 
13,716 billion dollars in 2000 to 27,755 billion dollars in 2015. As mutual funds hold 
constantly more than 30% of this value, they form the largest group regarding their number of 
total investment volume, while governments and individuals form the smallest investor types. 
3.4 Results 
The analysis in this paper is divided into two major parts. Part I investigates owners and their 
investment behavior with regards to carbon intensive stocks in general, and examines the 
following two key questions: (i) How much carbon risk exposure do portfolios of different 
owner types contain? (ii) What is the fraction of ownership (i.e. the percentage of the total 
market capitalization) for the companies in the portfolio of different ownership types? Note 
that the analysis in part I only considers stocks that are held in the owners’ portfolio, whereas  
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Table XVIII: Comparison of the different investor types 
This table shows on a yearly basis the number of different investors for each investor type. Besides it reports the number of stocks this group holds at the end of year t. Additionally, it shows how big the 
seven groups are regarding their percentage of the total investment volume in our Asset4 universe. 
    Investor Types Total investment volume in bn. 
    Institutionals Hedge Funds Individuals Government Inv. Advisor Mutual Funds aggregated 
Mutual Funds 
units of shares value of shares 
 
2000 # of owners 506 843 1,625 43 1,443 17,659 910 
1,413 13,716 # of reported holdings 50,469 102,254 1,672 110 109,506 870,907 111,458 
% of investment volume in units/value 14.7% / 10.3% 21.5% / 23.4% 3.2 / 3.9% 7.1% / 2.1% 13.7% / 21.4% 32.1% / 31.6% 7.7% / 7.2% 
2001 # of owners 506 906 2,366 28 1,415 16,204 980 
686 9,522 # of reported holdings 54,069 119,288 2,435 87 110,402 874,814 128,501 
% of investment volume in units/value 6.1% / 8.3% 19.3% / 24.8% 7.1% / 2.7% 6.0% / 1.4% 16.6% / 27.9% 31.2% / 28.0% 13.7% / 6.8% 
2002 # of owners 545 1,013 2,381 29 1,422 18,409 1,130 
910 8,357 # of reported holdings 61,927 127,713 2,467 101 111,993 1,050,105 140,812 
% of investment volume in units/value 6.2% / 8.1% 24.6% / 25.8% 4.5% / 3.1% 3.5% / 2.1% 14.7% / 26.5% 36.3% / 28.9% 10.2% / 5.4% 
2003 # of owners 582 1,133 3,528 33 1,479 18,753 1,115 
1,075 12,133 # of reported holdings 65,740 139,347 3,652 103 123,821 1,127,696 137,886 
% of investment volume in units/value 5.7% / 8.0% 22.6% / 26.5% 5.4% / 2.8% 5.4% / 2.1% 13.3% / 25.6% 38.6% / 29.3% 9.0% / 5.8% 
2004 # of owners 592 1,283 3,870 36 1,562 19,101 1,210 
1,129 14,004 # of reported holdings 66,107 146,259 4,012 103 129,039 1,148,571 139,938 
% of investment volume in units/value 5.0% / 7.1% 21.1% / 25.3% 4.6% / 3.1% 9.4% / 2.0% 14.2% / 25.8% 36.9% / 31.5% 8.7% / 5.1% 
2005 # of owners 663 1,458 4,838 37 1,717 20,078 1,283 
1,248 16,902 # of reported holdings 69,452 163,565 5,049 94 139,908 1,215,343 142,279 
% of investment volume in units/value 4.9% / 6.6% 20.9% / 25.4% 5.0% / 2.9% 7.8% / 1.7% 13.9% / 23.3% 40.9% / 35.4% 6.7% / 4.7% 
2006 # of owners 691 1,647 4,831 42 1,823 21,728 1,353 
1,309 20,723 # of reported holdings 71,629 186,982 5,038 98 155,468 1,318,032 155,280 
% of investment volume in units/value 4.6% / 6.4% 22.7% / 26.1% 3.75 7 2.95 7.55% / 1.65% 13.0% / 22.6% 41.6% 35.8% 6.9% / 4.6% 
2007 # of owners 666 1,768 5,251 43 1,913 22,028 1,563 
1,111 21,301 # of reported holdings 71,858 226,978 5,482 104 166,835 1,408,210 184,511 
% of investment volume in units/value 5.9% / 6.1% 20.1% / 25.6% 6.2% / 3.6% 3.9% / 2.4% 14.7% / 23.0% 35.3% / 31.9% 13.9% / 7.3% 
2008 # of owners 607 1,698 6,291 62 1,904 18,007 1,436 
1,142 12,076 # of reported holdings 66,618 212,675 6,628 134 169,994 1,282,063 161,112 
% of investment volume in units/value 4.9% / 5.9% 18.7% / 25.1% 7.7% / 3.4% 11.0% / 2.4% 15.5% / 25.1% 31.0% / 32.0% 11.3% / 6.2% 
2009 # of owners 603 1,605 6,892 68 1,932 18,199 1,413 
1,211 16,815 # of reported holdings 68,300 216,605 7,222 161 168,261 1,272,460 145,820 
% of investment volume in units/value 4.8% / 6.1% 18.2% / 24.5% 7.5% / 4.2% 11.3% / 3.3% 15.2% / 24.4% 32.0% / 31.8% 10.9% / 5.7% 
2010 # of owners 606 1,645 6,461 66 2,013 18,843 1,446 
1,288 18,877 # of reported holdings 72,906 220,763 6,773 159 176,934 1,298,089 155,585 
% of investment volume in units/value 4.7% / 6.3% 17.7% / 24.7% 7.8% / 4.2% 10.5% / 3.0% 15.3% / 23.8% 32.8% / 32.4% 11.2% / 5.6% 
2011 # of owners 612 1,723 6,880 64 2,112 21,123 1,640 
1,346 17,697 # of reported holdings 72,230 226,511 7,178 150 184,848 1,410,596 161,486 
% of investment volume in units/value 5.3% / 6.6% 17.4% / 24.5% 7.9% / 4.0% 10.2% / 2.5% 15.3% / 24.2% 33.1% / 33.1% 10.7% / 5.1% 
2012 # of owners 586 1,691 6,698 67 2,231 21,365 1,599 
1,430 20,908 # of reported holdings 77,238 240,460 6,985 159 203,126 1,498,424 163,192 
% of investment volume in units/value 5.6% / 6.6% 17.6% / 24.0% 6.9% / 4.0% 9.5% / 2.2% 13.4% / 23.2% 35.4% / 34.6% 11.6%/5.4% 
2013 # of owners 602 1,788 6,995 69 2,418 23,144 1,678 
1,493 26,375 # of reported holdings 82,117 256,324 7,310 155 222,322 155,841 196,156 
% of investment volume in units/value 5.5% / 6.2% 17.6% / 24.2% 6.4% / 3.6% 9.4% / 1.9% 13.1% / 23.4% 35.6% / 34.7% 12.5% / 6.0% 
2014 # of owners 608 1,877 7,306 66 2,645 22,806 1,739 
1,600 28,672 # of reported holdings 89,699 271,439 7,603 153 249,578 1,558,897 211,522 
% of investment volume in units/value 5.9% / 6.2% 17.6% / 24.2% 6.5% / 3.1% 8.7% / 1.7% 13.2% / 23.9% 35.2% / 35.1% 12.9% / 5.8% 
2015 # of owners 628 1,860 9,441 66 2,745 22,452 1,802 
1,616 27,755 # of reported holdings 90,200 274,820 9,719 155 267,901 1,650,714 219,468 
% of investment volume in units/value 5.2% / 5.8% 17.7% / 24.0% 6.2% / 3.3% 9.3% / 1.6% 13.4% / 24.2% 35.4% / 35.3% 12.8% / 5.9% 
TOTAL total # of different owners 1,380 3,248 26,417 105 4,691 57,037 3,546   
total # of reported holdings 1,130,559 3,131,983 89,225 2,026 2,689,936 20,543,662 2,555,006   
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in part II the analysis is augmented to the full investment universe of all stocks that are 
potentially available for purchase. Part II answers the following questions: How is the (CO2-
intensive) stock universe split between different owner types? How are the different owner 
types invested in ‘dirty’ stocks in comparison to their normal investment habits and portfolio 
allocations?  
3.4.1 Part I: About the owners and the stocks in their portfolio 
3.4.1.1 Exposure of ‘dirty’ stocks in investor portfolios 
In this section we investigate the carbon risk exposure in portfolios of different owner types. 
Hereby, we examine institutionals, hedge funds, individuals, government agencies, 
investment advisors, mutual funds and aggregated mutual funds - and compute the following 
variables to measure the exposure:  
The carbon risk exposure 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 of investor i in t is computed as  
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑠,𝑡𝑠 ∈𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡     
∑ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑘,𝑡𝑘 ∈𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+𝑃𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡
  (1) 
where 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is the value of stock s that investor i has in her portfolio at time t, and 
𝑘 ∈ 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 describes all ‘dirty’ stocks 𝐷𝑆 in the portfolio P of investor i at time t. 𝑘 ∈
𝑃𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡  analogously describes all ‘non-dirty’ stocks N𝐷𝑆 in this portfolio. 





∑ 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑖∈𝑂𝑗   (2) 
where 𝑖 ∈ 𝑂𝑗 contains all investors i that belong to owner type j and 𝑛𝑂𝑗 is the number of 
these investors in owner type j. 
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Additionally to our analysis about the average carbon exposure behavior of the single 
owner types, we aggregate all investors within one owner type and compare the exposure of 
this hypothetical aggregated portfolio. For this purpose, we sum up all corresponding stocks 
of all investors i that belong to owner type j.  
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑗,𝑡(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟) =
∑ ∑ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑠,𝑡𝑠∈𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑖 ∈𝑂𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑠,𝑡𝑠∈𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+𝑃𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑖 ∈𝑂𝑗
  (3) 
Thus, a 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑗,𝑡(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟) value of 30% indicates that all investors of owner type j (e.g. all hedge 
funds) have 30% of their total money invested in carbon intensive stocks. 
Figure 5 displays the development of average carbon risk exposure 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑗,𝑡(∅) and the 
aggregated carbon risk exposure 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑗,𝑡(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟) for the various investor types over time. 
In our description of the results we focus on the average carbon risk exposure that is 
displayed in the left graphs since the described tendencies are qualitatively the same for the 
aggregated exposure on the right. 
Interestingly, the most significant difference in investment preferences among the 
different investor types can be observed within government agencies. Panel A shows that the 
average portfolio of government agencies consists of about 50% carbon intensive stocks while 
the average portfolio of all other owner or investor types is relatively stable over time and 
ranges from 15% to 30%. Values between 15% and 30% lie within the expected range since 
carbon intensive stocks account for approximately 21% of the market capitalization in our 
sample (see Table XVII). However, the high investment of government agencies in carbon 
intensive stocks is remarkable. Main driver is probably the high occurrence of state-
ownership within CO2-heavy sectors like Utilities and Oil & Gas. This hypothesis is 




Figure 5: Carbon risk exposure of different investor types 
The following graphs show the carbon risk exposure in the portfolios of the following investor types: Institutionals, Hedge 
Funds, Individuals, Government Agencies, Investment advisors, Mutual Funds and aggregated Mutual Funds. Graphs on the 
left present the average exposure 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑗,𝑡(∅) within one owner group, while the graphs on the right illustrate the aggregated 
value of CO2-intensive stocks 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑗,𝑡(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟) as a proportion of the aggregated total assets of each investor type. 
The results in each panel vary due to the different categories of CO2-intensive stocks. Panel A shows the carbon risk exposure 
for ‘dirty’ stocks from CO2-intensive industries. Panel B, C and D represent the results for the worst emitters according to the 
ranking of their carbon footprint (CO2e-emissions normalized by Market Capitalization, EBITDA and Sales, respectively). 
Finally, Panel E includes the exposures in stocks with the worst ranking in climate scoring. 
 
















Figure 5 (continued): 
















and financial services are dominant sectors among state-owned enterprises in the Fortune 
Global 500, with metals and motor vehicles being the most emerging sectors (Sturesson et al. 
(2015)). In Panels B-E, the exposure to carbon intensive stocks is further disentangled by 
examining investments into the ‘dirtiest’ stocks within the carbon intensive stock category. 
For this purpose, the worst emitters are defined as the 50% companies with the highest carbon 
footprint measured by CO2e-emissions divided by market capitalization (Panel B), carbon 
emission divided by EBITDA (Panel C) and carbon emission divided by sales (Panel D). 
Furthermore, Panel E includes investments into 50% of the firms in each CO2-intensive 
industry with the worst climate scores. 
Recall that in terms of market capitalization, Table XVII shows that companies 
classified as worst emitters make up only slightly more than 40% (based on the different 
business metrics in Panel B-D) and 15% (based on the climate scoring in Panel E) of all CO2-
intensive stocks
31
. This means that without any exposure preferences between worst and best 
emitters within the ‘dirty’ stocks category - one would expect the investment of government 
agencies in Panel B-D to equally decrease to slightly more than 20% (40% of 50% exposure) 
and 7.5% (15% of 50% exposure) in Panel E. As the values of the exposure of government 
agencies are within the expected range, we can conclude that portfolio allocation is made 
irrespective of the ranking within the CO2-intensive stocks universe. 
3.4.1.2 Ownership of stocks in the portfolio 
In this section we target the following question: How much ownership of the carbon intensive 
stocks in their portfolio (in terms of percentage of the total market capitalization or total shares 
outstanding) do the different owner types possess?  
                                                 
31 Total market capitalization of all stocks from carbon intensive stocks is 8,331 billion dollars. The total market 
capitalization of all stocks that are classified as worst emitter is 3,545 (3,875 / 3,335 / 1,241) billion dollars. 
Notice that due to limited data availability not all stocks from the carbon intensive industry could be ranked 
according to their footprint. 
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For this purpose we define for each owner type j (e.g. all hedge funds), the ownership 
that this group possess in all ‘dirty’ stocks in their portfolios. 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃_𝑃 𝑗,𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟. )  =
∑ ∑ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑠,𝑡𝑠∈𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑖∈𝑂𝑗
∑ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠,𝑡𝑠∈𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑗,𝑡
       (4a) 
Therefore, an 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃_𝑃 𝑗,𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟. ) of 20% indicates that all investors of owner type 
j together (e.g. all hedge funds) possess 20% of the shares outstanding of all ‘dirty’ stocks DS 
in their portfolios P. 
Additionally as robustness, we use a similar variable that is not based on shares held but on 




𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟. )  =
∑ ∑ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑠,𝑡𝑠∈𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑖∈𝑂𝑗
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠,𝑡𝑠∈𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑗,𝑡
       (4b) 
Figure 6 displays the amount of carbon intensive stocks in the portfolios possessed by the 
different owner types. The left panel describes ownership in terms of owned shares, while the 
right panel describes ownership in terms of market value held by the investors. The results 
show that if investors - again with the exception of governments - invest in carbon intensive 
companies they hold on average less than 10% in terms of stocks and less than 20% in terms of 
market capitalization of these firms. However, it is remarkable that government agencies 
typically have a considerably higher share of ownership that is greater than 40%. This again 
might indicate a high occurrence of state-ownership within CO2-intensive sectors as it reveals 
that when governments are invested in these companies, they hold proportions far above the 
                                                 
32
 Both approaches might be justified depending on the purpose of investigation as they can lead to different 
interpretations: Imagine that there are only two CO2-intensive stock companies which have the same market 
capitalization. One is a penny stock, the other is not. (e.g. company A has a market capitalization of 100 and 100 
shares outstanding (penny stock); company B has a market capitalization of 100 and only 10 shares outstanding 
(no penny stock)). If all hedge funds altogether possess 10 stocks of each company, its 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃 𝑗,𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟. ) is 18% (
10+10
100+10
), but the 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑡 







average. Since governments usually do not primarily invest for financial gain, but to provide 
services to their citizens, holding higher shares provides them with more shareholder rights 
which can be used to get a stronger position to control the targeted companies. 
Figure 6: Carbon stock ownership of the different investor types  
The following graphs show the fraction of carbon intensive stocks that is owned by the different investor types. Carbon 
intensive stocks that do not occur in the investors’ portfolios are not considered. The left graph presents the aggregated 
ownership of each owner group measured in units of shares outstanding 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃_𝑃𝑗,𝑡 
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟. ). The right one 
constitutes the aggregated ownership measured in value held of the market capitalization 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃_𝑃𝑗,𝑡 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟. ). 
The results in each panel vary due to the different categories of CO2-intensive stocks. Panel A shows the ownership share for 
‘dirty’ stocks from CO2-intensive industries. Panel B, C and D represent the results for the worst emitters according to the 
ranking of their carbon footprint (CO2e-emissions normalized by Market Capitalization, EBITDA and Sales, respectively). 
Finally, Panel E includes ownerships in stocks with the worst ranking in climate scoring. 
 






















Figure 6 (continued): 

























3.4.2 Part II: About the owners and the full investment universe 
So far our analysis only considers stocks that are held in the owners’ portfolio. However, it 
does not take into account that some of the carbon intensive stocks might be completely 
ignored by the different investor types. To illustrate this difference, imagine a universe with 
100 CO2-intensive stocks. If hedge funds only invest in one of these companies (e.g. with 
ownership = 100%), our analysis in part I correctly detects that they possess 100% of the ‘dirty’ 
stocks in their portfolio. However, it does not take into account that there are 99 further carbon 
intensive companies in which their share is 0%. To draw inferences about ownership of 
different investor types in the CO2-intensive stock universe, in the following we consider the 
full investment universe of all stocks that are potentially available for purchase. Such an 
analysis will then allow us to answer the following questions: How is the whole (carbon 
intensive) stock universe split between the different owner types? How are the different owner 
types invested in the ‘dirty’ stocks universe in comparison to their usual investment habits and 
portfolio allocations? 
For this analysis, we rely on the 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑡(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟. ) measures that are developed 
in the previous section. Clearly, the main difference to the analysis previously conducted is in 
the denominator: we no longer consider only shares outstanding (or market capitalization) of 
CO2-intensive stocks in the portfolios of the different owners (𝑠 ∈ 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑗,𝑡), but the whole 
investment universe of all carbon intensive stocks. Thus, we consider all ‘dirty’ stocks (𝑠 ∈
𝐷𝑆𝑡) that could have been bought by the different investor types. We define 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟. )  =
∑ ∑ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑠,𝑡𝑠∈𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑖∈𝑂𝑗
∑ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠,𝑡𝑠∈𝐷𝑆𝑡
               (5a)  
and          𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑡




                    (5b) 
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where 𝑠 ∈ 𝐷𝑆𝑡 contains all stocks in the carbon intensive stock universe (available in Asset4) at 
time t. 
Figure 7: Carbon stock ownership of the different investor types - full investment universe 
Following graphs show how the full carbon stock universe is split between different owner groups. It shows the ownership 
distribution of carbon intensive stocks according to their affiliation to 15 CO2-intensive industries. Panel A presents the 
aggregated ownership of each owner group measured in units of shares outstanding 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟. ). Panel B 
constitutes the aggregated ownership measured in value held of the market capitalization 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟. ). 
 









Panel B: Development of ownership distribution of CO2-intensive stocks - value of shares outstanding 
 
 
Figure 7 shows how ownership of carbon intensive stocks is distributed among the different 
investor types. It illustrates that mutual funds are the strongest owner group, holding around 
10% of all outstanding shares (Panel A) and 20% of market capitalization (Panel B) of all 
carbon intensive stocks in our sample. In total, Figure 7 reveals that mutual funds, hedge funds 
and investment advisors hold the highest proportion of the carbon risk bomb. This might not 
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only be interesting for clients of these investor types, but also for policy makers, who are 
thinking of controlling the sponsors of ‘dirty’ companies. Governments, which had more than 
50% carbon intensive stocks in their portfolio (see Figure 5) have only about 2% ownership in 
all carbon intensive stocks in total. Therefore, governments belong to the weakest investor 
types. Overall, we see their role as a carbon risk taker mainly stemming from state-ownership 
of selected CO2-intensive firms. 
One might argue that different owner types have different amounts of money to invest. 
For this reason it is self-evident that owner types with more assets under management are 
generally able to have higher ownership in companies. Therefore, solely relying on aggregated 
measures of ownership might lead to misleading results. To draw conclusions about the 
different owners’ investment preferences in carbon intensive stocks, we now conduct an 
analysis that puts the owners’ ownership of one individual stock in relation to their average 





     (6) 
denote the ownership of an investor type j of a specific stock s at time t as the sum of shares 
held of stock s by all investors i of group j divided by the number of shares outstanding of stock 
s at time t. In order to evaluate how much this single investment differs from the owner group’s 
j usual investment behavior, we adjust the ownership in stock s of owner type j by the owner 
type’s j average ownership in all other stocks, which yields 
∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 =  𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑠,𝑡






    (7) 
Thus, a value of 1% for the variable ∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 indicates that investor type j (e.g. 
hedge funds) holds 1 percentage point (pp) more of this particular company s than she holds 
on average in any other carbon intensive and non-carbon intensive companies. 
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Panel A in Figure 8 focuses on the ownership preference in carbon intensive companies. 
It displays how the average ∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃 for every investor type for all carbon intensive 
stocks of the Asset4 universe has developed over time. It is observable that governments are the 
only owner group with a constantly positive value of ∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃. This indicates that on 
average governments have a higher share of ownership in a specific ‘dirty’ company than they 
average ownership in all other Asset4 companies. This inferred preference for carbon intensive 
firms is in line with our findings from part I of our empirical analysis. All remaining investor 
types have negative values of ∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃, which means that they typically hold less of a 
specific CO2-intensive stock in comparison to their usual investment behavior.  
Figure 8: Delta ownership development 
In order to evaluate how much a single investment differs from the owner group’s usual investment behavior, we adjust the 
ownership in a specific stock of an owner type by the owner type’s average ownership in all other stocks. This is expressed 
by the variable ∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃. Panel A displays for every investor type how their average ∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃 for all carbon 
intensive stocks of the Asset4 universe has developed over time. As a comparison, Panel B shows the development for 
∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃 of an average stock that does not belong to one of the 15 CO2-intensive industries identified earlier. 
 
Panel A: Development of delta ownership distribution of CO2-intensive stocks 
 







Analogous to this, Panel B shows that governments are less invested in non-carbon intensive 
companies while all other investor types seem to favor non-carbon intensive stocks and have a 
higher ownership in these companies. 
To further test how significant these differences are, we use year-end observations and 
run for each stock s, each investor type j and each year t the following regression model. 
∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 =  𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑗𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝑌𝑗,𝑠,𝑡𝑗∈{1,2,..,𝐽} + 𝑎𝐽+1𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑠,𝑡 + 𝑎𝐽+2𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑠,𝑡 +
 𝑎𝐽+3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 (8) 
The dummy variables 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝑌𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 equal one if the stock s is categorized as a carbon intensive stock 
and held by the corresponding investor type 𝑗, and zero otherwise. It is computed for each 
different owner type (J indicates the number of different owner types). In line with Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) who conduct a similar analysis based on sin stocks, we use the following 
control variables: We compute 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑠,𝑡 as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of 
the company at the end of year t, 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑠,𝑡 as the daily stock return standard deviation during the 
year t and 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑠,𝑡 as the arithmetic average of monthly returns of year t. All variables are 
calculated at the end of the year. 
The coefficients of interest however are the coefficients of the dummy variables 𝑎1 to 
𝑎𝐽 , which measure whether different sets of carbon intensive stocks cause a change in 
investment habits of the corresponding owner group. For example, assume that hedge funds are 
owner type number 1, and the estimation yields 𝑎1=0.01. This result would then correspond to 
hedge funds having a ∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃 for carbon intensive firms that is higher than for non-
carbon intensive firms by 1 percentage point. Hence, for our example, on average this owner 
group would own 1 percentage point more of a ‘dirty’ company in comparison to a ‘clean’ 
company based on all Asset4 firms. 
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Table XVIV reports the results of the regression. Panel A contains a specification without 
control variables. We find that all signs for the estimated coefficients of the owner  
Table XVIV: Regression estimation results 
This table shows the estimation results for a pooled panel regression for ownership data from 2000 to 2015. It only includes 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝑌𝑠,𝑡(𝑗) as 
the independent variable. The dummy variable 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝑌𝑠,𝑡(𝑗) equals one if the stock 𝑠 is categorized as a CO2-intensive stock and held by a 
specific investor type j, and zero otherwise. The categorization can either be based on “Industry Affiliation”, “Carbon Footprint” or 
“Climate Scoring”. Thereby, the carbon footprint for “Carbon FootprintM” is normalized by market capitalization, the one for 
“Carbon FootprintE” by EBITDA and the one for “Carbon FootprintS” by net revenues/sales. 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the logarithm of the market 
capitalization of the company. 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴 is the daily stock return standard deviation during the past year. 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉 is the inverse of the stock 
price. 𝑅𝐸𝑇 is the arithmetic average of the last year’s monthly returns. All variables are calculated at the end of the year 
 ∆OWNERSHIP 
















𝐷DIRTY (Institutional) -0.012 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 
 (2.00)** (0.54) (0.57) (0.62) (1.09) 
𝐷DIRTY (HF & Inv. Adv./HF) -0.024 -0.033 -0.028 -0.021 -0.012 
 (4.18)*** (3.34)*** (2.83)*** (2.18)** (1.53) 
𝐷DIRTY (Individuals) -0.012 -0.017 -0.016 -0.012 -0.006 
 (2.13)** (1.79)* (1.65)* (1.25) (0.69) 
𝐷DIRTY (Governments) 0.003 0.010 0.008 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.60) (1.03) (0.86) (0.12) (0.30) 
𝐷DIRTY (Inv. Advisor) -0.027 -0.026 -0.018 -0.006 -0.020 
 (4.73)*** (2.62)*** (1.81)* (0.58) (2.45)** 
𝐷DIRTY (Mutual Funds) -0.023 -0.046 -0.032 -0.042 0.003 
 (4.07)*** (4.75)*** (3.27)*** (4.32)*** (0.31) 
𝐷DIRTY (aggr. Mutual Funds) -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.012 0.001 
 (1.00) (0.80) (0.71) (1.24) (0.15) 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 326,480 326,480 326,480 326,480 326,480 
 
Panel B: Pooled panel regression incl. control variables 
 𝐷DIRTY (Institutional) -0.014 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 
 (2.65)*** (0.81) (0.87) (0.84) (1.34) 
𝐷DIRTY (HF & Inv. Adv./HF) -0.024 -0.032 -0.027 -0.019 -0.011 
 (4.49)*** (3.63)*** (3.09)*** (2.17)** (1.48) 
𝐷DIRTY (Individuals) -0.016 -0.021 -0.020 -0.015 -0.009 
 (3.07)*** (2.39)** (2.25)** (1.72)* (1.18) 
𝐷DIRTY (Governments) -0.002 0.007 0.004 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.29) (0.75) (0.50) (0.23) (0.82) 
𝐷DIRTY (Inv. Advisor) -0.028 -0.026 -0.018 -0.005 -0.018 
 (5.26)*** (2.95)*** (2.08)** (0.52) (2.41)** 
𝐷DIRTY (Mutual Funds) -0.023 -0.044 -0.030 -0.039 0.004 
 (4.29)*** (5.01)*** (3.35)*** (4.36)*** (0.59) 
𝐷DIRTY (aggr. Mutual Funds) -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.014 -0.002 
 (1.99)** (1.17) (1.09) (1.61) (0.33) 
log(Marketcap) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (8.55)*** (8.78)*** (8.78)*** (8.73)*** (8.17)*** 
Vola 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (12.97)*** (12.39)*** (12.35)*** (12.36)*** (12.61)*** 
Mthl. Return 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.056 
 (1.95)* (1.91)* (1.95)* (1.95)* (2.01)** 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 303,352 303,352 303,352 303,352 303,352 
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dummies are in line with the results reported earlier: we obtain negative coefficients for 
institutional investors, hedge funds, individuals, investment advisors, and mutual funds, while 
the coefficients for government agencies are typically positive. However, there is no 
statistically significant support for our earlier findings with regards to governments holding a 
higher share in carbon intensive firms in comparison to other stocks. For institutionals, hedge 
funds, individuals, investment advisors and mutual funds it can be statistically proven that these 
investor types have a smaller ∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃 if a firm is considered ‘dirty’ according to its 
industry affiliation. This indicates that they hold a smaller portion of a carbon intensive firm 
than they would usually do in any other stock. However this does not hold for every 
specification of ‘dirty’ stock. 
Panel B reports the results for the pooled panel regression including the control 
variables. We find economic effects that are similar to that reported in Panel A. Although the 
sign for governments becomes negative for some specifications, this investor type remains the 
investor with the highest ∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃. All control variables have positive significant 
loadings, indicating that all investor types generally favor stocks with higher market 
capitalization, volatility and higher historical returns. 
Overall, the results of the conducted regression analysis confirm our findings from 
previous sections on investor behavior with respect to carbon intensive stocks: hedge funds, 
individuals, investment advisors and mutual funds own statistically significant less carbon 
intensive stocks in comparison to non-carbon intensive stocks. On the other hand, government 
agencies are found to typically hold more carbon intensive stocks in comparison to the overall 
Asset4 investment universe. We note, however that while the latter results seem to be relatively 
robust across different classifications of carbon intensive stocks as well as size of the 




We provide one of the first studies to examine the exposure of various investor types to carbon 
intensive stocks, using a large universe of stocks. In particular, we combine different metrics to 
classify carbon intensive stocks with Thomson Reuters’ Global Ownership database that 
provides year-end holdings for these stocks for the time period 2000 to 2015. The applied 
approach allows us to thoroughly examine the ownership structure of carbon intensive stocks 
for various ownership types such as institutional investors, hedge funds, individuals, 
investment advisors, mutual funds or government agencies.  
The conducted analysis allows us to examine important questions related to carbon risk 
and ownership structure. We define three different categories of carbon intensive stocks that 
help to identify companies that are particularly exposed to carbon risk, i.e. to possible 
regulatory changes with regards to GHG emissions. We argue that investors have a strong 
interest in understanding which firms could be particularly affected by new policies restricting 
carbon emissions, due to the possible detrimental effects of such policies on the financial 
performance of these companies. Moreover, we are the first to work with an extensive dataset 
of ownership structures in order to analyze investor behavior related to carbon intensive stocks. 
In particular, we examine portfolios of different owner types, with regards to their investment 
in the classified high-polluting firms. Interestingly, we find that it is actually government 
agencies who have the highest exposure to carbon risk, with approximately 50% of their 
portfolios invested in carbon intensive stocks. Comparable numbers for all other investor types 
are significantly lower and lie between 15% and 30% of their total investments.  
Another area of interest is what percentage of the total market capitalization of high-
polluting firms are held by the different investor groups. The results show that governments 
typically hold around 40% of a ‘dirty’ stock in their portfolio, whereas institutionals, hedge 
funds, individuals, investment advisors and mutual funds hold a significantly lower share, 
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corresponding to approximately 10% of the total market capitalization of these stocks. In this 
context, it is also interesting to investigate how the whole CO2-intensive stock universe is 
divided between different owner types. We find that mainly mutual funds, but also hedge funds 
and investment advisors form the biggest investor groups which have an ownership between 
10% and 20% each. Both aspects help to understand how influential the different owner types 
are for the carbon intensive sector overall as well as for specific stocks that have a high share of 
government agencies as investors.  
Moreover, we provide more detailed information on the preferences of each owner type, 
by examining how they are invested in carbon intensive stocks in comparison to their overall 
investment behavior. Our findings suggest that hedge funds, individuals, investment advisors 
and mutual funds own statistically significant less carbon intensive stocks in comparison to 
non-carbon intensive stocks. At the same time, government agencies typically have more 
ownership in carbon intensive stocks in comparison to their holding in other stocks, although 
the results are not statistically significant. These results are at least somehow surprising, given 
that it is typically government at all levels claiming to expedite the transition to a low-carbon 
and climate resilient economy. We believe that the information provided in this study can help 
policy makers tailoring incentives for each investor type to support the goal of reducing 
emissions. Based on our results, this might either happen through encouraging investors to de-
invest in carbon intensive firms or particularly for government agencies through executing 
voting rights to influence emission levels of carbon intensive firms. 
Our findings also suggest directions for future research. One possible direction is to 
further explore the importance different investor types assign to carbon risk exposure and how 
much it influences their investment decisions in real life. Furthermore, given that it is typically 
government agencies holding the highest shares in carbon intensive firms, it might be 
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worthwhile to investigate the relationship between shareholder activism and carbon intensive 
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4 Article III: About carbon risk exposure in mutual funds - New evidence from 
mutual fund holdings 
Janik Syryca 
 
Abstract. Since the 21st climate conference in Paris (2015), the goal is precisely defined: The global 
average temperature may not exceed to more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. To reach this goal, 
regulatory requirements will tighten and companies must pay for allowances to eject carbon emissions. 
This will not only pose a challenge for the companies involved. Asset managers and investors with 
exposure to such companies will be equally affected. This study is the first to demonstrate the 
implication and meaning of the so-called carbon risk to actively managed US domestic open-end 
mutual funds. It describes the asset allocation, exposure preference and ownership structure in carbon 
intensive stocks within the fund universe. In doing so, both, funds exposed to particular high carbon 
risk and funds that already have started to divest will be identified. Furthermore, the study reveals that 
funds that structure their portfolio towards low emitter stocks generate more risk-adjusted performance 
and have less risk.  
Thus, the study not only helps investors to better assess the carbon risk, they involuntarily might be 
invested in, but equally provides support to policy makers that want to tailor fund-customized 
measures to facilitate the transformation into a carbon-constrained world. 
JEL Classification G11, G18 





Carbon dioxide (CO2) accounts for about three-quarter of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and is considered to be the main cause of anthropogenic global warming (Pachauri 
et al. (2014)). However, governments are slowly starting to counteract. Recent initiatives as 
the 21
st
 Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris 2015 proof that policy makers are 
determined to put a stop to further rise in global temperature
33
. Consequently, companies need 
to transform into a carbon-constrained world and will be affected by many structural changes. 
Extra costs due to tighter regulatory requirements, taxes or forced payment for carbon 
emission certificates will negatively influence future cash flows of all companies involved. To 
meet the goals set forth in Paris, approximately only one-quarter of all worldwide coal, oil 
and gas reserves will be allowed to be exploited (IPCC (2014), Carbon Tracker Initiative 
(2013)). Resources that become suddenly no longer useable to its full potential, experience a 
decrease in value. Companies that own such “stranded assets” will suffer from significant 
future economic losses. As to this moment, this future loss is not all considered in the current 
balance sheets of the companies, their value might currently be severely overestimated - a 
situation known as “carbon bubble”. Additionally, rising ecological awareness in society will 
cause high carbon polluters to be exposed to reputational risk. 
These changes will come and not only influence the corresponding companies. Asset 
manager and investors will equally be affected. As Carrington (2013) expects a possible burst 
of this “Carbon Bubble” to have similar consequences as the financial crisis in 2008, insights 
about the influence and meaning of carbon risk for different investor types is all the more of 
vital importance. 
                                                 
33
 The precise goal is to limit the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2° C above pre-




This paper contributes to this question as it is the first study at all that links the 
implication and meaning of carbon risk to one of the largest investor group - the actively 
managed domestic open end mutual funds.  
As a foundation for the subsequent mutual fund related analyses, this study starts by 
comparing several characteristics on stock level and answers the following questions: How do 
companies from carbon-heavy industries and carbon light industries differ? How are high CO2 
emitters within the carbon-heavy industries different from low emitters? The main finding is 
that between 2007 and 2014 stocks from carbon intensive industry have less performance 
(6.6% p.a. in terms of Carhart alpha). Low emitter stocks, i.e. stocks that belong to the lowest 
emission ejectors within their industry, outperformed high emitter stocks by 0.5% p.a. and 
significantly experienced less risk. Thus, this paper confirms the majority of studies as 
Aggarwal and Dow (2011), Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2015), Saka and Oshika (2014) and 
Misani and Pogutz (2015) which find that reduction and lower usage of carbon emissions are 
associated with a better positive performance. In this context, only Delmas and Narin-Birch 
(2011) deliver mixed results. They confirm that low emission has a positive effect on Tobin’s 
Q, but find a negative relation to corporate financial performance. 
The next aspect, investigated in this study, targets the fund manager’s portfolio 
allocation and exposure preference. Additionally, it investigates the mutual fund’s ownership 
structure in carbon risk stocks. This section is of interest for both, policy makers as well as 
investors in mutual funds, as it provides insights of to which extent the fund universe is 
invested in carbon risky stocks and therefore affected by the future changes to come. In 
concrete terms, the following questions will be answered: How much carbon risk exposure is 
within the fund universe? How can these values be interpreted? How did exposure change 
over time? Which percentage of all dirty stock companies does the mutual fund universe 
possess? The study finds that the average fund portfolio - with decreasing tendency - consists 
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of 23.49% carbon risk stocks. This is nearly 10% more than the weight of all carbon risk in 
the CRSP universe. However with an average ownership of 2.14%, actively managed US 
domestic open end funds only possess a small fraction of the US carbon risk companies in the 
CRSP universe.  
To help policy makers tailor customized measures, it is important to let them know the 
characteristics of funds that face high carbon risk exposure. The study contributes to this 
question by finding that it is especially old funds with high expense ratio and low 12b1 fees 
that are exposed to a higher amount of carbon risk. In the broader sense, this part of the study 
can be linked to Scherer et al. (2017), which provide a broad overview of the worldwide 
exposure and ownership structures of different owner types as institutionals, hedge funds, 
individuals, investment advisors and mutual funds. However, their focus is not on the US and 
not on actively managed open-end mutual funds. 
The fourth contribution of this paper breaks new ground and is the first to deliver a 
link between a manager’s performance/risk and his preference of structuring the portfolio 
towards low emitter stocks. Confirming the commonly known fact that between 2007 and 
2014 stocks from carbon-heavy industries like oil, coal, etc. have suffered from a bad 
performance in comparison to other industry sections, the study interestingly reveals that 
there seems to be a difference on how strong a portfolio was balanced towards low emitter 
stocks. Investors who gave money to funds with a focus on only the lowest emitters within 
each carbon intensive industry could benefit from more performance and less risk.  
If one considers the ecological aspect of carbon risk, this study can be connected to 
research about social investments as well. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) provide evidence that 
social considerations of the players in the financial markets can no longer be neglected. They 
show that many large investors, such as public pension funds, have started to avoid companies 
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that are involved with tobacco, alcohol, gambling or weapons. Bollen (2007) additionally 
finds deviant behavioral patterns of social retail investors as he reports that all other things 
being equal, socially responsible mutual funds (SRI) experience less outflow after a negative 
performance in comparison to their peer group of regular funds. 
With regard to performance, however, research is split. Even though there exist many 
studies on stock level that find that social stock portfolios generate lower risk-adjusted returns 
(Fabozzi et al. (2008), Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Statman and Glushkov (2009), Derwall 
et al. (2011) and Salaber (2013))
34
, their findings often cannot be transferred to fund level. 
The common conclusion of studies as e.g. Hamilton et al. (1993), Bauer et al. (2005), Derwall 
et al. (2011), Leite and Cortez (2014) is that SRI funds do not underperform regular funds. 
Only Climent et al. (2011) and Chang et al. (2012) find that green funds have significant 
lower alphas - the first one, however, only for the first period in his study. 
Last but not least, as high carbon emitting companies are likely to face decreasing 
profits in the future, it is of interest for investors to see what kind of funds already started in 
anticipation to engage in divesting trading strategies. Here the study reveals that it is 
especially small and young funds that are taking lead to the way to a carbon - constrained 
world. 
To summarize, this study is the first to link carbon risk and mutual funds. It therefore 
helps investors and policy makers to get a better understanding of the opportunities and 
challenges for this important group of investors. 
                                                 
34 From a theoretical point of view, socially controversial stocks are expected to have higher expected returns. 
The reason is that stocks that are avoided by investors due to social considerations, experience less demand and 
lower stock prices (see Angel and Rivoli (1997), Heinkel et al. (2001) and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)). 
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The remaining of this paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 introduces definitions and 
methodology used in this study. Section 4.3 gives a description of the data. Section 4.4 
presents the empirical results followed by a conclusion in section 4.5.  
 
4.2 Methodology 
This study deals with carbon risk and its implications and meaning for mutual fund managers. 
The following section aims to give precise definitions and differentiations of the terms that 
occur in the context of this study.  
4.2.1 Definition of carbon risk stock  
Correct measurement and identification whether a stock is a carbon risk stock or not are of 
vital importance for a study of a mutual fund’s carbon risk exposure. However, this process 
can be arbitrarily deep and complex and strongly depends on the respective application. For 
the sake of simplicity, I use a very simple but intuitive approach to identify carbon risk stocks 
- a categorization based on the carbon emission of the industry the stock is affiliated to. This 
idea is not new and similar to Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2015), Misani and Pogutz (2015) and 
Scherer et al (2017). A stock is classified as carbon risk stock if it belongs to an industry with 
high carbon emissions. To divide the stock universe into different industrial sectors, I use 
French’s suggested industry classification, where each stock is assigned to one of 30 different 
industries.
35
 To select the most carbon intensive industries I refer to many different sources 
(Labatt and White (2002), Labatt and White (2007), Pachauri et al. (2014)). According to 
these studies, steel, fabricated products and machinery, autos, carry (aircraft ships and railroad 
equipment), mines, coal, oil, utilities, and paper belong to the industries with the highest 
                                                 
35
 French assigns each NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock to one of 30 different industry portfolios based on 
its four-digit SIC code at that time. I thank Kenneth R. French for providing these data. For more details, please 
refer to http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_30_ind_port.html.  
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carbon emissions. For this reason, I categorize a stock as carbon risk stock, if it belongs to one 
of the above-mentioned industries. 
4.2.2 Definition of carbon footprint and worst / medium / light emitter stock 
The above-mentioned categorization based on industry affiliation is basic but useful and 
correct. However, it neglects the fact that different companies within the same industry are 
likely to vary in terms of their carbon emission. For this reason, I further disentangle each 
carbon risk stock in a second step by additionally applying a more precise measure of its 
carbon intensity - the carbon footprint. The carbon footprint of a company indicates all of its 
total GHG emissions. This measure includes emissions from both, Scope 1 and Scope 2, i.e. it 
takes into account all emissions from sources directly owned and controlled by the company 
(Scope 1) as well as all emissions that arise indirectly by the purchase and use of electricity, 
heat or steam (Scope 2). Emissions of activities that are not controlled by the company, e.g. 
waste disposal (Scope 3), have very low reporting requirements, are not very reliable and are 
therefore not included in the measure (Carbon Trust (2012)).  
To take into account that big companies are more likely to have more carbon 
emissions than smaller ones - even if they have equal environmental awareness - I follow 
Hoffmann and Busch (2008) and Busch (2010) and make carbon emissions comparable by 
normalizing them by net sales, one of the suggested proxies for company size. This yields the 
following formula of carbon footprint 𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡.
36
 
                                                 
36 Please note that there a further related studies to the measure of carbon footprint. Pandey et al (2011) suggest  
measurement of carbon emissions in the carbon footprint from the point of view of the products. Andrew and 




𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐻𝐺 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
        (1) 
Another aspect to be investigated in this study is the comparison of carbon risk stocks that 
have relatively low carbon emissions (low emitters) and carbon risk stocks with high carbon 
emitting values (high emitters). The comparison is interesting as it compares companies that 
are rather progressive in terms of environmental awareness with those, who will probably be 
more severely affected by the transformation into a carbon-constrained world. As value chains 
strongly vary across the different industrial sectors, a simple comparison of carbon footprint 
among different industries is not expedient. For this reason, I choose to apply the best in class 
approach. This means I rank each stock based on its average carbon footprint for each 
industry separately. 
Thus, a company is defined to be a low emitter (LE) if its average carbon emission / 
net sales values belong to the bottom 33% in the corresponding industry. Similarly, a medium 
emitter (ME) stock lies in the range between 33% and 66%. High emitter (HE) stocks have 
average carbon emission / net sales values that are higher than 66% of all other companies 
within the same industry. 
4.2.3 Definition of a fund’s carbon risk exposure 
The focus of this study is the impact and meaning of carbon risk for the mutual fund manager. 
For this reason, I develop a new but basic measure, which represents the carbon risk exposure 
of a manager’s portfolio. To compute the carbon risk exposure CREi,t of fund i at quarter t I 
simply sum up the holding weights of all stocks that have been categorized as carbon risk 
stock. 
 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗,𝑡 · 𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡         (𝑗=1 2) 
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where 𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡 is a dummy that equals 1 if stock j is a carbon risk stock 
4.2.4 The degree of investment in low emitter - the DILE factor 
For some research questions, it might be interesting to not only consider the absolute carbon 
risk exposure but to specifically compare the differences between fund managers that prefer 
low emitter stocks in their portfolio with those, who do not. For this purpose, I develop a new 
measure which is able to capture the manager’s preference for low emitter stocks in his 
portfolio - the degree of investment in low emitters (DILE). 
The DILE-measure is calculated as the difference between the exposure in low emitter 
stocks and high emitter stocks. It has the following formula: 
𝐷𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗,𝑡 𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝑗=1 −   ∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗,𝑡 𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝑗=1      (3) 
where 𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡 ( 𝐷𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡) is a dummy that equals 1 if stock j in the 
portfolio is a low emitter stock LE (high emitter stock 𝐻𝐸) . 
The advantage of this measure is that it takes more information into account than a 
measure that only includes the exposure of the low emitter stocks. The reason for this is that it 
indirectly considers exposure in medium emitter stocks (ME) as well. 
Figure 9: Example DILE factor 
 
This figure illustrates the computation of a fund’s DILE factor. DILE indicates the degree of investment in low 
emission and is the difference between exposure in low emitter minus exposure in high emitter stocks.  
 







A 100 % 0 % 0 % 100 % 
B 80 % 0 % 20 % 60 % 
C 80 % 10 % 10 % 70 % 
D 0 % 0 % 100 % - 100 % 
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Figure 9 is meant to illustrate this relation: Fund A obviously possesses the highest 
degree of investment in low emitters. A distinction between fund B and C based on solely 
regarding the exposure to low emitters is not possible. However, the DILE factor enables to 
provide a more precise differentiation between those both funds, as it takes into account that 
fund C has more ME exposure and less HE exposure than fund B.  
4.3 Data 
The study uses information on mutual fund holdings from Morningstar where all holdings 
with more portfolio weight than 0.006% are reported.
 37
 I delete holdings reports if the weight 
of all equities is less than 75% of the fund’s TNA. Fund characteristics are obtained from the 
CRSP Survivorship-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database and mostly only available at the share 
class level. To aggregate them to fund level, I value weight them with the corresponding total 
net assets of each share class. Only the fund’s total net assets are computed as the sum of each 
share class. Furthermore, I delete all funds that are not listed as domestic equity style or cap 
based funds (EDY or EDC).  
In line with Amihud and Goyenko (2013), I exclude index funds by removing those 
with names containing words like index, ‘S&P’, ‘Dow’, ‘WILSHIRE’, ‘RUSSELL’. 
Additionally, I exclude funds with less than 5 million TNA as in Fama and French (2010). 
Following Kacpercyk et al. (2008), I eliminate fund periods with less than 10 reported 
holdings as this is an indication of bad reporting quality. 
38
 
Information on stock returns and characteristics are from the CRSP Stock Database. I 
only include common equity holdings (share codes 10 and 11) and delete all penny stocks 
with a price below $1. Information on a company’s carbon emission characteristics is 
                                                 
37 For a more detailed description of the Morningstar holdings data, see Elton (2012). 
38 The approach applied is similar to Rohleder et al. (2017). 
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obtained from voluntary reports of the Asset4 database. It is important to note that the Asset4 
database suffers from two major limitations as firstly, their reports are only voluntary and 
therefore potentially be affected by a reporting bias and secondly, their coverage among all 
companies is not very high. However - due to the lack of alternatives - the Asset4 database is 
nevertheless considered to be one of the best possible data sources available for research 
related to carbon emissions. To make inferences in my study more reliable, I use a subsample 
of funds and require their holding reports to have at least more than 30% of equities available 
in the Asset4 database. However restricted availability of carbon emission values limits the 
sample period to be from 2007 to 2014. The final sample consists of 15,946 quarterly
39
 fund 
observations of 702 active U.S. domestic equity funds. 
Table XX: Completeness of the Asset4 database 
This table demonstrates how many funds exist in each year if a certain percentage of holdings 
availability in the Asset4 database is required. The percentage of holdings availability is measured 
in market value of all equities available in the Asset4 database / TNA of the fund. 
 
% (equity / TNA) matchable with CRSP and available in Asset4 
Year Full sample over 20% over 30% over 40% over 50%  
2007 1,102 440 139 4 20 
2008 1,128 481 154 8 10 
2009 1,111 621 480 195 29 
2010 1,033 601 448 145 30 
2011 995 607 455 208 9 
2012 992 614 484 227 1 
2013 978 539 317 81 20 
2014 943 424 183 13 10 
 
Table XX demonstrates the availability of data in the Asset4 database and indicates 
the number of funds existing in each year. In the full sample, the number of funds declines 
                                                 
39 During my sample period, mutual funds are obliged to report portfolio holdings to the SEC on a quarterly 
basis. Empirically however, actual reporting frequencies deviate from strictly quarterly reports, even within 
individual funds, and may be as high as monthly or as low as semiannually in few cases. As the average time 
between reporting frequency is close to 3 months, I simplify by referring to reporting periods as quarterly. 
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from 1,102 to 943. The other columns indicate how many different funds remain if a certain 
percentage of holdings availability in the Asset4 database is required. 
A reliable study about carbon emissions and funds requires, on the one hand, a fund 
sample as big as possible, but on the other hand, a sample with sufficient coverage in the 
Asset4 database. Having these conflicting goals, I decided to use the subsample of funds in 
which at least more than 30% of equities is covered in the Asset4 database. This allows 
analysis of 139 funds in 2007 and 183 funds in 2014. To mitigate the suspicion that funds in 
the subsample do differ systematically from the full sample, Table XXI is intended to 
compare the fund’s main characteristics of each sample. It demonstrates that funds in the full 
sample are only slightly smaller (1.3 billion vs. 1.7 billion) and younger (214 months vs. 237 
months) and that they have quite similar expense ratio (0.012 vs. 0.011), 12b1 fee (0.003 vs. 
0.002), rear load (0.009 vs. 0.008), front load (0.031 vs. 0.030) and flows (-0.002 vs. -0.004). 
This militates in favor of the subsample being representative for the full sample. 
 
Table XXII displays descriptive statistics of the fund characteristics in my sample. Funds 
have on average 1.7 billion of TNA and have increased from 1.7 billion to 3.3 billion on 
average. Overall, the size of the characteristics is in line with previous mutual fund research. 
Table XXI: Comparison of the subsamples 
 
This table displays fund characteristics of the different subsamples. TNA is denoted in million $. Expense ratio, 
12b1 fee, rear load, front load are yearly (and denoted in relation to a fund’s TNA). Age is declared in months. 
Flow / TNA is based on quarterly observations. 
 
 
TNA Exp. ratio 12b1 fee Rear load Front load Age Flow/TNA 
  
      full sample 1,341.733 0.012 0.003 0.009 0.031 213.671 -0.002 
over 20% 1,740.739 0.011 0.003 0.008 0.030 233.210 -0.002 





Table XXII: Fund characteristics of the subsample 
 
This table displays the average fund characteristics of the subsample where equity value available in Asset4 is more than 30% of the TNA. TNA is denoted in million $. 
Flow / TNA is based on quarterly observations. Expense ratio, 12b1 fee, rear load, front load are yearly (and denoted in relation to a fund’s TNA). Age is declared in 
months. Fund reports indicate the number of different available holdings reports. The column “funds” shows the number of different funds. 
 
 
TNA Age Flow/TNA Expense ratio 12b1 fee Front load Rear load Fund reports Funds 
2007 1,727 159.1 0.002 0.012 0.003 0.034 0.011 492 139 
2008 810 201.5 -0.007 0.012 0.002 0.030 0.010 672 154 
2009 1,173 218.5 -0.004 0.011 0.003 0.030 0.009 2,939 480 
2010 1,345 231.7 -0.006 0.011 0.002 0.030 0.008 2,645 448 
2011 1,582 241.6 -0.004 0.011 0.002 0.031 0.007 2,937 455 
2012 1,705 249.7 -0.006 0.011 0.002 0.030 0.007 3,141 484 
2013 2,273 260.5 0.003 0.010 0.002 0.030 0.007 2,043 317 
2014 3,295 261.3 -0.002 0.010 0.002 0.030 0.006 1,077 183 





Table XXIII: Fund performance and risk characteristics 
This table displays average performance and risk characteristics of the subsample where equity value available in Asset4 is more than 30% of the TNA. Returns are monthly. 
Standard deviation is monthly based on daily return data. For each month, Carhart alpha, beta market, beta smb, beta hml and beta mom are computed based on daily data. 
Carhart alpha is annualized. CRSP vw indicates the monthly returns of the CRSP value-weighted market Index.  
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For the sake of completeness, Table XXIII adds further performance and risk 
characteristics of the fund sample. As expected funds have a negative Carhart alpha of -2.2% 
p.a., but positive monthly returns (1.1% p.m). The other characteristics are as well in line with 
existing literature. 
4.4 Empirical Analysis 
4.4.1 Carbon stock characteristics 
This section serves as the basis for the subsequent fund related analyses to come. It describes 
the most important characteristics of the stocks that are held at least once by the mutual fund 
managers in my sample. 
Table XXIV demonstrates the stocks’ distribution across the different industries and 
gives an overview of the availability of the Asset4 database. The funds in the sample hold 
8,235 different stocks. 404 different stocks are prevalent in the Asset4 database whereas 138 
belong to carbon-heavy industries (as indicated by being below the black line). Applying the 
approach described in section 4.2.4 I divide all carbon risk stocks - based on their average 
carbon footprint within their industry - into worst, medium and low carbon emitters. This 
procedure yields 48 worst emitters WE, 47 medium emitters ME and 43 lowest emitters LE.  
Table XXV compares common characteristics of carbon risk and non-carbon risk 
stocks. As described in section 4.2.1, all stocks from carbon-heavy industries are carbon risk 
stocks. The table shows that carbon stocks have more market beta and a higher HML loading. 
This is in line with the fact that carbon-heavy stocks tend to belong to the production industry 
which is known to be more cyclical and volatile around the market. The high amount of 
production facilities is also reflected in a high book value and therefore a higher HML 
loading. Besides carbon-heavy stocks tend to be bigger and more liquid. However, they have  
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Table XXIV: Distribution of stocks across the different industries 
 
This table demonstrates the stocks’ distribution across the different industries and gives an overview of 
the availability of the Asset4. The black line separates non-carbon risk stocks (above) and carbon risk 
stocks (below). Carbon risk stocks that are available in the Asset4 can be ranked within their industry 










in % HE ME LE 
Non classified 820 10.0% 10 2.5% 0 0 0 
Apparel 80 1.0% 4 1.0% 0 0 0 
Banking, Insurance, Real 
Estate, Trading 1,824 22.1% 69 17.1% 0 0 0 
Beer 22 0.3% 1 0.2% 0 0 0 
Business Equipment 615 7.5% 40 9.9% 0 0 0 
Chemicals 107 1.3% 20 5.0% 0 0 0 
Construction 158 1.9% 9 2.2% 0 0 0 
Consumer Goods 71 0.9% 4 1.0% 0 0 0 
Electrical Equipment 93 1.1% 2 0.5% 0 0 0 
Food 118 1.4% 9 2.2% 0 0 0 
Healthcare 631 7.7% 13 3.2% 0 0 0 
Other 22 0.3% 3 0.7% 0 0 0 
Personal and Business Services 1,374 16.7% 27 6.7% 0 0 0 
Printing and Publishing 62 0.8% 2 0.5% 0 0 0 
Recreation 118 1.4% 4 1.0% 0 0 0 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 113 1.4% 8 2.0% 0 0 0 
Retail 249 3.0% 7 1.7% 0 0 0 
Telecommunication 225 2.7% 4 1.0% 0 0 0 
Textils 15 0.2% 2 0.5% 0 0 0 
Tobacco Products 12 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0 0 
Transportation 190 2.3% 20 5.0% 0 0 0 
Wholesale 217 2.6% 8 2.0% 0 0 0 
Aircraft, ships etc. 39 0.5% 2 0.5% 1 1 0 
Auto and Trucks 77 0.9% 3 0.7% 1 1 1 
Coal 21 0.3% 3 0.7% 1 1 1 
Fabricated Products and 
Machinery 164 2.0% 8 2.0% 3 3 2 
Mines 130 1.6% 20 5.0% 7 7 6 
Oil 346 4.2% 41 10.1% 14 14 13 
Paper 65 0.8% 9 2.2% 3 3 3 
Steel 74 0.9% 3 0.7% 1 1 1 
Utilities 183 2.2% 49 12.1% 17 16 16 
Total 8,235 
 






less return and less momentum, consistent with the observation that these industries have 
performed not very well in the period of the sample between 2007 and 2014. The standard 
deviation of returns is quite similar. 
Comparing worst WE and lowest emitters LE as in Table XXVI, it is remarkable that 
WE stocks are smaller and more liquid than LE stocks. Low emitter stocks have an 
economically significant higher Carhart alpha by 0.5% p.a. (-0.6% vs. -1.1%). Thus this study 
shows a tendency to support literature that finds a positive relationship between 
Table XV: Comparison of stock characteristics - carbon risk stock vs. non-carbon risk stock 
This table compares the stock characteristics of carbon risk stocks (i.e. stocks that are from carbon intensive 
industries) and non-carbon risk stocks. Market capitalization is denoted in million $. Momentum indicates 
aggregated discrete returns over the last 12 months. Turnover is the number of stocks traded during a month 
divided by the stock’s shares outstanding, return is monthly, Carhart alpha, beta market, beta HML, beta SMB and 
beta MOM are estimated for each month with the Carhart (1997) model based on daily data. Carhart alpha is 
annualized. Standard deviation is monthly and computed based on daily returns. 
 
 
Carbon risk stock Non-carbon risk stock Carbon – non-carbon 
 
mean N mean N 































































Standard deviation  0.023*** 20,851 0.023*** 71,873 0 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.210) 
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environmental and financial performance
40
 and rather contradicts literature that finds either no 
relationship
41
 or a negative relationship
42
.  
Table XXVI: Comparison of stock characteristics - low emitter stocks vs. high emitter stocks 
This table disentangles carbon risk stocks (i.e. stocks that are from carbon intensive industries) into high emitter 
stocks (HE), medium emitter stocks (ME), low emitter (LE) and carbon risk stocks that are not available in the Asset4. 
High emitter stocks are carbon risk stocks that have carbon/emissions that belong to the top 33% of their 
corresponding industry. Medium emitter and low emitter belong to the medium and lowest tercile. 
Market capitalization is denoted in millions $. Momentum indicates aggregated discrete returns over the last 12 
months. Turnover is the number of stocks traded during a month divided by the stock’s shares outstanding, return is 
monthly, Carhart alpha, beta market, beta HML, beta SMB and beta MOM are estimated for each month with the 
Carhart (1997) model based on daily data. Carhart alpha is annualized. Standard deviation is monthly, and computed 
based on daily returns.  
 
 
High emitter (HE) Medium emitter (ME) Low emitter (LE) HE - LE 
Carbon risk stock (not in 
Asset4) 
 
























































































deviation 0.021*** 2,564 0.018*** 2,598 0.020*** 2,665 0.001*** 0.025*** 13,024 
                                                 
40 E.g. Ulshöfer and Bonnet (2009), Derwall et al. (2005), Konar and Cohen (2001), King and Lenox (2001), 
Matsumura et al. (2011), Aggarwal and Dow (2011), Misani and Pogutz (2015), Saka and Oshika (2014) and 
Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2015), Kim et al. (2015) and Chen and Silva Gao (2012), Climent and Soriano (2011) 
and Chang et al. (2012). 
41 E.g. Cohen et al. (1997). 
42 E.g. Wang et al. (2014), Labatt and White (2002), Mallett and Michelson (2010) and Muñoz et al. (2014). 
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Table XXVI shows as well that carbon stocks that are not reported in the Asset4 
database even perform worse than those, classified as high emitters. 
4.4.2 Mutual fund carbon risk exposure preference and ownership 
Until now there is no study investigating the extent to which fund managers are engaged in 
carbon risk investments. To fill this gap, this section targets, on the one hand, the fund 
manager’s portfolio allocation and exposure preference, and on the other hand, the mutual 
fund’s ownership structure in carbon risk stocks. For this reason, this section might be of 
interest for both, policy makers as well as investors in actively managed mutual funds, as it 
allows insights of to which extent the fund universe might be affected by the possible burst of 
the carbon bubble. 
Table XXVII shows the carbon risk exposure within the fund universe and how it 
changes over time. Additionally, it displays the share of carbon risk stocks in the market 
capitalization of the whole CRSP stock universe. Table XXVII indicates that the average 
carbon risk exposure in mutual funds’ portfolios decreases from 28.26% in 2007 to 23.49% in 
2014, while carbon risk exposure in the CRSP stock universe is 19.97% in 2007, has its peak 
in 2011 (23.49%) and declines back to 19.59% in 2014. Thus, in every year, exposure in 
mutual fund portfolios is on average higher than exposure in the CRSP universe. The 
difference is highest in 2007 (fund portfolios have 42% more exposure than the CRSP 
universe), decreases to only 1% in 2012, followed by an increase to 17% in 2014. 
Disentangling carbon risk stock exposure into high, medium and low emitter exposure (the 
remaining part belongs to carbon intensive industries, but is not available in Asset4) provides 
the following insights: Mutual fund exposure in low emitter stocks is 7.72% in 2007 and 
declines to 5.23% in 2014, while exposure in high emitter stocks is always lower, ranging 
from 3.91% in 2007 to 3.53% in 2014. Table XXVII additionally shows that the difference  
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Table XXVII: Descriptive statistics carbon risk exposure 
This table displays the average carbon risk exposure (CRE) of a fund and the percentage of the carbon risk exposure that is available in the CRSP universe. The average fund 
carbon risk exposure is split into exposure in high emitter stocks (HE), medium emitter stocks (ME), low emitter stocks (LE) and exposure in carbon risk stocks that could 
not be assigned into of these categories as there were not emission values available in the Asset4. The column fund / CRSP indicates the ratio of a fund’s carbon risk 
exposure and the CRSP carbon risk exposure.   
 
  
Funds’ carbon risk exposure (CRE) 
 
CRSP carbon risk exposure Fund / CRSP 
Year N Fund Mean HE ME LE Not in Asset4 LE - HE 
 
Mean  
2007 139 28.26 3.91 9.07 7.72 7.56 3.81  19.97 1.42 
2008 154 28.37 4.95 8.25 7.42 7.75 2.47  23.84 1.19 
2009 480 22.70 4.38 5.25 5.84 7.23 1.46  21.99 1.03 
2010 448 23.51 4.44 5.22 5.39 8.46 0.95  21.65 1.09 
2011 455 24.42 4.58 5.31 5.55 8.98 0.97  23.49 1.04 
2012 484 22.09 4.07 4.66 4.99 8.37 0.92  21.91 1.01 
2013 317 23.00 3.94 5.04 5.47 8.55 1.53  20.69 1.11 
2014 183 22.95 3.53 5.25 5.23 8.94 1.7  19.59 1.17 
Total 702 23.49 4.26 5.36 5.58 8.29 1.32  21.64 1.09 
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between the low emitter and high emitter exposure decreases from 3.81 percentage points in 
2007 to 1.7 percentage points in 2014. To sum up, the table indicates the following. First, 
mutual funds’ seem to lower their carbon risk exposure over time, second, their exposure is 
still high in comparison to the exposure within the CRSP stock universe and third, within their 
carbon risk exposure portfolios, funds tend to be relatively more invested in low emitter 
stocks than in high emitter stocks over time.  
Table XXVIII provides insights into the ownership structure of the carbon risk stocks, 
i.e. more specifically it answers the question what fraction of market capitalization is owned 
by the mutual fund industry. The total market capitalization of all carbon risk stocks is 13,500 
billion dollar in 2007 and 14,200 billion dollars in 2014. The fraction owned by mutual funds, 
however, is only rather low, ranging between 0.30% and 1.36%. The total market 
capitalization of all companies belonging to industries that are not assigned to be carbon risk 
industries is significantly lower. It is 3,370 billion dollar in 2007 and 4,170 billion dollars in 
2014. As those companies are smaller, it is more likely for mutual funds to achieve a higher 
percentage of ownership. Ownership of mutual funds thus can rise up to more than 15%. As 
actively managed mutual funds only possess a relatively small fraction of carbon risk stocks, 
they are likely to have only few voting rights and therefore are only limitedly suitable to put 
pressure on companies to cut down emissions. Governments trying to tailor incentives for 
different investor types should keep this in mind.  
A more detailed overview of the ownership structure of carbon risk companies is provided by 
Scherer et al. (2017) who are the first to investigate ownership for the different investor types 
as institutional investors (e.g. banks, trusts, insurances, pension and endowment funds and 
foundations), hedge funds, mutual funds, investment advisors, as well as individuals and 
government agencies.  
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Table XXVIII: Descriptive statistics ownership 
 
This table displays the amount of market capitalization of all stocks, being either categorized as carbon risk stock or non-carbon risk stock that are available in the 




Market capitalization carbon risk 
stocks (in billion $) 
 
Market capitalization non-carbon risk 
stocks (in billion $)   
Total market capitalization 
 (in billion $) 














2007 139 13,500 41 0.30% 
 
3,370 97 2.87% 
 
16,870 138 0.82% 
2008 154 10,700 40 0.38% 
 
3,370 92 2.72% 
 
14,070 132 0.94% 
2009 480 8,070 106 1.31% 
 
2,270 328 14.45% 
 
10,340 434 4.20% 
2010 448 9,950 135 1.36% 
 
2,750 428 15.56% 
 
12,700 563 4.43% 
2011 455 11,200 151 1.35% 
 
3,440 486 14.13% 
 
14,640 637 4.35% 
2012 484 11,900 144 1.21% 
 
3,330 509 15.29% 
 
15,230 653 4.29% 
2013 317 14,200 143 1.01% 
 
3,700 483 13.05% 
 
17,900 626 3.50% 
2014 183 17,100 100 0.58% 
 
4,170 356 8.54% 
 
21,270 456 2.14% 
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4.4.3 Determinants of carbon exposure 
To support policy makers tailor customized measures, knowledge about the characteristics of 
funds that face high carbon risk exposure might be helpful. Until now the analysis about 
carbon risk exposure only considered average mutual fund exposure without taking into 
account that different funds might have a differing exposure behavior. To identify which fund 
characteristics are associated with a higher degree of carbon exposure, I run a panel regression 
with fund-, style, and time-fixed effects to explain the determinants of carbon exposure with 
the common fund characteristics reported in Table XXII.  
I use the following formula to explain a fund’s carbon risk exposure 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡: 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 log(𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑏2 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3 12𝑏1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏4 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑏5 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏6 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏7 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡         (4) 
Table XXIX shows the results of the regression.
 43
 
Results are robust, no matter whether the panel regression specification contains time, 
style or fund fixed effects or whether it is controlled for limited boundaries by using tobit 
regression. The coefficient on expense ratio is positive and significant at the 10% significance 
level, indicating that funds with higher expense ratio tend to have higher carbon risk 
exposure. Additionally, high 12b1 fees are correlated with lower carbon risk exposure. One 
possible explanation for this might be that having low carbon risk exposure (i.e. being a rather 
green fund) is in line with current trends that are well received in the society and therefore 
heavily advertised by the corresponding fund managers. Besides, older funds are more likely 
to have high carbon risk exposure, because younger funds might tend to invest in modern new 
                                                 
43 Funds do not always report perfectly at equal intervals. However, this model assumes that these inequalities 
are not systematically.  
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industries as e.g. media and older funds tend to stick to the “older” production intensive 
industries that are assigned to be a carbon intensive industry.  
Table XXIX: Analysis of the determinants of carbon risk exposure 
This table shows the determinants of a mutual fund’s carbon risk exposure (CRE). TNA is denoted in million $. 
Flow / TNA is the ratio between flow and the fund’s total net assets TNA. Expense ratio, 12b1 fee, rear load, 
front load are denoted in relation to a fund’s TNA. Age is declared in months. The first three models are 
estimated by panel regression and include different specifications with time, style, and fund fixed effects. The 
fourth specification is estimated by tobit regression. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 Carbon risk exposure (CRE). 
Log(TNA) 0.2158 0.2173 0.2158 0.2116 
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) 
Expense ratio 218.0367* 218.2753* 218.0367* 218.3085** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
12b1 fee -587.9821** -586.7484** -587.9821** -595.9921** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Front load -3.8922 -4.2042 -3.8922 -3.6804 
  (0.85) (0.84) (0.85) (0.86) 
Rear load -22.7439 -22.6347 -22.7439 -22.9147 
  (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) 
Age 0.0540*** 0.0539*** 0.0540*** 0.0540*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Flow/TNA 0.6876 0.6705 0.6876 0.7405 
  (0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.43) 
Intercept 2.0171 0.3318 8.8826** 20.1532*** 
  (0.67) (0.95) (0.02) (0.00) 
     
Time fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Style fixed No Yes No No 
Fund fixed No No Yes Yes 
Model Panel Panel Panel Tobit 
R
2 0.15 0.15 0.15 . 
N 15,946 15,946 15,946 15,946 
 
4.4.4 Carbon risk exposure and the relation to performance and risk 
Investors are particularly interested in performance and risk characteristics of the fund in 
which they intend to invest. For this reason, studies that investigate the driver of these two 
parameters belong to one of the most frequently investigated research questions in the fund 
literature. However, until now there is no study investigating, how manager portfolios with 
high carbon risk exposure 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 respectively a high degree of investment in low emitter 
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stocks (DILE) differ in terms of performance and risk. The following analysis is intended to 
close that gap.  
For each fund i and every month t I estimate the Carhart (1997) alpha 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 based on 
daily data. I explain alpha by common control variables, the fund’s carbon risk exposure CRE 
and the DILE factor (see section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4). Additionally I add the fund’s weighted 
carbon footprint WCFP of all carbon risk stocks in the portfolio as further explanatory 
variable.  
This yields 
𝛼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + ∑ 𝑏𝑘𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + b𝐾+1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + b𝐾+2𝐷𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝐾+3𝑊𝐶𝐹𝑃i,t
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡    (5) 
where  𝑊𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗,𝑡 𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑗,𝑡  𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑗,𝑡       𝑗=1  
Again, I run panel estimation with the different specifications that contain time, style and fund 
fixed effects.
44
As expected, bigger funds have significantly lower performance. This is in line 
with Chen et al. (2004) and Pastor et al. (2015) and might partly be explained by the fact that 
big funds suffer through price impact while investing their money. The coefficient of CRE is 
significant and negative (-0.0015). This finding is in line with section 4.4.1, which 
demonstrated that carbon risk stock performed worse than non-carbon risk stocks in the 
observed period between 2007 and 2014. As the categorization of carbon risk stocks is based 
on industry affiliation, CRE in this context can be interpreted as industry index which 
captures characteristics of the carbon intensive sectors. So the negative sign only states that 
these industries have on average performed worse in the observed period between 2007 and 
2014. Consequently, fund managers with high exposure to these sectors were only able to 
generate a lower alpha than others. For this reason, impact on alpha until this point might 
rather be due to industry characteristics than carbon risk effects.   
                                                 
44 Funds do not always report perfectly at equal intervals. However, this model assumes that these inequalities 
are not systematically. 
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Table XXX: Analysis of the determinants of fund manager performance 
This table shows the determinants of fund manager performance. Fund manager performance is measured for each fund and each month by the monthly Carhart (1997) alpha 
based on daily data. TNA is denoted in million $. Flow / TNA is the ratio between flow and the fund’s total net assets TNA. Expense ratio, 12b1 fee, rear load, front load are 
denoted in relation to a fund’s TNA. Age is declared in months. CRE is a fund’s carbon risk exposure and indicates the weight of all carbon risk stocks in the portfolio. DILE 
indicates the degree of investment in low emitter stocks and is computed by the difference of exposure in low emitter stocks minus exposure in high emitter carbon risk 
stocks. WCFP is the weighted carbon footprint of all carbon risk stocks in the portfolio. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The model includes specifications with time, style, and fund fixed effects. 
 
 Carhart alpha 
Log(TNA) -0.0077*** -0.0077*** -0.0075*** -0.0076*** -0.0077*** -0.0077*** -0.0076*** -0.0076*** -0.0077 -0.0077*** -0.0075*** -0.0076*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expense ratio 3.7477*** 3.6256*** 3.4981*** 3.6475*** 3.7212*** 3.6002*** 3.4488*** 3.5979*** 3.7477 3.6256*** 3.4981*** 3.6475*** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
12b1 fee -3.3582 -3.3577 -2.5100 -2.5507 -3.3923 -3.3893 -2.5986 -2.6417 -3.3582 -3.3577 -2.5100 -2.5507 
  (0.21) (0.20) (0.34) (0.33) (0.20) (0.20) (0.32) (0.32) (0.21) (0.20) (0.34) (0.33) 
Front load 0.1290 0.1144 0.0983 0.1106 0.1312 0.1155 0.0999 0.1136 0.1290 0.1144 0.0983 0.1106 
  (0.48) (0.53) (0.59) (0.54) (0.47) (0.53) (0.58) (0.53) (0.48) (0.53) (0.59) (0.54) 
Rear load -0.4272 -0.4178 -0.4011 -0.4158 -0.4327 -0.4221 -0.3956 -0.4115 -0.4272 -0.4178 -0.4011 -0.4158 
  (0.43) (0.44) (0.47) (0.45) (0.43) (0.44) (0.48) (0.46) (0.43) (0.44) (0.47) (0.45) 
Age -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 
  (0.25) (0.22) (0.14) (0.18) (0.25) (0.22) (0.15) (0.18) (0.25) (0.22) (0.14) (0.18) 
Flow / TNA 0.0048 0.0046 0.0059 0.0061 0.0050 0.0048 0.0063 0.0065 0.0048 0.0046 0.0059 0.0061 
  (0.83) (0.83) (0.79) (0.78) (0.82) (0.83) (0.77) (0.77) (0.83) (0.83) (0.79) (0.78) 
CRE -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015 -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DILE   0.0007* 0.0008**     0.0007* 0.0008**     0.0007* 0.0008**   
    (0.09) (0.04)     (0.09) (0.04)     (0.09) (0.04)   
WCFP     0.0039 0.0022     0.0039 0.0022     0.0039 0.0022 
      (0.20) (0.47)     (0.19) (0.46)     (0.20) (0.47) 
Intercept 0.1240* 0.1229* 0.1329* 0.1344* 0.1517** 0.1441** 0.1766** 0.1617** 0.0971 0.0951* 0.1020* 0.1344* 
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) 
Time fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Style fixed No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund fixed  No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 




To measure the influence of carbon risk effects and to control at the same time for 
industry-specific characteristics I use the following approach: First, I rank the companies 
based on their carbon footprint within their industry. Afterward, I use this ranking to classify 
each company as either low, medium or high emitter stock (see section 4.2.2). To aggregate 
this information on a portfolio level, I develop the DILE factor (see section 4.2.4) which is 
computed by the difference of exposure in low emitter stocks and high emitter stocks. Thus, 
the DILE factor indicates, how much a manager has balanced his portfolio towards low 
emitter stocks.  
The coefficient on the DILE factor is positive and significant, i.e. the more the fund 
manager’s portfolio was structured towards the lowest emitters of each industry sector, the 
more performance the manager were able to generate. Investing in the best in class companies 
(in terms of carbon footprint) seemed to be rewarding in the investigated period of time. This 
tendency was already observable in section 4.4.1 where low emitter and high emitter were 
compared (however not statistically signficant). Therefore it cannot be completely ruled out 
that outperformance of managers with a preference for low emitter stocks is due to skill and 
their more progressive mindset. 
Is there a general relationship (i.e. regardless of the industries) between exposures to 
stocks with high carbon footprint and performance? The insignificance of the carbon footprint 
variable WCFP suggests that there is not. Mixing carbon footprint values across different 
industries does not seem to provide further explanatory power. 
In analogy to above, the following section investigates the relationship of carbon risk and 
a fund manager’s portfolio risk.  
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𝜎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + ∑ 𝑏𝑘𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + b𝐾+1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + b𝐾+2𝐷𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝐾+3𝑊𝐹𝑃i,t
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡    (6) 
 
As a proxy of risk, I compute for each fund i and every month t the fund’s standard deviation 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡 of its daily fund returns. The interpretation of the results is analogously to the analysis of 
the fund’s alpha. 
The coefficient of CRE is significantly positive. This indicates that managers with 
high exposure to carbon intensive industries have been exposed to higher variation in the 
observed period between 2007 and 2014.  
The coefficient on the DILE factor is negative and significant. Fund managers who 
have balanced their portfolio towards the lowest emitters of each industry sector faced 
significantly less risk in terms of variation. This is in line with section 4.4.1 as low emitter 
stocks face less risk than high emitter stocks. However, a possible additional explanation 
might be as well that funds with the more progressive attitude towards environmental 
awareness are simply more risk averse in general.  
In contrast to the analysis of the performance, I find a positive relation between 
exposure to stocks with high carbon footprint and risk. Stocks with high emissions seem to 
have experienced - irrespective of the industry they belong to - more variation and thus cause 
more variation in the fund manager’s portfolio.  
To conclude, this section empirically confirms the fact that portfolios with stocks from 
carbon-heavy industries like oil, coal, etc. suffered from bad performance and more risk in 
comparison to other industry sections. However, interestingly, there seemed to be a difference 
on how strong a portfolio was balanced towards low emitter stocks. Investors who gave 
money to funds with a more environmental awareness could benefit from more performance 
and less risk. 
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Table XXXI: Analysis of the determinants of a fund manager risk 
This table shows the determinants of fund manager risk. Fund manager risk is measured by the monthly standard deviation based on daily fund returns. TNA is denoted in 
million $. Flow / TNA is the ratio between flow and the fund’s total net assets TNA. Expense ratio, 12b1 fee, rear load, front load are denoted in relation to a fund’s TNA. Age 
is declared in months. CRE is a fund’s carbon risk exposure and indicates the weight of all carbon risk stocks in the portfolio. DILE indicates the degree of investment in low 
emitter stocks and is computed by the difference of exposure in low emitter stocks minus exposure in high emitter carbon risk stocks. WCFP is the weighted carbon footprint 
of all carbon risk stocks in the portfolio. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The model 
includes specifications with time, style, and fund fixed effects. 
 
 
 Standard Deviation 
Log(TNA) 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)* (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Expense ratio 0.0100 0.0136 0.0165 0.0110 0.0089 0.0125 0.0155 0.0099 0.0100 0.0136 0.0165 0.0110 
  (0.66) (0.55) (0.46) (0.62) (0.69) (0.58) (0.49) (0.66) (0.66) (0.55) (0.46) (0.62) 
12b1 fee 0.0140 0.0140 -0.0064 -0.0049 0.0128 0.0127 -0.0075 -0.0059 0.0140 0.0140 -0.0064 -0.0049 
  (0.79) (0.79) (0.90) (0.93) (0.81) (0.81) (0.89) (0.91) (0.79) (0.79) (0.90) (0.93) 
Front load 0.0047 0.0051 0.0053 0.0048 0.0046 0.0051 0.0053 0.0048 0.0047 0.0051 0.0053 0.0048 
  (0.26) (0.22) (0.18) (0.22) (0.26) (0.22) (0.18) (0.22) (0.26) (0.22) (0.18) (0.22) 
Rear load -0.0042 -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0038 -0.0047 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0038 
  (0.59) (0.57) (0.58) (0.63) (0.56) (0.53) (0.53) (0.58) (0.59) (0.57) (0.58) (0.63) 
Age -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.51) (0.47) (0.49) (0.54) (0.51) (0.47) (0.48) (0.53) (0.51) (0.47) (0.49) (0.54) 
Flow / TNA -0.0011*** -
0.0011*** 
-0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0011 -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CRE 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DILE   -0.0000** -0.0000***     -0.0000** -0.0000***     -0.0000** -0.0000***   
    (0.01) (0.00)     (0.01) (0.00)     (0.01) (0.00)   
WCFP     -0.0003*** -0.0002***     -0.0003*** -0.0002***     -0.0003*** -0.0002*** 
      (0.00) (0.00)     (0.00) (0.00)     (0.00) (0.00) 
Intercept 0.0100*** 0.0100*** 0.0101*** 0.0101*** 0.0137*** 0.0095*** 0.0096*** 0.0138*** 0.0082 0.0083*** 0.0085*** 0.0101*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Time fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Style fixed No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund fixed  No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
N 15,946 15,946 15,733 15,733 15,946 15,946 15,733 15,733 15,946 15,946 15,733 15,733 
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4.4.5 Divestment in mutual funds 
As policy makers have to tighten up regulatory constraints on the use of carbon to target the 
2°C goal as set in Paris (2015), it is very like for carbon consuming companies to experience 
decreasing profits in the future. For this reason, it is of interest for investors to identify the 
funds that have anticipated this development and have already started to divest, i.e. lower 
their exposure to carbon risk stocks.  
So, the last analysis in this study investigates what kind of funds already started to 
divest during my sample between 2007 and 2014. For this purpose, I compute the divestment 
proxy 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 as the difference between carbon risk exposure in time t-1 and t. 
This yields: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡      (7) 
respectively 




𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1 log(𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑏2 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3 12𝑏1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏4 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑏5 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏6 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏7 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡       (8) 
The coefficient on log(TNA) is negative and statistically significant. Big funds tend to do less 
divestment. Similarly, the coefficient on age is negative, meaning that old funds as well do 
not divest a lot. 
To sum up, I find that new funds (small and young) tend to divest, i.e. become less 
invested in carbon-heavy industries over the observed period of time between 2007 and 2014. 
                                                 
45 Funds do not always report perfectly at equal intervals. However, this model assumes that these inequalities 
are not systematically. 
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The fact that young funds i.e. more recently founded funds engage in divestment might 
indicate that they follow a trend to become greener, as this is a trend that is well received in 
the population. 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
Carbon dioxide (CO2) accounts for about three-quarter of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and is considered to be the main driver for anthropogenic global warming (Pachauri 
Table XXXII: Analysis of divestment behavior 
This table displays characteristics of funds that engage in divesting trading behavior. Divestment is measured 
as the difference between 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 . TNA is denoted in million $. Flow / TNA is the ratio between 
flow and the fund’s total net assets TNA. Expense ratio, 12b1 fee, rear load, front load are denoted in relation to 
a fund’s TNA. Age is declared in months. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The model includes specifications with time, style, and 




Log(TNA) -0.0599* -0.0567* -0.0599* 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Expense ratio 0.7978 4.1144 0.7978 
  (0.97) (0.83) (0.97) 
12b1fee 36.2309 40.7758 36.2309 
  (0.44) (0.38) (0.44) 
Front load 3.3400 2.9911 3.3400 
  (0.52) (0.56) (0.52) 
Rear load -3.8783 -2.3808 -3.8783 
  (0.54) (0.71) (0.54) 
Age -0.0239*** -0.0238*** -0.0239*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Flow / TNA 0.2835 0.2679 0.2835 
  (0.40) (0.43) (0.40) 
Intercept 7.2976*** 3.2785** 3.4945*** 
  (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Time fixed Yes Yes Yes 
Style fixed No Yes No 
Fund fixed No No Yes 
R
2 0.09 0.09 0.09 
N 15,786 15,786 15,786 
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et al. (2014)). However recent initiatives as the Paris agreement 2015 proof that awareness in 
society increases and that policymakers are determined to put a stop to further rise in global 
temperature. This has the consequence that companies will be severely affected by structural 
changes in a carbon-constrained world. Extra costs due to tighter regulatory requirements, 
taxes or forced payment for carbon emission certificates will not only influence future cash 
flows of the companies involved but will have as well a direct impact on asset manager and 
investors. For this reason, analysis of the influence of carbon risk on different investor types 
is of vital importance. 
This paper contributes to this question by being the first study, investigating the 
implication and meaning of carbon risk for one of the largest investor group - actively 
managed domestic open end mutual funds.  
The study starts - as a foundation for the fund related analyses - with a comparison of 
stock characteristics and answers the following questions: How do companies from carbon-
heavy industries and carbon light industries differ? How are high CO2 emitters within the 
carbon-heavy industries different from low emitters? The main finding is that stock from 
carbon intensive industries had less performance between 2007 and 2014 (yearly Carhart 
alpha -0.0012 vs. 0.054) but similar monthly standard deviation (0.023 vs. 0.023). Low 
emitter stocks, i.e. stocks that belong to the lowest emission ejectors within their industry, 
performed better than high emitter stocks (Carhart alpha: -0.005 vs. -0.011) and experienced 
less risk (standard deviation 0.020 vs. 0.021). 
The second aspect investigated in this study targets on the fund industry and is of 
interest for both, policy makers as well as investors of mutual funds. It provides an overview 
about the fund manager’s portfolio allocation and exposure preference. Additionally, it 
investigates the mutual fund’s ownership structure in carbon risk stocks. This section enables 
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the reader to get to know the extent of which the fund universe is invested in carbon risky 
stocks and therefore is affected by the future changes to come. In concrete terms, the 
following questions will be answered: How much carbon risk exposure is within the fund 
universe? How can these values be interpreted? How did exposure change over time? Which 
percentage of all dirty stock companies does the mutual fund universe possess? One of the 
key findings is that the average fund portfolio - with decreasing tendency - consists of 23.49% 
carbon risk stocks. This is nearly 10% more than all carbon risk stocks make up in the CRSP 
universe. With an average ownership of 2.14%, actively managed US domestic open end 
funds only possess a small fraction of the US carbon risk companies in the CRSP universe. 
If policy makers want to tailor customized measures to facilitate the transformation 
into a carbon-constrained world, it is of advantage to know, what kind of funds face high 
exposure to carbon risk. So, this study contributes additionally to this question by finding that 
it is especially old funds with high expense ratio and low 12b1 fees that are exposed to a 
higher amount of carbon risk.  
The fourth contribution of this paper is a better understanding of how carbon risk and 
the manager’s preference of structuring the portfolio towards low emitter stocks is related to 
the manager’s performance and risk structure. Here the study describes the commonly known 
fact that stocks from carbon-heavy industries like oil, coal, etc. have suffered from bad 
performance and more risk in comparison to other industry sections between 2007 and 2014. 
However, the study interestingly reveals that there seem to be differences on how strong a 
portfolio was balanced towards low emitter stocks. Investors who gave money to funds with a 
focus on only the lowest emitters within each carbon intensive industry could benefit from 
more performance (0.8% Carhart alpha difference p.a.) and less risk. 
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Last but not least, as high carbon emitting companies are likely to face decreasing 
profits in the future, it is of interest for investors to see what kind of funds already started in 
anticipation to engage in divestment. Here the study reveals that especially small and young 
funds are taking lead to the way to a carbon -constrained world. 
To summarize, this study is the first to link carbon risk and mutual funds. It therefore 
helps investors and policy makers to get a better understanding of the opportunities and 
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The first contribution of this dissertation is the development of an approach that enables 
investors to assess fund manager stock picking skill more precisely than was possible in prior 
existing literature.  
In order to achieve this, we take into account that a fund manager is not always 
allowed to trade voluntarily based on valuation, but is sometimes forced to trade to meet 
investors’ liquidity demands. The TMM approach is the first to allow differentiation of both 
different trade categories. This not only facilitates assessment of the magnitude of the adverse 
effect of flow, but additionally allows a more precise evaluation of stock picking skill. Having 
this more accurate measure of skill provides several applications:  
First, it could be used within fund families to find suitable manager compensation or 
to help promote only the most skilled managers.  
Secondly, the results of the TMM can provide direct economic value for investors as 
we find that stocks that are bought based on valuation by a lot of managers tend to outperform 
their benchmark. The same holds true for funds that are able to execute a high proportion of 
valuation-motivated trading. Thus, identification of these stocks and funds is useful for 
investors to find investment opportunities that are more likely to outperform their benchmark 
in the future.  
The TMM is based on holdings data which are available because the SEC obliges all 
mutual funds to report their holdings at a quarterly frequency. Approaches based on holdings 
data have many advantages in comparison to fund-level analyses as they allow a less diluted 
look at a manager’s trading activity. However, Elton et al. (2010) name the following 
limitations. First, quarterly holdings data lack round-trip transactions, i.e. transactions that 
open and close positions within the reporting period are not observable in the data. Second, 
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the exact timing of the trades remains concealed as they could have occurred at any time 
within the quarter.  
However, on October 13, 2016, the SEC adopted a new portfolio form, obliging 
(among other things) all registered management investment companies (other than money 
market funds and small business investment companies) to file monthly instead of quarterly 
reportings.
46
 As of now, only every third of these monthly reportings becomes available to the 
public. However, it may be that in the near future, the SEC will give in to the pressure from 
the public demanding more transparency by granting access to the monthly reportings.  
Elton et al. (2010) estimate that quarterly reportings miss 18.5% of trades, all of which 
could be revealed with access to monthly data. Therefore, these monthly data could 
tremendously improve the accuracy of the TMM and the transparency of manager behavior in 
general in the future. For this reason it remains exciting to await new decisions from the SEC. 
The second issue addressed in this dissertation is carbon risk which is a topic that is 
more current than ever. When, at the beginning of June 2017, the current president of the US, 
Donald Trump, decided in a quite spectacular way, to step back from the Paris Agreement 
(2015), the world public refocused its attention back to climate protection and the 
corresponding reduction of greenhouse gases. In this context, paper two and three seem more 
relevant than ever.  
Paper two provides an overview of how the different investor groups are engaged in 
carbon intensive companies. This knowledge could help policymakers to tailor customized 
measures as well as investors to better locate the risk and extent of a possible burst of the 
carbon risk bomb.  




Paper three, in contrast, puts more focus on US domestic actively managed mutual 
funds. One of the key findings of this study is that investors who gave money to funds with a 
focus on only the lowest carbon emitters within each carbon intensive industry could benefit 
from more performance and less risk.  
However, one limitation of these studies is the data quality of carbon emissions that is 
provided by the Asset4 database. The database is available for free but based on voluntary 
reportings of the corresponding companies. Thus, the coverage is sparse and a selection bias 
cannot be completely ruled out. Data availability could be improved by additionally 
complementing further data providers such as CDP, South Pole, and MSCI. However, as 
these data providers do not have full coverage of all companies either, an even more 
promising approach is suggested by Görgen et al. (2017) who calibrate a risk factor that is 
applicable to companies without emission data as well. In any case, as the quality and 
availability of carbon-related company specific data will increase due to more public focus on 
this field, the potential of further research in this field is huge. 
Overall, this dissertation makes a contribution to a better understanding of two 
important challenges investors face - the risk of liquidity and the risk of carbon dependent 
assets. New data sources will improve the accuracy of existing studies. The potential to close 
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